The Effects Of A Nuclear Iran

With reference to Israel’s nuclear strategy, would a nuclear-armed Iran spur proliferation among Arab states, strengthen Hamas and Hezbollah and disrupt oil shipping?
{Department of War Studies, King’s College London}

Having deposed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from its throne, the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme currently occupies the prized position as the mainstay of Middle Eastern debate. Intransigence and fiery rhetoric has gained Iran few friends, numerous enemies, and left the international community playing a guessing game as to how the conflict will evolve. There are few moments of clarity within this subject area. One, however, is the indubitable fact that the regime is pursuing the development of a weaponized nuclear capability. The IAEA revealed in May of last year that Tehran has been working on the construction of a nuclear detonator, a project that has absolutely no civilian purpose; its only use is in the detonation of a nuclear warhead.1

Thus this paper will initially question why Iran wishes to develop a nuclear weapon (NW), proceeding to analyse Israeli nuclear strategy and pre-emptively assaulting the question by declaring its non-viability: I argue that Iran categorically will not acquire a NW in the foreseeable future. As such, all latter arguments come with the caveat that they are inherently speculative and capricious. I argue that should Iran ‘go nuclear’ proliferation in the region is preventable, that a nuclear-armed Iran would be unlikely to assail oil shipping and I provide various differing situations, policy-recommendations and predictions regarding a nuclear Iran’s relationships with regional non-state actors.

Iranian Nuclear Desire: Why?

This section will analyse Iranian nuclear desire through the prism of Sagan’s three theories of nuclear proliferation: security considerations, domestic considerations and international norms. Resultantly corroborating the view that “nuclear proliferation cannot be explained by a single causal model”.2

Security Considerations

Iranian desire for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) was born following the Iran-Iraq War, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani explaining: “it was made very clear during the war that [WMDs] are decisive… . We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of [these] weapons”.3 Fear of Iraq metamorphosed into a fear of the United States following its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the declarations of intent for regime-change in Iran by the Bush administration augmenting “long-standing concerns about American intentions”.4

The view that “there is no way to deter the United States other than by having nuclear weapons” has been corroborated by the case of North Korea.5 The East Asian country has tested its NWs on more that one occasion and continues to provoke the powers that be;6 Iraq on the other hand did not have a nuclear ability and suffered the consequences. The lesson to be learned is apparent: the acquisition of nuclear weapons prevents American military intervention.7 Thus, given the plethora of American military forces in the region, when viewing Iran’s situation through a security prism desire for NWs is understandable.

Domestic Considerations

Irrespective of whether a NW serves the security of the state, such a programme is “likely to serve the parochial bureaucratic or political interests of at least some individual actors within the state”.8 Sagan outlines three groups that could stand to benefit from proliferation: (i) the nuclear energy establishment; (ii) the military (or an element within it), and; (iii) politicians presiding over a populace desiring nuclear capability.9

The evolution of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) into a “socio-military-political-economic force” with influence stretching far and wide within the Islamic Republic has, according to some analysts, afforded the entity greater control over Tehran than the Supreme Leader.10 With clout in the nuclear establishment, influence in the military and significant control over the political system (former Guard commanders hold positions in the Supreme National Council, the Expediency Council, and of course the current President),11 its desire for nuclear capability is undoubtedly a driving force within Iran. Additionally, polls suggest that 7 out of every 10 Iranians (both pro- and anti-government) support the nuclear programme, thus providing political incentives for politicians.12 Consequently domestic theory provides further answers to comprehending Iranian nuclear ambition.

International Norms

The last of Sagan’s theories argues that proliferation may not be determined by “leaders’ cold calculations about the national security interests [nor] their parochial bureaucratic interests, but rather by deeper norms and shared beliefs about what actions are legitimate and appropriate in international relations”.13 Examples given are the establishment of Air Malawi, Royal Nepal Airlines and Air Myanmar. None were founded to develop transport infrastructure within their respective countries, more because national leaders “believed that a national airline is something that modern states have to have to be modern states”.14

Iran is a proud country that often proffers its vision of itself as a regional power with aspirations to become a world leader. Due to the fact that the first five nuclear states hold positions of great power in international diplomacy (permanent seats in the United Nations Security Council), is it any wonder that a country with a vision such as Iran’s seeks to develop attributes that would allow it to achieve a status on par with its desires?

The Begin Doctrine

Menachem Begin’s famous words have long been adopted as the underlying doctrine behind Israeli policy towards neighbouring countries’ WMD manufacturing: “on no account shall we permit an enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against the people of Israel”. The dictum has been altered by later Israeli statesmen, including Ariel Sharon: “Israel cannot afford the introduction of the nuclear weapon… . We shall therefore have to prevent such a threat at its inception”.15 Such iteration has given birth to common sentiment that Israel will assault any proximate nation that seeks to develop a NW, building on the Begin Doctrine which referred more generally to any form of WMD. A cursory glance at Middle Eastern nuclear proliferation attempts and Israeli reactions demonstrates that Israel has not always held true to such an axiom.

