Afghanistan Part 2: The Rise Of ‘Green On Blue’ Attacks

October 26, 2012 by Peter Kelly in Middle Eastern Politics with 8 Comments

The recent surge of ‘green on blue’ attacks in Afghanistan may be the most successful tactic in the history of this conflict towards this aim, the aim of breaking the will of domestic populations to support the wars for stability and security in the Middle East.

This is the second part of a two part series on Afghanistan. View the first part here.

By 2014 the ISAF may well have succeeded in creating an Afghanistan which can be secured by the government, supported by the significant infrastructure and well-trained military developed in the latter half of the conflict. In-fighting between Taliban moderates and extremists and the many groups in the Pakistan federal regions may prevent them developing the strength to challenge government forces. The departure of Western forces may kill off the Taliban’s chief propaganda engine and cut their recruits. The ISAF/UN efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan locals, already having shown some signs of success before the recent resurgence of extremist attacks in the wake of the rise of Pakistan-based groups over the increasingly moderate Afghan Taliban, may yet develop hostility towards yet more violence after the war involving the West is over.

What may result after 2014 is an unknown to even the most knowledgeable military thinkers and strategists. However what the withdrawal itself will show is more solid. What began with the retreat from Mogadishu in 1993 will be completed with that from Kabul in two years time. Western inability to stomach the sacrifice of lives necessary to win such long and non-traditional “bleeding” conflicts may prove the defining element of Western militaries in many conflicts to come. There is no lingering over the death of ever Kenyan to die in the fight of Al-Shabaab nor every Columbian kidnapped and executed by the FARC. Extremist knowledge and use of the strategy, outlined and shown at its most crippling by bin Laden, of goading the west with brutal terrorist attacks into wars which will eventually be defeated by their own public may well be the most devastating development since the advent of nationwide guerrilla warfare in 1800s Spain.

The Taliban will continue to fight to break the hearts of the West to win the minds of their leaders. And they will do so by the use of horrifyingly brutal tactics, by sowing sorrow and despair in those populations least able to cope with them. That is what the ‘green on blue’ attacks symbolise, the massacre of happy Afghans whose only crime was to dance, the murder of raped women and accused homosexuals. This is what terror is, to not know whether the man you taught to bear arms for their own freedom will simply wait till your back is turned before aiming that weapon at your head. Hopelessness and terror is their weapon, and as the ISAF prepares to withdraw they may be giving up their fight against it.

Unfortunately bin Laden was right, and is still winning victories long after his death. The major NATO powers, having not experienced a single conflict on their own soil in over half a decade, have lost the tolerance to violence and death our species had developed over millennia of traumatic and brutal existences. By contrast populations of those states ravaged by war in the Middle East have experienced such constant and repeated violent trauma that death and violence have become normalised. The idea that ten fighters were killed in a raid has become a part of life. In comparison every individual death of ISAF forces is broadcast across world media with sorrowful regret and sentimental remembrance of their life.

I in no way intend to criticise the way the West deals with death. I believe the increasing value placed on lives is a great testament to the culture of individuals rights and the freedom from violence and persecution the West continues to develop. However, it does not lend itself well to war. With every death the Taliban suffers, another willing recruit takes their place. Driven by the trauma of a country which has known no peace, to seek the community, purpose and order of extreme Islamism and with no sense of the sanctity of their own lives, only of that of their purpose. By contrast every ISAF death saps the will to fight of western forces and drives domestic populations away from the idea of a war which is worth fighting.

The recent surge of ‘Green on Blue’ attacks may be the most successful tactic in the history of this conflict towards this aim, the aim of breaking the will of domestic populations to support the wars for stability and security in the Middle East. This colloquial term for the attacks by newly trained Afghan forces on their ISAF allies covers the sudden growth of a new tactic to win the hearts and minds of western audiences. To convince them the war in Afghanistan, possibly a vital one for the fight against Islamist terrorism and regional stability, is both unwinnable and unjust. Why, when ISAF deaths are still so high (despite being nearer half of the losses suffered in the Iraq war), should we believe after a decade that Afghanistan can still be saved? Why, when we dedicate so many of our sons and brothers to the conflict, only to have them killed by those they are trying to help, should we believe the Afghans are deserving of our help?

This has even begun to seep into the highest ranking generals in ISAF forces, commanders vocalising their anger, frustration and sadness at the campaign which continues to drag on with no end in sight. This is no Iraq. The enemy are not collapsing, casualties have not been dramatically reduced by a troop surge, the government is not increasingly powerful or secure. In Iraq both military and civilian casualties dived from their peak after a troop surge which broke the back of extremist elements. In Afghanistan the continuous stream of combatants and extremist preachers from neighbouring Pakistan, outside the reach of the ISAF, is instead breaking the back of western morale. The battle for hearts and minds is one we are losing, it is the strength of religious extremists and their brutal tactics. No where is that more evident than when our hearts fall and minds recoil every time Green turns on Blue.

