Iran & The Bomb: When Theory Is Not Enough

If the Cold War peace was only an exceptional case, thus allowing Iran to build its own nuclear capabilities would not be the best option for the United States and Israel, which kind of theoretical contribution is useful for policymakers today?

During the past months a great deal of attention has been paid to Iranian nuclear activities, especially with regard to the best measures for the United States and Israel to adopt in order to tackle the threat of the theocratic regime acquiring nuclear weapons.

Although the United States and the European Union have applied diplomatic and economic sanctions with growing harshness in order to oblige Iran to withdraw, or at least to negotiate, its nuclear purposes, no decisive step towards a peaceful solution has been achieved. While on the political level the situation is stagnant, the theoretical debate, centred upon the so-called theory of nuclear deterrence, could provide useful hints and strategic suggestions for policy-makers.

First and foremost, it is worth remembering that the debate over the possibility of nuclear proliferation and the related threat to regional stability has already been discussed by Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan in 1981, and renewed in 2002 by the same scholars.

Waltz has always welcomed and sustained the idea that nuclear proliferation should guarantee peace and stability, basing this assumption on the historical record of the Cold War confrontation and the following nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan. As a result, in the last article published by Waltz in Foreign Affairs, nuclear asymmetry is conceived of as destabilizing given the objective gap in military power and capabilities between Iran and Israel. In addition, such a strategic shortcoming is worsened by the pre-existing ideological rivalry, an irrational aspect that could be worked out only by the logic of deterrence, deemed by Waltz as the most suitable option for assuring stability in the Middle East. In fact, following this reasoning, once Iran obtains its own nuclear weapons, itself and Israel shall be strategically balanced, and no other country in the region should have the incentive to acquire further nuclear capability, leaving the region more stable than today.

If a first sight the rational logic suggested by Waltz seems to be correct and attractive, it is worth considering that the realm of international politics is quite complex and security concerns are not the only characteristic that states are affected by. As Sagan pointed out as early as 1981, states pursue nuclear weapons building because of three major considerations: security, domestic dynamics and international norms.

Aside from the security concerns already discussed, domestic considerations such as the existence of parochial but powerful political groups or individuals (the nuclear energy establishment, the military complex and populist politicians) and the concurrent influence of international norms and shared beliefs on national leaders (such as the Iranian establishment pretension to be a regional power with global aspirations), are not elements of the Waltzian equation and as such alter the balance, perhaps bringing unpredictable consequences.

Indeed, as Sagan himself recalled, Cold War’s “nuclear peace” should not be deduced as the general rule or as an excuse for inaction with either arms control or non-proliferation; instead it remains an exception to celebrate and wonder about.

By the same token, Colin Kahl posits that Waltz ignores other crucial findings, such as the Iranian sponsorship of terrorist groups and militants throughout the Middle East. In addition, given Iran is a revolutionary and by definition revisionist regime, its leadership is not only concerned about its own survival and security, but it is also committed in spreading anti-systemic support through offensive tools in order to expand Iran’s influence and advance its revisionist agenda and ideology in the Islamic world.

Furthermore, critiques against Waltz’s argument are strengthened when Stephen Walt, a neo-realist scholar labelled as “defensive” (as Waltz is), doubts the contemporary validity and workability of the logic deterrence. As a matter of fact, such a strategy could work well once both sides are endowed with survivable forces – second strike capability – that make each of them unwilling to launch the first attack for strategic calculations.

If the Cold War peace was only an exceptional case, thus allowing Iran to build its own nuclear capabilities would not be the best option for the United States and Israel, which kind of theoretical contribution is useful for policymakers today?

Ironically, a partial answer could lie in history. By considering the current situation like a Cuban missile crisis in “slow motion”: Graham Allison has prefigured an inexorable showdown in which the US president will be forced to choose between ordering a military attack or acquiescing to a nuclearized Iran, as happened to Kennedy in the final Saturday. Then, the US President chose for a third way, namely a secret promise to withdraw US missiles from Turkey within six months after the crisis was resolved. Today the situation is much more complicated given the presence of a third nuclear party, Israel, and its domestic perception of threat. According to Allison, only in the case of the domestic situation in Israel reducing the likelihood of a unilateral Israeli attack will American policymakers plan a more reasoned strategy.

In conclusion, even international relations theory admits that the best way to prevent Iranian nuclear weapon is diplomacy, by diminishing Tehran’s need for a deterrent and offering a diplomatic deal that allow Iranians to keep their right for nuclear energy and removes their perception of threat.

Tagged Bomb, Colin Kahl, Graham Allison, Iran, Israel, Kenneth Waltz, Nuclear Weapons, Realism, Scott Sagan, Stephen Walt, Tehran, USA