Negotiating With Terrorists

Under what conditions should governments negotiate with terrorists?
{Department of War Studies, King’s College London}

‘You’ve got to be strong, not weak. The only way to deal with these people is to bring them to justice. You can’t talk to them. You can’t negotiate with them.’

George Bush articulated the above statement as part of a response to a press conference question concerning Al-Qaeda in 2003. He had clearly summed up his administration’s position on the subject in question – that negotiating with terrorists is a sign of weakness and should thus be avoided, even suggesting that merely talking to them was out of the question. His rhetoric remained consistent throughout his presidency regardless of the actor in question; if they could be successfully labelled ‘terrorist’ then dialogue was instantly deemed unacceptable and counter-productive. For instance, in 2008 he made an address to the Israeli Knesset mocking negotiations with ‘terrorists and radicals’ as half-baked attempts to ‘persuade them that they have been wrong all along.’[2] It is easy to be swept away by the conviction of these words, yet the administration’s actions did not always reflect Bush’s uncompromising language. In Iraq for example, the U.S. military was authorised to negotiate extensively with insurgents who were known to use terrorist tactics against coalition troops and civilians.[3] This essay will examine how and why the conditions arise for negotiations with terrorists and will conclude by suggesting best practices.

Peter Neumann has identified ‘a number conditions [which] must be met in order for talks to even have a chance of success’ – these can be simplified as three questions: who, when and how.[4] ‘Who’ refers to the nature of specific terrorist groups i.e. a government needs to assess ideology, propensity to violence and internal cohesion before committing to a course of action. The IRA made suitable negotiating partners for the British Government because their leaders realised that violence had limited utility and were capable of controlling the rank and file of the organisation. ‘When’ refers to the timing of negotiations in terms of strategic juncture, perhaps when the terrorists have recently suffered an tactical or operational setback, or are otherwise ‘questioning the utility of violence’[5]. ‘How’ refers to the actual format of the negotiations – ideally a ‘broad, multiparty process [which] exposes the terrorists to democratic practices.’[6] In Northern Ireland this was achieved through encouraging the participation of Sinn Féin in the democratic process.

Particularly contentious is Neumann’s assertion that ‘…a government should begin formal negotiations only after the terrorist group has declared a permanent cessation of violence’[7] which is directly contradicted by Jonathan Powell’s declaration that ‘it is always an error to set a precondition to a negotiation.’[8] There is a long, well documented history of deceitful or capricious behaviour by non-state ‘terrorist’ negotiators and the setting of preconditions is intended to provide assurances (mainly) to the government. However, the very act of securing these assurances, such as agreeing upon mechanisms for implementing and monitoring a ceasefire, can derail the whole process. The Government of Colombia has repeatedly experienced these frustrations with FARC.[9]

Neumann does not consider the conditions imposed by the nature of the state actor. It is important, for instance, to contemplate the effects of the counter-terrorism model adopted by the state in question.  In broad terms there are two ways for states to deal with the threat posed by those sub-state actors labelled ‘terrorists’. One might be forgiven for deducing from the above statement alone that George Bush advocates the criminal justice model, which was internationally prevalent until he dramatically declared ‘war on terror’ in an address to congress nine days after the 9/11 attacks. The war model sees terrorism as an act of war (as opposed to a criminal act), leverages military rather than law enforcement assets to provide a maximum force response and proactively searches for terrorists wherever they seek sanctuary (as opposed to the reactive, minimum force employed by the criminal justice model).

The problem with the war model is its high economic and human cost. Currently U.S. military deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan number 6,399[10], spending on the ‘9/11 wars’ is in excess of $1.3 trillion[11] and consequently the U.S. is growing weary of its open-ended commitment to ‘war on terror’. Hence, in direct contradiction of the above statement the U.S. sought after a negotiated settlement with terrorists in Iraq and similarly the search is now well underway for a negotiated settlement with the Taliban and Haqqani network.[12] This turn of events should not have been unexpected. Indeed ‘since the 1990s the majority of armed conflicts have been ended through dialogue, negotiation and compromise’[13]. The war model thus makes negotiations more likely, given the difficulty of developing a plausible theory of victory for Afghanistan or the war on terror more generally. Additionally, terrorists are arguably raised to the international plane (alongside nation-states) by the very act of declaring war on them. This puts the state at a relative disadvantage, hence the war model should only be used where a rapid military victory is realistic and sustainable, a notable recent example of which is the Sri Lankan campaign against the Tamil Tigers 2006-2009.

Bush’s rhetoric therefore seems increasingly nonsensical. However, there is one possible explanation: secret negotiations. Browne and Dickson have examined the secret negotiation policies of other world leaders who have made hard-nosed declarations which condemn terrorists and apparently forgo the possibility of negotiations. In 1993, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel reneged on an earlier assertion that his government would never negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). In 1999 José Aznar of Spain entered into peace talks with Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) despite his stated policy of no negotiation being ‘one of his party’s strongest weapons’.[14] Browne and Dickson go on to offer the plausible explanation that this behaviour is actually designed to reduce the state’s bargaining power, thus encouraging terrorists to come to the table. This is because engaging in secret negotiations while publicly decrying them increases the potential ‘audience cost’ for the state – i.e. ‘a leader who denounces a counterpart, but then negotiates with him anyway, and then fails to achieve an agreement may pay a particularly harsh price for appearing irresolute, incompetent, or both.’[15] Despite this risk, secret negotiations are preferable to public negotiations because they avoid conferring the same degree of legitimacy.

Avoiding the legitimisation of terrorism is a key aim of the criminal justice model. In contrast to the war model, terrorists are treated like regular criminals and denied any political recognition. However, this can also backfire, as was demonstrated by the hunger strikes of Bobby Sands and other IRA prisoners in 1981. The Government policy of avoiding public negotiations and offering only limited concessions behind the scenes (which were rejected) led to the death of ten prisoners and ultimately ‘growing polarisation between the two communities in Northern Ireland. In this context, the level of violence within the province climbed once more…’[16]

In summary, favourable conditions for negotiations exist when the government can easily activate existing, reliable channels of communication to negotiate secretly with a coherent and dominant terrorist leadership who have reached a strategic juncture in their campaign. Where possible, the government should use a criminal justice model over a war model, but should be open to the possibility of limited political concessions. Of course, these conditions are rare. However, they are more likely to manifest if dialogue is maintained. As Jonathan Powell puts it: ‘…we had to keep things moving forward like a bicycle…If we ever let the bicycle fall over, we would create a vacuum and that vacuum would be filled with violence.’[17] It therefore follows that to impose preconditions and risk stifling negotiations before they begin is bad practice: ‘It is best to leave the issue of weapons to the end of a peace process.’[18] At the time of writing, the government of Nigeria is struggling to open negotiations with the violent Islamic sect known as Boko Haram (BH). This has been a failure until now, but stands an increasing chance of success as the Nigerian government moves away from the war model towards the criminal justice model and attempts to open channels of communication without preconditions. However, the fractionalisation of BH and its lack of coherence, plus the absence of any apparent ‘strategic juncture’ do not bode well for the immediate future.

Citations & Bibliography

Tagged 9/11, al-Qaeda, Criminal Justice Model, ETA, FARC, George W. Bush, IRA, Negotiating With Terrorists, Tamil Tigers, terrorism, War Model