Photo credit: The U.S. Army

Tagged Afghanistan, Green on Blue, Hearts and minds, ISAF, public opinion, Taliban, the West, UN, USA

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About Peter Kelly

Peter holds an MSc in International Security from the University of Bristol and a BA in Philosophy and Politics from Durham University. His focus is on security and conflict issues in the western world, Middle East and Africa. He runs the site A Third Opinion at http://athirdopinion.net and www.facebook.com/AThirdOpinion

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Ciaran CareyOctober 26, 2012 at 6:54 pmReply

The premise of this article – as I perceive it – seems to rest on the assumption that the Taliban are responsible for all green-on-blue attacks. Were that assumption correct then the conclusions may have followed suit. However, that assumption is not correct.
The Taliban and other groups may have instigated some such incidents, or more likely piggy-backed on the first of them which were (note were) isolated in nature. The majority of green-on-blue attacks can in fact be attributed to individual grievances and/or instances of Afghan soldiers snapping after years of living and fighting in stressful conflict environments – just as westerners have been known to do. I appreciate there may be doubts and difficulties in ascertaining the exact causes and motivations in individual questions but that is all the more reason to be extremely careful in drawing definitive strategic-level conclusions from these incidents, as this article has done.
All that being the case,
NB: ‘green-on-blue’ is not a colloquial term. Quite the opposite in fact, it is a very specific military term.

Ciaran CareyOctober 26, 2012 at 6:59 pmReply

The premise of this article – as I perceive it – seems to rest on the assumption that the Taliban are responsible for all green-on-blue attacks. Were that assumption correct then the conclusions may have followed suit. However, that assumption is not correct.
The Taliban and other groups may have instigated some such incidents, or more likely piggy-backed on the first of them which were (note were) isolated in nature. The majority of green-on-blue attacks can in fact be attributed to individual grievances and/or instances of Afghan soldiers snapping after years of living and fighting in stressful conflict environments – just as westerners have been known to do. I appreciate there may be doubts and difficulties in ascertaining the exact causes and motivations in individual questions but that is all the more reason to be extremely careful in drawing definitive strategic-level conclusions from these incidents, as this article has done.
NB: ‘green-on-blue’ is not a colloquial term. Quite the opposite in fact, it is a very specific military term.

Peter KellyOctober 26, 2012 at 9:24 pmReply

Ciaran Carey Just because many of the green-on-blue attacks were individual grievances does not stop the fact that the Taliban has made it a strategy to infiltrate the new Afghan army and Police to carry out such attacks. This is part of what lead to the short freeze in recruitment and heightened checks earlier this year.Secondly, even if it were the case that the Taliban were not behind the attacks at all, this would not remove from the conclusions, which only rest upon the fact that the attacks occur, not who is behind them. The only conclusion harmed by this is that relating to Bin Laden and the one reference to it being a victory of the Taliban.Green-on-blue is a colloquial term, the same way ‘friendly fire’ is. Just because it has been adopted by the military for use does not mean it is not colloquial.

Ciaran CareyOctober 27, 2012 at 8:42 amReply

The military did not ‘adopt’ the term ‘green-on-blue’ – it IS their term, which has been adopted by the media. ‘Friendly fire’, for example, is a colloquial term (also used by the military, yes) but the military term for that is ‘blue-on-blue’.
I don’t wish to digress on semantics but the reason I mentioned that in the first place was to underline my point that is is vital to properly establish facts before drawing definitive conclusions, something which I felt has not been done in this article.
I don’t deny that the Taliban and other groups are actively seeking to infiltrate the ANSF and carry out such attacks. In fact, I pretty much said just that at the beginning of my second paragraph. However, that doesn’t lessen the need to draw attention to other causes of ‘green-on-blue’ attacks, such as widespread PTSD among the ANSF. That in itself is highly deserving of attention because it threatens to undermine the security transition.
In terms of (western) ‘hearts and minds’, I fully agree that the important fact is that these attacks happen at all, not who is behind them. However, I am rather taken aback that you would write an entire article on this subject on the premise that this is Taliban strategy, only to turn round and say it doesn’t really matter who carries them out. That’s quite a self-contradiction.
Long story short, this is a complex subject with, I agree, highly significant repercussions. All the more reason to properly establish facts (and terminology) before even thinking about drawing any kind of conclusion, let alone such sweeping and, frankly, out of context conclusions such as those made in the original article.