Shlomo Brom provides various instances showing the lack of Israeli action pursuant to the more general Begin Doctrine: Egyptian chemical and biological weapons development in the late 1950s; Syrian chemical weapons programmes after the Yom Kippur War, and; construction of an Iraqi chemical plant in the early 1980s.16 Brom proceeds to remind the reader that Baghdad restarted its nuclear program after the bombing of the Osirak reactor in 1982 inducing no further military action from Jerusalem. Similarly, after Operation Desert Storm and the revelation that Iraq was again attempting proliferation, Israel opted to coerce European countries into preventing the supply of materials necessary for such a program to reach realisation rather that performing additional strikes.17 The decision to utilize solely diplomatic overtures was most likely due to the difficulties involved in striking the post-Osirak Iraqi programmes. Saddam Hussein learned the lesson, one that Iran has clearly taken note of, that the dispersal of critical sites is imperative.18 By spreading his nuclear program thinly across Iraq, Hussein distinctly limited Israel’s ability to undertake pre-emptive aerial strikes against such facilities. The effortless destruction of Syria’s sole nuclear reactor at al-Kibar is a secondary case in point as to the importance of such a strategy.

This, however, does not lead to the extrapolation that Israel will not attempt to incapacitate Iran’s nuclear programme through military means should current diplomatic efforts fail. It is beneficial to allow diplomacy to see as much sunlight as possible before being shelved (owing to the difficulties in assailing Iran), but this route is only viable for Israel until Iran nears breakout capability. Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), in which he evoked memories of the holocaust as reasoning to destroy Iranian nuclear ambition, is one of many examples of Israeli dictum stating the intention to prevent an Iranian bomb whatever the cost.19 President Obama’s speech at the event similarly reiterated that his policy is to “prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon” and that he would “not hesitate to use force… to defend the United States and its interests”;20 the last three successive American presidents have vocalised similar ultimatums.21

We will not see an Iranian NW unless we see radical regime change (excuse the pun) in Tehran and the emergence of a government that is able to rebuild relations with Jerusalem. Even with such an implausible scenario manifesting, it remains highly unlikely that a Western-friendly Tehran would be permitted to construct this most dangerous of weapons. Thus, to all extents and purposes, the remainder of this paper deals with purely speculative analysis on issues that are unlikely to ever come to fruition. As Fiore notes, “given the security culture in the country, no Israeli decision-maker can risk allowing a bitter ideological enemy to acquire enemy weapons”.22 There will be no nuclear-armed Iran in the near future.

A Nuclear Iran and Proliferation

It has been argued that the Israeli fear of a nuclear Iran is more due to the resultant threat of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East than an Iranian NW per se.23 The revolutions that have swept across the region over the year or so will conceivably lead to greater control of Arab foreign policy by the Arab street, thus animosity towards Israel will appear in future decision-making. Israeli apprehension is born out of the theory that an Iranian NW will, by way of the security concept mentioned previously, lead to proliferation in the region. Combine greater regional acrimony toward the Jewish state with an Arab nuclear capability and Israeli fears are comprehensible.

As Kenneth Waltz has argued, history demonstrates that the cascade concept (a state will rapidly construct NWs to counter strategic imbalance created by a hostile neighbour’s nuclear arming) is flawed. His argument is further consolidated by virtue of the fact that the fear of rapid nuclear proliferation has been vociferously audible in Western media almost every year since the 1960s, yet the world possesses only nine nuclear powers.24 Leaving this convincing argument to one side, would a nuclear Iran provoke proliferation in the Middle East?

Sagan’s aforementioned three theories assume that a state has the ability and the opportunity to develop a weapon.25 By inserting such a caveat we can eliminate numerous states from this predictive analysis of proliferation in the region. Whilst existing nuclear powers (China and Pakistan for example) may be willing to suffer international condemnation for the provision of nuclear technology to a strong regional player (perhaps Saudi Arabia) in return for the “strategic prize of security ties”, they are highly unlikely to do so for minor actors (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait etc.) – irrespective of the ability of such states to pay over-the-odds for the technology.26 It is highly unlikely that such states would be able to proceed with a NW program as a result of this. Furthermore, it is doubtful that these smaller states would risk alienating their American or Saudi security backers by developing a NW given that such powers “are the cornerstones for ensuring their autonomies from the larger states of Iraq and Iran”.27 Such stumbling blocks would likely lead to these states further cultivating their security relationships with the United States.28

Saudi Arabia, whilst currently lacking the technical infrastructure to develop a weapon,29 is the most likely to respond to an Iranian weapon with one of its own. Saudi fears of future American intervention and mistrust of Israel combined with the threat of an increasingly Iranian dominated Gulf region would likely result in the logic that a NW would offset such perils.30 The former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal iterated last December that “it is our duty towards our nation and people to consider all possible options, including possession of [nuclear] weapons”, a statement that goes some way to substantiating this argument.31 The ability and opportunity clauses are satisfied owing to Saudi financial reserves and the long-standing defence ties between the Kingdom and nuclear-armed Pakistan.32 But such an eventuality is containable through the prevention of Pakistani assistance, American guarantees of non-intervention in the Arab country, provision of conventional arms to mitigate increased Iranian influence and a guarantee of American nuclear deterrence against Tehran.33

Turkey is one of a handful of countries that have recently communicated their intention to commence a nuclear program, a progression that has been interpreted by some analysts as a “hedge against a nuclear-armed Iran”, presumably their first steps towards developing a weapon.34 Such an interpretation can be refuted not only due to Ankara’s warming relations with Tehran and disaffection with American and European sanctions against the Islamic Republic, but furthermore owing to Turkey’s long history of participation in non-proliferation efforts.35 The Anatolian country joined NATO within a few years of its creation and has hosted nuclear weapons under America’s umbrella for some time. Thus it seems improbable that Turkey would feel the need to proliferate following the advent of an Iranian weapon.

Predicting eventual political make-up and direction of both Egypt and Syria falls outside the scope of this paper, though such analysis is paramount to anticipating the potential for proliferation. It is widely assumed that Assad will eventually succumb to the opposition movement in Syria, though envisioning how the rebels will behave vis a vis Assad’s allies in Tehran or the United States is problematic (with evident repercussions as to their potential pursuit of NWs).36 What is clear, however, is that Israel would not permit a Syrian weapon. As the strike on al-Kibar in 2007 demonstrated, Israeli Air Force (IAF) action against Syria is not constrained by the impracticalities of an attack on Iran. Syrian anti-aircraft weaponry and its air force are military relics of eras gone by, and, unlike Iran, the distances involved in an aerial strike are easily surmountable. Furthermore, Syrian infrastructure relating to a nuclear program is negligible and “bar significant infusions of external assistance”, unlikely to be realised.37 It is doubtful that a future Syrian government’s cost-benefit analysis would negate to take account of such points.

With similar caveats for Egyptian predictions, whilst the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) retain influence within the Republic proliferation is unlikely. The United States could deduct the “estimated budget of any suspect research and development program” from American military and economic aid to Egypt.38 Such a development would reduce the SCAFs power given their use of the $1.3 billion p/a aid to shore up support for their political presence.39 Owing to current political dilemmas it is improbable that such an occurrence would be welcomed.

In summation, whilst nuclear proliferation in the region following Iranian nuclear attainment poses a real threat in the case of Saudi Arabia, the remaining major regional players are unlikely to initiate a NWs programme. Noticeably absent from this analysis is Iraq, owing to this author’s belief that given the current pro-Iranian government and continued American influence proliferation seems unlikely – though it is recognised that this may change in the future. An American nuclear umbrella, the provision of conventional arms and a strictly enforced prohibition on the transfer of nuclear technology would diminish prospects of proliferation dramatically throughout the region.

Non-State Actors

The effects of an Iranian bomb on non-state actors can be dichotomised as follows: (1a) Iran provides a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon; (1b) an Iranian weapon is stolen by a militant group; (2a) an Iranian bomb would provoke unsanctioned aggression from Hamas and Hezbollah (the proxies as belligerents), and; (2b) Iran would sanction aggression by these proxies (Iran as the belligerent).

Nuclear Provision & Theft

At the recent AIPAC conference, President Obama aired the fear “that an Iranian nuclear weapon could fall into the hands of a terrorist organization”.40 This could occur in two situations: either Iran provides a nuclear weapon to a militant group or such a group steals an Iranian weapon. The former is highly unlikely.41 Since 1979 Iran has, for the most part, employed a coherent, rational foreign policy;42 the provision of nuclear weapons to proxies that it does not possess full control over is not an action undertaken by any rational pragmatist. Iran would be held responsible for any resultant detonation and thus would be subject to the full retaliation of the United States and its allies.43

The latter, given that Tehran may not implement sufficient safeguards to prevent unintended detonation or theft,44 is of greater concern. However, in the eventuality of an Iranian weapon, would this not provide a suitable opportunity to reintegrate Iran into the international fold? If the West were to provide assistance in securitising the Iranian nuclear program, economic benefits aside, the construction of links between the pariah state and the West would be wholesome for all involved.