Peter KellyOctober 27, 2012 at 10:07 amReply

Ciaran Carey Actually the US military still uses the term ‘friendly fire’, blue-on-blue is preferred by other NATO powers.So far you have admitted that the important element is that the attacks happen at all, and that it is in part caused by a strategy by the Taliban. Considering my main conclusions are about the domestic populations of western countries nothing you have presented hurts those conclusions. Your main criticism seems to be based on the fact I should have gone into more depth and complexity in the issues. Although I would have been happy to if this were an academic piece, as it was it was already so long theriskyshift.com decided it was necessary to divide it into two articles. The most crucial facts I have established is a) That they happen. b) That they are (at least in part) part of a Taliban strategy. c) That western populations can’t stomach them. d) This is a primary cause of what could be a premature withdrawal from Afghanistan. e) This could be catastrophic. The only part you have actually found problem with is b, and then you have gone on to say that there isn’t anything actually wrong with b. It leaves the conclusions hardly out of context.

Ciaran CareyOctober 27, 2012 at 2:22 pmReply

Peter Kelly Ciaran Carey
So ‘green-on-blue’ was a colloquial term but ‘blue-on-blue’ was a military term? Or at least a NATO term if not a US term? [NB: Again, false.] This admittedly impressive ability to keep shifting the goalposts must be the inspiration behind the creative interpretation – again, impressively so – of my own statements.
Little wonder you maintain that your initial opinions/conclusions are entirely valid… no matter how often they change.If we’re not going to stick to facts, correct terminology or even offer a pretence of being willing to listen to alternative opinions – i.e. from people who actually know what they are talking about re: Afghanistan – then I’m done here.

Peter KellyOctober 27, 2012 at 3:37 pmReply

Ciaran Carey I was simply pointing out that ‘military’ and ‘colloquial’ are in no way necessarily mutually exclusive. I at no point have changed the conclusions I’ve made, but your determination to insist that just because one section is generalised the conclusions must be wrong is simply false. Seeing as you haven’t actually countered my last post in any way I assumed you were done already.

Ciaran CareyOctober 27, 2012 at 1:32 pmReply

So ‘green-on-blue’ was a colloquial term but ‘blue-on-blue’ was a military term? Or at least a NATO term if not a US term? [NB: Again, false.] This admittedly impressive ability to keep shifting the goalposts must be the inspiration behind the creative interpretation – again, impressively so – of my own statements. Little wonder you maintain that your initial opinions/conclusions are entirely valid… no matter how often they change.
If we’re not going to stick to facts, correct terminology or even offer a pretence of being willing to listen to alternative opinions – especially from people who actually know what they are talking about re: Afghanistan – then I’m done here.

8 Comments

Ciaran CareyOctober 26, 2012 at 6:54 pmReply

The premise of this article – as I perceive it – seems to rest on the assumption that the Taliban are responsible for all green-on-blue attacks. Were that assumption correct then the conclusions may have followed suit. However, that assumption is not correct.
The Taliban and other groups may have instigated some such incidents, or more likely piggy-backed on the first of them which were (note were) isolated in nature. The majority of green-on-blue attacks can in fact be attributed to individual grievances and/or instances of Afghan soldiers snapping after years of living and fighting in stressful conflict environments – just as westerners have been known to do. I appreciate there may be doubts and difficulties in ascertaining the exact causes and motivations in individual questions but that is all the more reason to be extremely careful in drawing definitive strategic-level conclusions from these incidents, as this article has done.
All that being the case,
NB: ‘green-on-blue’ is not a colloquial term. Quite the opposite in fact, it is a very specific military term.
Ciaran CareyOctober 26, 2012 at 6:59 pmReply

The premise of this article – as I perceive it – seems to rest on the assumption that the Taliban are responsible for all green-on-blue attacks. Were that assumption correct then the conclusions may have followed suit. However, that assumption is not correct.
The Taliban and other groups may have instigated some such incidents, or more likely piggy-backed on the first of them which were (note were) isolated in nature. The majority of green-on-blue attacks can in fact be attributed to individual grievances and/or instances of Afghan soldiers snapping after years of living and fighting in stressful conflict environments – just as westerners have been known to do. I appreciate there may be doubts and difficulties in ascertaining the exact causes and motivations in individual questions but that is all the more reason to be extremely careful in drawing definitive strategic-level conclusions from these incidents, as this article has done.
NB: ‘green-on-blue’ is not a colloquial term. Quite the opposite in fact, it is a very specific military term.
- Peter KellyOctober 26, 2012 at 9:24 pmReply
  
  Ciaran Carey Just because many of the green-on-blue attacks were individual grievances does not stop the fact that the Taliban has made it a strategy to infiltrate the new Afghan army and Police to carry out such attacks. This is part of what lead to the short freeze in recruitment and heightened checks earlier this year.Secondly, even if it were the case that the Taliban were not behind the attacks at all, this would not remove from the conclusions, which only rest upon the fact that the attacks occur, not who is behind them. The only conclusion harmed by this is that relating to Bin Laden and the one reference to it being a victory of the Taliban.Green-on-blue is a colloquial term, the same way ‘friendly fire’ is. Just because it has been adopted by the military for use does not mean it is not colloquial.
  - Ciaran CareyOctober 27, 2012 at 8:42 amReply
    
    The military did not ‘adopt’ the term ‘green-on-blue’ – it IS their term, which has been adopted by the media. ‘Friendly fire’, for example, is a colloquial term (also used by the military, yes) but the military term for that is ‘blue-on-blue’.
    I don’t wish to digress on semantics but the reason I mentioned that in the first place was to underline my point that is is vital to properly establish facts before drawing definitive conclusions, something which I felt has not been done in this article.
    I don’t deny that the Taliban and other groups are actively seeking to infiltrate the ANSF and carry out such attacks. In fact, I pretty much said just that at the beginning of my second paragraph. However, that doesn’t lessen the need to draw attention to other causes of ‘green-on-blue’ attacks, such as widespread PTSD among the ANSF. That in itself is highly deserving of attention because it threatens to undermine the security transition.
    In terms of (western) ‘hearts and minds’, I fully agree that the important fact is that these attacks happen at all, not who is behind them. However, I am rather taken aback that you would write an entire article on this subject on the premise that this is Taliban strategy, only to turn round and say it doesn’t really matter who carries them out. That’s quite a self-contradiction.
    Long story short, this is a complex subject with, I agree, highly significant repercussions. All the more reason to properly establish facts (and terminology) before even thinking about drawing any kind of conclusion, let alone such sweeping and, frankly, out of context conclusions such as those made in the original article.
    - Peter KellyOctober 27, 2012 at 10:07 amReply
      
      Ciaran Carey Actually the US military still uses the term ‘friendly fire’, blue-on-blue is preferred by other NATO powers.So far you have admitted that the important element is that the attacks happen at all, and that it is in part caused by a strategy by the Taliban. Considering my main conclusions are about the domestic populations of western countries nothing you have presented hurts those conclusions. Your main criticism seems to be based on the fact I should have gone into more depth and complexity in the issues. Although I would have been happy to if this were an academic piece, as it was it was already so long theriskyshift.com decided it was necessary to divide it into two articles. The most crucial facts I have established is a) That they happen. b) That they are (at least in part) part of a Taliban strategy. c) That western populations can’t stomach them. d) This is a primary cause of what could be a premature withdrawal from Afghanistan. e) This could be catastrophic. The only part you have actually found problem with is b, and then you have gone on to say that there isn’t anything actually wrong with b. It leaves the conclusions hardly out of context.
    - Ciaran CareyOctober 27, 2012 at 2:22 pmReply
      
      Peter Kelly Ciaran Carey
      So ‘green-on-blue’ was a colloquial term but ‘blue-on-blue’ was a military term? Or at least a NATO term if not a US term? [NB: Again, false.] This admittedly impressive ability to keep shifting the goalposts must be the inspiration behind the creative interpretation – again, impressively so – of my own statements.
      Little wonder you maintain that your initial opinions/conclusions are entirely valid… no matter how often they change.If we’re not going to stick to facts, correct terminology or even offer a pretence of being willing to listen to alternative opinions – i.e. from people who actually know what they are talking about re: Afghanistan – then I’m done here.
    - Peter KellyOctober 27, 2012 at 3:37 pmReply
      
      Ciaran Carey I was simply pointing out that ‘military’ and ‘colloquial’ are in no way necessarily mutually exclusive. I at no point have changed the conclusions I’ve made, but your determination to insist that just because one section is generalised the conclusions must be wrong is simply false. Seeing as you haven’t actually countered my last post in any way I assumed you were done already.
Ciaran CareyOctober 27, 2012 at 1:32 pmReply

So ‘green-on-blue’ was a colloquial term but ‘blue-on-blue’ was a military term? Or at least a NATO term if not a US term? [NB: Again, false.] This admittedly impressive ability to keep shifting the goalposts must be the inspiration behind the creative interpretation – again, impressively so – of my own statements. Little wonder you maintain that your initial opinions/conclusions are entirely valid… no matter how often they change.
If we’re not going to stick to facts, correct terminology or even offer a pretence of being willing to listen to alternative opinions – especially from people who actually know what they are talking about re: Afghanistan – then I’m done here.