Hamas & Hezbollah

Fiore argues that Hamas and Hezbollah “might take the nuclear umbrella for granted and be more inclined to escalate minor conflicts with or without encouragement from Tehran”,45 an argument that is supported elsewhere.46 There have been conflicting messages originating from the Palestinian group regarding their response to a pre-emptive strike on Iran, but how would the two groups act should Iran cross the nuclear threshold?47

In the event that aggression was not sanctioned by Tehran, aggressive posturing by Hamas and Hezbollah would likely facilitate a destructive Israeli response. We can draw a parallel with the intifadas: Arab pacifism in the First Intifada limited the potency of the IDF; violence in the Second permitted the IDF to utilize its distinct military superiority. Iran would likely be reluctant to intervene in such a scenario as to do so would result in all-out war with Israel.48 That leads us to question whether Iran would galvanize the two organizations into action, a consideration that would ultimately prove or disprove Waltz’s theory that nuclear states act responsibly. It is unclear whether Iran would undertake such action, however it should be noted that if Assad were to fall the current supply-line would cease to exist,49 therefore the most feasible solution to supplying Hamas and Hezbollah would be through Iranian use of the Suez Canal (the precedent of which has been recently set).50 Whether Israel would allow such a transfer to take place is arguable, though the Jewish state has acted in the past (the Karine A affair) to stop similar actions in international waters.51 The Iranian backlash to Israeli action on this front is equally unpredictable.

To conclude this section, it is not only dubious to assert that Iran would provide a non-state actor with a nuclear weapon, but coequally to suggest that Iran would support Hamas or Hezbollah in the event of their non-sanctioned aggression against Israel. What is unclear is how Iran would weigh up the costs and benefits of stimulating proxy action against Israel. The threat of an Iranian weapon being stolen by another entity is preventable should the West seek to ingratiate itself with the Iranian regime.

The Oil Weapon

The Supreme Leader has emphasized Tehran’s willingness to “seriously jeopardize” energy supplies should the US attack or punish Iran, an assertion that has been repeated by various elements of the Iranian establishment.52 Such rhetoric is seized upon by neoconservatives to demonstrate the dangers that Iran poses and the need for conclusive military action to prevent Iran building a bomb and thus becoming ‘immune’ to retribution in the case of Iranian actions against shipping. But such logic is flawed as Iranian use of the oil weapon would be reactionary to intervention of some description.

The United States and the European Union have recently punished Iran through increased sanctions, an action that has not catalysed an Iranian response. Should Iran ‘go nuclear’ and thus achieve military immunity (if the N. Korea-Iraq paradigm of American non-intervention in nuclear-armed states holds true), America would not attack Iran and thus there would be no provocation to induce an Iranian reaction. The risk of Iran acting against the Strait of Hormuz emanates from a pre-emptive military strike that Tehran considers to be severely threatening and that fails to destroy Iranian military assets.53 Once Iran has crossed the nuclear threshold, America would not act against Tehran and therefore the reasoning behind an assault on oil shipping lacks foundation.

In Summation

Initially considering the reasons why Iran would desire a nuclear weapon, this paper proceeded to assert the improbability of Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon through an analysis of Israeli nuclear strategy and the Jewish state’s irrevocable attitude towards preventing any regional power challenging its military superiority. In the implausible circumstance that such an eventuality manifests, this paper has argued that of all the proximate states likely to view an Iranian weapon as a security threat, Saudi Arabia, with its financial reserves and strong links to Sunni Pakistan, is the most likely to attempt proliferation. This paper has posited that such a development is containable through the provision of a well-received and believed-in American nuclear umbrella, conventional arm sales to limit Iranian influence and stringent controls on the spread of existing nuclear technology. Syrian, Egyptian and Iraqi nuclear development is unlikely for a host of reasons, though inevitably such predictions rest on the ontogenesis of these states following recent upheavals.

Latterly, if the Iraq-N. Korea paradigm holds true, Tehran would have no reason to impact on oil shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, not least out of consideration for the detrimental effects on the Iranian economy. This paper further asserted the absurdity of the suggestion that the Islamic Republic would provide its proxies with a nuclear weapon. Whether a nuclear weapon would morph Iran into a regional aggressor, or whether its possession of such a bomb would provide the foundations for integration with the West has been left unanswered. Israeli nuclear capability allowed the Jewish state some semblance of security in a region of hostile Arab states. A Persian nuclear capability would serve the same purpose.

Tagged Begin Doctrine, China, Egypt, Hamas, Hezbollah, India, Nuclear Weapons, Oil Weapon, Pakistan, Proliferation, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey