All posts by Jamiesha Majevadia

Jamiesha is a contributor and Interviews Editor at theriskyshift.com. She has a BA Hons in French Studies with German from the University of Warwick and an MA Distinction in Terrorism, Security and Society from the Department of War Studies, King's College London. Follow her on Twitter with @Jamiesha_Maj or contact her on [email protected] All views expressed are personal and do not reflect the TRS editorial policy.

#VoxPopShambles: Nick Clegg on LBC Radio Weekly Call-In

 Nick Clegg has signed himself up for a weekly half-hour phone-in bollocking.

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You might already have heard that Nick Clegg, the fatigable, self-titled Deputy Prime Minister*, has decided to go on LBC Radio every Thursday morning to answer questions by members of the public, because he needs to be more in touch with the people. Yes, that’s right, he’s signed himself up for a weekly half-hour phone-in bollocking. I wasn’t the only one to receive this bit of PR news with some level of incredulity, bemusement and your basic expression of WTF.

This is an attempt to make amends for harsh criticisms that the corridors of Whitehall and Westminster are full of ‘professional politician’ with plastic smiles and insincere eyes, or the old classic of the Etonian boys club and the collective ignorance of the price of milk. But how good an attempt is this really? Yes, he’s engaging directly with anyone with enough time on their hands to listen to LBC, write to them, or wait on their phone-line listening to a tinny section of the Overture from Bizet’s Carmen on repeat (I’m guessing, I haven’t actually called them.) But with mild controversies from the get-go, such as the green onesie affair, in which ‘Harry from Sheffield’, who asked the DPM the only question to make him seem slightly less lizard-like, turned out to be a fairly active young Lib-Dem member, you’ve got to wonder what the real rationale is.

Granted, he has increasingly appeared to be the coalition government’s whipping boy, but this (brave?) decision does cause concerns about his credibility and standing within the coalition. Whilst Clegg goes in for a weekly ear-bashing from armchair generals and curtain-twitchers** from all over the country, Cameron appears on carefully selected discussion shows such as Daybreak on ITV1 (presumably because the BBC is probably too high-brow or too tainted now) to repeat his carefully rehearsed announcements and offer his carefully assembled smile-of-the-people. Perhaps some SpAd or spin guru suggested that Nick has the perfect face for radio (a cheap shot, I know).

Whether they were trying to boost public confidence in elected officials, increase the Lib Dem popularity ratings, or trying to slowly put Clegg out to pasture, audience reactions were as vociferous  as one might expect from a rage-brewing radio station such as ‘London’s Biggest Conversation’. It remains to be seen if this can repair damage to his personal and party reputation, damage which even the hilarious ‘apology’ video couldn’t undo.

 

*I haven’t got a huge problem with him, but I do wish he would retrieve his backbone from the back of the coalition sofa.

** Credit to www.ifyoulikeitsomuchwhydontyougolivethere.com – no, really, click it.

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Photo Credit: Chatham House, London

POW! Act Tough On Play Fighting And Vaccinate Against Mass Shootings

Last week on The Blog, Tom Hashemi discussed the case of a 6 year old at a Maryland elementary school who was suspended for pretending to shoot a classmate with his fingers. Cheeks puffed, thumb at the ready to pull the invisible trigger. POW. Tom considered the school’s decision to suspend the child an overreaction, even more so that his parents hired an attorney to fight the decision in the hopes of removing the mark from his scholastic record.

I offer an alternative perspective; what if that really was the right decision? Prefaced with the recent wave of mass shootings in schools, universities, places of work, worship and leisure, Tom argued that children should still be left to play as they see fit. However, we must ask ourselves where the social acceptability of gun-play came from. How through shoot-‘em-up video games*, film franchises such as Die Hard and Transformers and children’s toys, we have surreptitiously taught little boys from birth that guns are seriously cool.** Playing cowboys and Indians or cops and robbers is assumed to be a natural part of play.

I agree wholeheartedly that the child is not at fault. He is merely behaving as society – particularly American society, as saturated with firearms as it is – has dictated. Yes, these parents feel outraged that their child has been singled out, victimised even, but where I differ from my colleague is in the ultimate rightness of the school authority’s decision. It is high time we modified our children’s perception of acceptable play from the foundations and on a much bigger scale. Guns, even pea-shooters, should not be taken for granted.

This school’s decision should be taken as a message – the penny has dropped – gun culture has gone too far. Teach children not to emulate the errors of previous generations or to cry foul at something vague like the ‘freedom’ or the ‘right’ to act however one wishes, but rather to respect firearms, that they are not for play and that to wield one is irrevocably tied to a monumental responsibility.

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Photo Credit: Linh.ngan

 

*Let’s not get sucked into that debate about video games and the desensitisation from violence. There isn’t room here to go into it but I promise another article on The Blog in the near future.

** I also promise to discuss the issue of gendered toys very, very soon.

Cristina Fernández de Kirchner Has It All Wrong

Today the Guardian published an open letter by Argentina’s President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, urging UK Prime Minister David Cameron to recommence talks for the handover of the Falkland Islands, which she refers to as Las Malvinas. This brief correspondence, timed to appear as an advertisement in the Guardian’s print edition (p. 25) on the 180-year anniversary of the re-establishment of British rule on the islands, rehashes tired accusations of continued colonialism but fails to mention either sovereignty or self-determination.

She props her claim upon 48-year old UN Resolution 2065, waving it as a flag of transnational support for Argentina’s claim. However, this rather old but well-meant resolution, like most UN edicts, doesn’t say much at all except to promote talks in the hope of calming the waters. Being seen to say something, whilst not saying anything of great import. The letter even copies in Ban Ki-Moon, the secretary-general of the UN. On the sovereignty question, the UN Resolution that Kirchner is clinging to like a deflating buoy explicitly states that these discussion and both governments must take into consideration “the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)”. It seems the UK is alone in this particular concern.

This 212-word piece of showmanship highlights that Kirchner is clearly not insensible to the impending referendum on March 10th-11th 2013 in which the 3000-strong population of the Falklands will decide their own fate, despite Argentina’s unwillingness to recognise its validity. In between spiky remarks on the geographic distance between the Falklands and the UK (8700 miles), Kirchner fails to recognise a point made by many others in the past including myself, its not so much geographic distance as cultural difference that often matters most, and in that regard, Argentina couldn’t be further away from the islanders.

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Photo credit: Expectativa Online

The Falkland, Las Malvinas

Falkland/Malvinas: Identity Crisis
{Department of War Studies, King’s College London}

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Falklands

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ʻNational unity is always effected by means of brutalityʼ, Ernest Renan(1)

[dropcap]T[/dropcap]he thirty year anniversary of the Falklands/Malvinas War was commemorated in both Britain and Argentina just weeks ago with much ceremony, speeches and media coverage. For the past five years, Argentina has reasserted its claim to the islands more vocally, takings its complaint of the ʻillegitimateʼ UK presence to the United Nations. Tensions have been rising, with Argentina drumming up allies and imposing embargoes on vessels flying the Falklands flag in Argentinean waters, going so far as to persuade Chile to restrict or ban flights to the islands, further isolating the residents and increasing the sense of ʻencirclementʼ.(2) British Prime Minister David Cameron, among others, retaliated in a show of political posturing, not only with British naval presence near the Islands, but also rather curiously by accusing Argentina of possessing a ʻcolonialist attitudeʼ.(3)

National identity played, and continues to play, a significant role in the perpetuation of the conflict. The aim of this analysis is to review current displays of nationalism and portrayals of national identity in Argentina and Britain with reference to the domestic and international circumstances at the time of the invasion in 1982 and thus to discern the key factors and justifications on both sides of the conflict. In order to do this, the author will conduct a theoretical analysis of the construction and securitization of national identity in both nation-states. The analysis will first analyze Michael Billigʼs ʻbanal nationalismʼ, often associated with this historic dispute, incorporating its foundations in Roland Barthesʼ semiological analysis of myth-symbols. The analysis will then look at an alternative approach through Benedict Andersonʼs ʻimagined communitiesʼ. During the analysis a number of examples will be discussed including language, symbols, speeches and events from the years preceding the war to the present day in order to view the way in which these displays of nationalism and representations of national identity are perpetuated and received.

Definitions

Before we define nationalism and national identity, it is useful to have an understanding of what exactly constitutes a nation. The ʻnationʼ can be viewed as a distinctive group of people dwelling in a specific territory, the members of which may or may not be ancestrally related.(4) A ʻquasi-mythical bondʼ is assumed between the group and the territory.(5) Alternatively, the nation can be viewed as a social construction, the character of which forms the basis for political strategies.(6) It has been argued that the nation is a contingency rather than a necessity.(7)

In the framework of this thesis, it is useful to view the nation-state, as represented by its central political institutions, in a dual capacity as legitimate if its internal members, as well as external counterparts, accept its sovereignty. This is particularly relevant considering the popular opinion that the Argentinean military dictatorship at the time of the 1982 invasion sought a ʻjust warʼ to seal its sovereignty.(8) The same applies when considering successive British governments attempts to maintain popularity and unity amidst shifting political spectrums and economic crises, and how the island dispute can effect this in the creation of a common enemy.

Nationalism is ʻprimarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruentʼ(9) Alternatively, nationalism is ʻan ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a human population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential ʻnationʼʼ.(10) Another perspective is that nationalism refers to the largest group of people with common descent, whereas ʻpatriotismʼ refers to civic and state affiliations.(11) These definitions show the difficulty in agreeing upon a universal formula for nationalism because a particular understanding of ʻnationʼ is presupposed.

Expressions of nationalism are one form of identity, as well as ethnicity, religion, language and of course gender. National identity involves a form of political community, which implies common institutions, rights and duties as well as the assumption of a common and finite social space within a fixed territory. National ʻidentityʼ implies that the members identify with, and feel they belong to, this fixed space.(12)

The Bold…

Constructivism argues that ʻinterests and identities are informed by norms which guide actors (states) along certain socially prescribed channels of ʻappropriateʼ ehaviour[sic]ʼ.(13) States, in their formation, look to apparently ʻlegitimateʼ behaviors and actions, which are not known a priori, but are based on the domestic and international circumstances in which they find themselves. Following this framework it is possible to analyze the depictions of Argentine and British national identities, and also how they can be categorized as ʻhotʼ or ʻbanalʼ, but exist ultimately in the aim of ʻimaginingʼ or creating national fervor around the Falkland/Malvinas dispute, or in reaction to the circumstances surrounding the dispute.

National identity can be employed to create or consolidate political legitimacy. ʻHotterʼ forms of nationalism such as the existence of causa Malvinas and vocal Argentinean expressions of ʻincompletenessʼ add fuel to the fire for groups of people not (yet) connected to the dispute. It must be acknowledged that criticisms of extreme Argentinean nationalism came predominantly from British governments, and that the present Argentinean government has attempted to depict ʻcoolerʼ territorial nationalism in its use of the UN as arbitrator.(14) Nevertheless, bold displays of nationalism, such as visits to strategically chosen locations such as la plaza de las Malvinas in Ushuaia by President Kirchner, as well as aggressive political posturing between Kirchner and Prime Minister David Cameron, are in direct contrast to the everyday, unnoticed reminders of national symbols which will be discussed later.

However, there are two dimensions to such bold displays of nationalism. As Matthew Benwell and Klaus Dodds point out, public expressions of national identity and attempts at solidarity such as Kirchnerʼs 2010 visit to Ushuaia – far south of Buenos Aires – have limited audiences, environmental conditions reduce the potential for large crowds of ʻflag waversʼ. Whilst ceremonies serve as ʻbanalʼ yearly reminders of the continuing relevance of the conflict, it has limited reach because it presupposes a ʻquasi-mythicalʼ bond between the average Argentine and the Malvinas. The study conducted by Benwell and Dodds shows the opposite relationship to be true. Young people interviewed, most born at the time of or after the conflict, did not see a ʻpurposeʼ to the islands and some questioned, ʻwhat nation?ʼ, depicting a major disconnect between Argentinean political rhetoric on national belonging and the younger voting generations.(15)

One of the hottest examples of nationalism for both nation-states arises in the discussion of UN Resolution 2065 on the Falklands/Malvinas ʻquestionʼ, based upon Resolution 1514. Resolution 1514 is informed by a conviction that ʻall peoples have an inalienable right to […] the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territoryʼ.(16) Argentina bases its accusation of ʻillegalʼ British presence upon this resolution, whilst its own claim is ostensibly territorial, refusing to acknowledge the rights or interests of the Islanders, whom they see as ethnically British settlers on a territory of Spanish inheritance. Resolution 2065 explicitly cites the interests of the Islanders.(17) These differences in legalistic stances reveal diverse perspectives on national identity. The British government has maintained that ʻit is the inalienable right of the Falkland Islanders to decide where sovereignty lies.ʼ(18) The previous British assertion was on the basis of long-term peaceful administration of the Islands since 1833. On the other hand, Argentina upholds territorial integrity over the rights of the population which is at odds with liberal democratic principles as well as Argentinaʼs past as a colonial territory and former military dictatorship – a past from which it is eager to distance itself. D. George Boyce highlights the inconsistency of a ʻcomparatively […] new nation […] comprised largely of immigrants […] seeking to make good its claim to the Falklands on anti-colonial groundsʼ.(19) Both nation-states appear to have a negative view of colonialism in line with UN Conventions, yet both accuse the other of maintaining just such an attitude.(20)

British national identity, in its overt manifestations, is somewhat more muted than that of Argentina. However, in the past decade or so, successive British governments have attempted to construct a greater sense of national belonging, more akin to American ʻflag wavingʼ, in the light of international terrorism, economic crises and widespread rioting in 2011. Understandably, British national identity is currently somewhat fragmented considering potential Scottish evolution, which has led to more regionalized nationalisms. There has been a significant debate on ʻEnglishnessʼ, rather than ʻBritishnessʼ – a conversation that occurs in peaks and troughs during times of duress, and which has a significant impact on Britonsʼ ability to identify with the culturally identical, yet geographically removed, Falklanders.(21) Similar to the disillusionment of young Argentines, Britons are less concerned with continued administration of, and sovereignty over, the Islands and are arguably more attuned to political pandering and diversionary tactics in the domestic space.(22)

Comparing British positions past and present, the circumstances do not appear to be drastically different. Whilst the United Kingdomʼs place on the international stage has increased in prominence, as has Argentinaʼs in light of a burgeoning Latin American economy, there is still a worldwide economic crisis and a significant national debt. Recent budget cuts have presented different angles on the debate, for example, in late 2010, retired naval commanders wrote to The Times to express their concern at defense cuts and the reining in of armed forces in the region, amidst fears that this was tantamount inviting Argentina to invade again. However, it was suggested that relations with Argentina had improved drastically, Argentine veterans ʻcome [to the Island] to bury the ghost. People here donʼt show any aggression to them.ʼ(23) This exemplifies the major disconnect between the reality of the situation between the islanders, those explicitly connected to the conflict and the general public, as well as those with outside interests such as politicians, pundits and military personnel; this highlights the mixed receptions to and justifications for ʻhotʼ nationalism.

…The Banal…

Argentinean nationalism has been analyzed in relation to Michael Billigʼs concept of ʻbanal nationalismʼ. Benwell and Dodds argue that research into territorial nationalism should not ignore the wider spatial, temporal and everyday contexts, concluding that interest in the ʻMalvinasʼ issue varies in intensity depending not only on wider social, political and economic circumstances, but also on the geographic location under consideration and familial circumstances of the individual.(24) An important example is the national remembrance day of the war on April 2nd in both nation-states. For the average Argentine this provides a regular, annual reminder of the contemporary relevance of the dispute, bringing las Islas Malvinas to the fore of public consciousness. In Britain also the remembrance day brings weeks of media attention, causing parts of the public to fulminate against the issue.(25)

Benwell and Dodds highlight two issues with continuous ʻforgettingʼ in Argentina which constitute two sides of the same issue: in evoking the memory of the conflict as a representation of national identity and unity, the sense of ʻincompletenessʼ that the lack of sovereignty of the islands inflicts on Argentinean national identity is perpetuated. As discussed briefly above, this in turn is exacerbated by the disparity between the theatre of action and the individual – not only in the framework of the past conflict, but also in the present circumstances, in which the average citizen – Argentinean or British – cannot comprehend the reality of the islands in their geographically and/or culturally removed existence, but is nonetheless presented with an identity crisis.

The use of language, gendering in particular, is another aspect of banal nationalism in this case. Las Malvinas were referred to as ʻthe little lost sistersʼ, evoking a sense of feminine vulnerability.(26) Masculine terminology is ʻcolonizingʼ whilst feminine terminology is ʻcolonizedʼ.(27) In addition, the use of phrases and slogans such as ʻlas Malvinas son argentinosʼ (the Malvinas are Argentine) in rhetoric and propaganda perpetuates not only the use of a specific name – ʻMalvinasʼ rather than ʻFalklandsʼ – but also the possessive nature of the claim. Interestingly, such slogans refer to the islands only, and not the islanders themselves. However, Benwell and Dodds highlight that not all generations and regions identify with the narrative of ownership. Boyce states that the Islanders are seen as ʻBritish, kith and kin of the home nation, speaking in familiar accentsʼ.(28) It is implied that shared language and heredity unite people to a nation more forcefully than the Argentinean connection to the Malvinas soil.

Cultural symbolism adds to this picture under Barthesʼ thesis on the layering of meaning onto seemingly arbitrary objects. Argentina has created a furore by making concerted efforts to prevent civilian vessels flying the Falklands flag from entering their waters, also persuading vital British allies such as Chile to follow suit. This has been contested in the words of an Argentinean student as a ʻbig lie […] all they have to do is change the Falklands flag for a British flag and they can sail into portʼ.29 Whilst the islands are seen as a ʻsymbol of patriotismʼ, an Argentinean filmmaker, Tamara Florin, stated upon her visit to the islands that the people ʻeat fish and chips […], theyʼre Britishʼ. She states unequivocally that ʻthere is nothing Argentinean about the islandsʼ except perhaps the landscape and the active landmines left behind by Argentine forces during the conflict 30 years ago – a far from positive legacy to the islands.(30)

…And The Imagined.

Benedict Andersonʼs ʻimagined communitiesʼ is relevant when considering the aforementioned disconnect between the reality of the Islands and the ʻeverymanʼ Argentinean or Briton. Whilst some aspects of ʻbanal nationalismʼ are more effective (and affective) than others, in truth most citizens of either nation-state will never visit the islands, thus a sense of connectedness has to be ʻimaginedʼ or ʻinventedʼ in order to maintain the relevance of the issue. Some examples to this end have already been given such as language, gendering, place names and ceremonies. However, thus far neither hot nor banal nationalism has fully explained the perpetuation of these symbols and their assumed ʻnaturalnessʼ – both overt and unconscious displays of national identity have varied absorption and reaction depending on spatial and temporal geographies.

Anderson argues that after the French Revolution the ʻnationʼ transformed into an ʻinventionʼ widely available for any prospective nation.(31) Indeed, Argentinaʼs transformation to a liberal democracy, and more importantly its past as a Spanish colony, could be said to involve much of this ʻinventednessʼ and the island dispute is ostensibly a significant factor in the full realization of a truly Argentinean national identity. Carlos Escudé argues that the remaining territorial nationalism in Spanish-speaking countries is a hindrance in regional and international cooperation and integration, citing the ʻindoctrination of public opinion through the educational systems and the mass mediaʼ.(32) He continues that ʻthe educational system appears to have been successful in the dissemination of the myth of Argentine territorial lossesʼ.(33) Boyce also states that ʻBritish children were not taught (as were Argentine children) that the islands were rightfully theirsʼ.(34)

Vicente Palermo argues that the island dispute is ʻdivisive and polarising [sic]ʼ; its place at the forefront of Argentine foreign policy affects its external relations and its ʻthinkingʼ. Thus, Argentina is reacting to the continuation of the dispute in its present democratic format with policy that affects the construction and reconstruction of national identity. ʻReconstructionʼ indicates that national identity is constantly morphing and shifting in line with domestic, regional and international landscapes. As Escudé states, in the national imagining, the historically derived perceptions of territorial losses created sensitivities which escalated ʻgrotesquely unimportant issues, preventing a much needed economic integration [and contributed] to push Argentina into a ludicrous, unwinnable and criminal war in 1982.ʼ(35)

In contrast, British national identity is constructed and ʻimaginedʼ by maintaining the rhetoric of self-determination for the Islanders, and is thus also ʻinventedʼ (in this case) in reaction to the dispute. It is considered a noble cause to defend the rights of a people faced with territorial expansionists whose cartographic policy continually draws and redraws their habitat in ever-encroaching boundaries.(36) At the same time, whilst it is appealing to perpetuate British national identity as a champion of democracy, it is constructed with the same pride, tantamount to pigheadedness, seen in the Argentine constitutional governmentʼs unwillingness to approach a negotiation that both would consider a capitulation.

Conclusion

In summary, Argentine national identity has undergone major shifts in the past 30 years through changing governments and economic situations. Whilst asserting its claim as a liberal democracy through the United Nations, Argentina continues to display quite ʻhotʼ forms of nationalism which have the potential to cascade to future generations who inherit the conflict. However, as shown, the potential for this to occur depends on geographies and individual affiliations – the assumed ʻnaturalnessʼ of banal references to the Malvinas in the Argentinean ʻimaginingʼ have varying levels of absorption across different demographics.

British national identity is similarly framed upon its history as a colonial Empire, seen in the light of global decolonization and the increasing role of the United Nations as an extremely negative legacy for which it must atone. Thus, national identity rebounds and reacts to the dispute, Britain assumes the role of defender of a weak island populace and its right to choose sovereignty, turning the conflict on its head and returning the colonialist accusation to its Argentinean opposition. The current domestic situation in both nationstates reflects their need to perpetuate the sovereignty dispute – President Kircher is being forced to implement the first budget cuts that a Peronist government has ever had to do, as well as maintaining the status quo stance on non-capitulation to territorial claims to avoid the self-perpetuating sense of national ʻincompletenessʼ whilst contending with the cultural disconnect between Islanders and Argentines. British national identity is imagined and reinforced in relation to its domestic economic and identity crises, but more importantly, this identity is created and reinforced through reminders of ethnic, cultural and linguistic similarities with the Falklanders in order to bridge the geographic distance that creates a disconnect between the Islanders and Britons on the mainland.

In short, both national identities derive characteristics from their own histories as well as their interactions with each other in the the perpetuation of the conflict. Nationalist fervor in both nation-states varies in strength depending on domestic and international climates, but both perspectives on the islands are ʻimaginedʼ to create a sense of connectedness, and justification for claims to the Falklands/Malvinas.

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Endnotes

1 Renan (1990) p.11
2 Beckett (2012)
3 Ibid.
4 Ozkirimli (2005) p.18
5 Penrose in Jackson & Penrose (eds.) (1993) p.29
6 Mohan (1999) p.28
7 Gellner (2006) pp.6-7
8 Boyce (2005) p.3
9 Gellner (2006) p.6
10 Smith (2004) p.198
11 Walker Connor cited in Ibid. p.200
12 Smith (1991) p.9
13 Hobson (2003) p.146 emphasis added
14 Benwell & Dodds (2011) p.442
15 Ibid. p.445-446
16 UN (Dec 1960)
17 UN (Dec 1965)
18 House of Commons (2012)
19 Boyce (2005) p.11
20 Watt (2012)
21 Mohan (1999) p.29
22 Jenkins (2012)
23 Weaver (2010)
24 Benwell & Dodds (2012)
25 Watt (2012)
26 Escudé (1988) p.164
27 Hobson (2003) p.162
28 Boyce (2005) p.4
29 Goni (2012)
30 First citation Benwell & Dodds (2012) p.446, thereafter Goni (2012)
31 Anderson (1991) p.67
32 Escudé (1988) p.139
33 Ibid. p.157
34 Boyce (2005) p.6
35 Escudé (1988) p.152
36 Ibid. p.160

Bibliography

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London & New York: Verso [rev. ed.] 1991 [1983])
James Aulich (ed.), Framing the Falklands War: Nationhood, Culture and Identity (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1992)
Roland Barthes, Mythologies (Paris: Seuil,1957)
Matthew C. Benwell & Klaus Dodds, ʻArgentine territorial nationalism revisited: The Malvinas/Falklands dispute and geographies of everyday nationalismʼ, Political Geography, Vo. 30 (2011), pp. 441 – 449
Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London, California & New Delhi: Sage, 2002 [1995])
D. George Boyce, The Falklands War, (Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2005)
John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State [2nd ed.] (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 1993)
Peter Calvert, Border and Territorial Disputes of the World 4th edition (London: John Harper, 2004)
Peter Calvert, ʻSovereignty and the Falklands Crisisʼ, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs), Vol. 59, No. 3 (Summer 1983), pp. 405 – 413
Carlos Escudé, ʻArgentine territorial nationalismʼ, Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1988), pp. 139 – 165
Kevin Foster, Fighting Fictions: war, narrative and national identity (Cambridge: Pluto Press, 1999)
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism [2nd ed.] (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006 [1983])
Uki Goni, ʻʻThe Falklanders eat fish and chips. How can they belong to Argentina?ʼʼ, The Guardian, (January 28th 2012)
Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 [1983])
House of Commons, Daily Hansard Commons Debates: Falkland Islands, (January 31st 2012)
John Mohan, A United Kingdom? Economic, Social and Political Geographies, (London: Arnold, 1999)
Vicente Palermo, ʻFalklands/Malvinas: In Search of Common Groundʼ, Political Insight, (April 2012)
Ernest Renan, ‘What is a Nation?’ (translated by M. Thom), in Homi Bhabha (ed.), Nation and Narration, (London: Routledge, 1990 [1882]), pp. 8 – 22
Stephen A. Royle, ʻPostcolonial Culture on Dependent Islandsʼ, Space and Culture, Vol. 13, No. 2, (2010) pp. 203 – 215
Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, (London: Penguin, 1991)
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 1514 (XV) – ʻDeclaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoplesʼ, (December 14th 1960 – 15th Session)
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 2065 (XX) – ʻQuestion of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)ʼ, (December 16th 1965 – 20th Session)

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Tottenham Court Road Bomb Threats: The Trouble With Lone Wolves

A man is arrested after, it is believed, having threatened to detonate gasoline cylinders in an office building on Tottenham Court Road. Was this a lone wolf terrorist?

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[dropcap]T[/dropcap]oday an unknown man held siege in an office block on Tottenham Court Road in Soho, London. It was confirmed at approximately 15.08 that he has been arrested and is in police custody whilst the offices are being secured.

Apparently alone and armed with devices of an indeterminate nature, he walked into the offices of Advantage HGV, a Transport Logistics firm and declared that he ‘doesn’t care about his life. Doesn’t care about anything [and] is going to blow up everybody’. The man identified himself to a member of staff as Michael Green, a former client of the firm, who had apparently failed a HGV course through the company. Eye witnesses who managed to escape the scene described what could have been gas canisters strapped to the man’s body. Upon entering the office he allegedly coerced office workers to throw computer equipment and office supplies out of the windows.

The talk on popular social media website Twitter, as well as other forums, is that this must be terrorism, the man is undoubtedly a Lone Wolf. Whilst his name still hasn’t been confirmed, his motivations have already been concluded without any due thought to his state of mind, exactly what he planned to do in the offices of transport logistics company, and more importantly, why them? This is ostensibly a clear cut case, a disenfranchised client seeks revenge on the company he blames for his failures. But the media, and as a consequence, the public, see terrorists around every corner.

A Lone Wolf is an individual who is ‘located within a broader network of extremists’ but [displays] some level of contact with operational extremists.’ [Pantucci, ICSR 2011, p9] Lone Wolves can, in some cases, operate under varying degrees of command and control. Additionally, ‘real’ Lone Wolves ‘are part of a virtual network’. [Sageman cited in Ibid. p5] There are different distinctions between different types of individual terrorist actors, some (loners) become operational through a ‘passive [ideological] consumption’ whilst Lone Wolves are more likely to participate in online forums ie. non-physical interaction with like-minded people.

We know nothing about this man at this stage. What we potentially know is that he may be called Michael Green, may have failed a driving test, and may be depressed, or perhaps mentally ill. None of these snippets of spurious information can help us determine exactly what happened in Central London today. There is as of this moment no clear political motivation that could connect this to terrorism. ‘He was throwing stuff out of the windows – it looked like someone with a grievance’. Whilst grievances can lead to violence, terrorists motivated by a particular ideology that they believe will repair this grievance seldom allow potential victims to leave because they are parents or because they are pregnant.

If we are to understand Lone Wolves and other types of terrorist actors, and more importantly, if we want a clear picture of what happened on Tottenham Court Road – British journalism should leave the terrorism investigation to the Metropolitan Police and try to view the events of today as they are – a serious security incident which thankfully avoided injuries and fatalities.

An Introduction To Nationalism Theory

An introduction to modernism, primordialism and ethnosymbolism.

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“A man must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears; a deficiency in any of these particulars is not inconceivable […], but only as a result of some disaster, and it is itself a disaster of a kind.”
Ernest Gellner

Modernism

[dropcap]M[/dropcap]odernists see nations and nationalism as entirely modern phenomena, beginning predominantly in Europe at the advent of industrialization. Ethnic and cultural roots are irrelevant to this view because not all modern nations have them. According to prominent modernists, nationalism and its cultural symbols used in the construction of the nation are invented as a form of top-down control. This view has been frequently criticized by ethnosymbolists for giving no agency to the masses in a more bottom-up approach.

The foremost modernist is Ernest Gellner who hypothesized that the industrial age ushered in a need for new forms of identity to mend rifts in society brought about by major shifts in social mobility. According to Gellner, modern industrializing societies require cultural homogeneity to perpetuate economic success. The most prominent and entirely relevant critique of this view lies in its failure to account for the widespread popularity and virtual fanaticism that nationalisms frequently inspire. To this end, perhaps a review of the pre-modern roots and symbolic layering of such ties and identities can elucidate further.

Benedict Anderson, another key modernist, evokes ‘imagined communities’ as an explanation for feelings of kinship amongst citizens who will never meet, expanding on Gellner’s thesis, with a focus on print capitalism as the lynchpin for the rise in national comradeship. This ‘fuzzy’ label, whilst taken to mean ‘created’ can be mistaken for ‘illusory’ and again fails to account for the sheer power behind nationalist sentiment and leaves little legroom for ethnic, religious and racial factors, falling rather too close to post-modern, single-factor constructionism.

Modernism, though an important contribution to the understanding nationalism de jour, tends to focus on single-factor hypotheses or broad explanations that cannot explain why its influence is just as strong in countries that experienced industrialization at a much later stage and more importantly, why it is almost non-existent in other, incredibly industrious countries. Symbols and ceremonies of nationalism are only important ‘insofar as they are able to mobilize, co-ordinate, and legitimize the various sub-elites who seek power through control of the modern state.’ [John Breuilly 1993 summarized by Anthony D. Smith 1999 p7]

One view that all agree on is that nationalism is not necessary but only appears so, thus reinforcing its existence as a self-referential and self-reinforcing concept.

Primordialism

Primordialism is the perspective that nationalism derives from the early, ‘primordial’ [fundamental], roots and sentiments such as being born into a particular religious community, speaking a certain language or having or taking part in certain traditions and rituals. This ‘cultural’ or ‘naturalist’ view implies that the nation, or some early form of nation, is ancient and thus a natural part of human experience. Primordialism is most often associated with ethnic attachments and thus predominantly ethnic nationalism. Place of birth is another characteristic ‘attachment’ used to emphasize the longevity of nationalism. These attachments are felt as natural for the individual, ‘spiritual’ in character, and provide a foundation for an early ‘affinity’ with others of same or similar backgrounds. [Paul R. Brass in Hutchinson & Smith (eds.) 1994 p83]

On the extreme end of primordialist thinking sits Pierre van den Berghe whose socio-biological perspective holds that nationalism is a product of ethnic and racial ties, described as an ‘extended and attenuated form of kin selection’. [van den Berghe in Hutchinson & Smith (eds.) 1994 p97] His theory of ‘inclusive fitness’ reduces behaviours and social structures both great and small to the basic fundamentals of resource competition and ‘adaptive evolution’. [ibid p99] In this subcategory, nationalism is one of many identities to which individuals adhere (both consciously and subconsciously) to manipulate the ‘cost/benefit ratio of [social] transactions’ to ones advantage. [ibid p97] This reduces the importance of language, race, religion and symbols to ‘myths of shared descent largely correspond[ing] to real biological ancestry’. [Smith 1999 p4 emphasis added]

The primordialist branch of nationalism is popular because it recognizes the need for identification with the familiar and meaningful, rather than ‘absorption into a culturally undifferentiated mass [or] domination by some other rival ethnic, racial, or linguistic community’. [Clifford Geertz in ibid. p30] However, few groups around the world would be able to posit a serious claim to a ‘known common origin’ and thus, as in the modernist viewpoint, the belief in a shared descent is more important than any proof of its existence.

Similar to primordialism, perennialists are of the opinion that nations have existed since time immemorial but that they are infrequent, unnatural developments, occurring in peaks and troughs.

Ethnosymbolism

Ethnosymbolism emphasizes the importance of symbols, traditions, values and myths in the creation and continuation of modern nations. Most scholars agree that the nation has taken on a particular form and prominence since the mid-eighteenth century, but prominent ethnosymbolists such as Anthony D. Smith argue that early memories, myths and symbols hold a continued importance in the understanding of nationalisms.

Smith’s distinction between ethnic or ethno-cultural communities – which he calls ethnies – and ‘nations’ is generally accepted as valid in the exploration of early civilizations such as medieval Islam and Christendom, which show that ‘ethnic belonging’ had very strong roots and contributed to nation-formation. [Smith citing Armstrong, 1986 p15, see Ch3]

In some ways, this approach has often been labelled a ‘middle-ground’ or compromise between the first two opposing views because Smith and others maintain that nations themselves are modern creatures (or that nations were ‘consolidated’ in the modern, industrial and post-industrial age), but that the pre-modern roots espoused by primordialism are also vital to understanding peoples’ relationships to the nation.

Potential nations needed to take on ethnic models and components in order to thrive but ethnies also adapt to territorial and civic models in the route towards ‘nationhood’. Nations have been described as ‘quasi-kinship groups, regulated by myths of common descent, a sense of shared history, and a distinctive culture.’ [Hutchinson in Guibernau & Hutchinson (eds.) 2001 p75]

The evocation of identity and history – the main concern of nations when considering nationalism according to this theoretical branch – as ‘culture’, to an ethnosymbolist, means more than symbols and rituals but ‘the meanings and orientations to collective action that these evoke.’

Lessons From Northern Ireland: Coping With Islamist Terrorism In The UK

Where should the line be drawn between ethical practices and protecting the population from terrorism?

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[dropcap]T[/dropcap]he increased threat of Islamist terrorism in the United Kingdom since September 11 in the US and the 7/7 bombings in London has had a significant impact on the UK government’s ability to relate to its Muslim communities, especially in the light of alleged human and civil rights violations, accusations of an emerging police state and highly controversial cases of international cooperation in counterterrorism operations. Yet we only have to look back a few short years to the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland to see that these issues are not entirely without precedent.

The start of the most significant period of violence associated with Northern Ireland can be traced to the wave of riots and civil rights demonstrations by the Catholic communities seeking redress from the predominantly Protestant Stormont regime. Fears of a Catholic ‘revolt’ led to major violence from both communities and the failure of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, also predominantly Protestant, to stymie a virtual civil war led to the British Army being called in as ‘peacekeepers’. Increased sectarianism and changing global politics caused the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to split at the end of 1969, leading to the creation of the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA (PIRA). PIRA represented the more significant and enduring threat. What should have only been a short few weeks or months of British military intervention, devolved into approximately thirty years of antagonism and violence.

The British treatment of the PIRA’s campaigns led to much criticism including corruption, collusion with Loyalist forces as well as PIRA informers, interrogation methods amounting to torture and other ethical quagmires in the intelligence gathering methodology. Whilst the Islamist threat is ostensibly different – a globally dispersed and structurally advanced network incorporating unpredictable individual-led attacks – the British treatment of this issue in either a domestic or international framework has been dogged by a learning curve which implies a lack of knowledge transfer from its long history of dealing with ‘cells’ of Republican terrorists.

In the early 1970s, 14 PIRA members were interrogated using internment and the techniques of sensory deprivation such as stress positions, lack of food or sleep, hooding and continuous uncomfortable noise – methods that, in a 1979 inquiry, were labelled as ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ liable to strengthen ‘the propaganda campaign […] for the enemies of society’. The balance here was sacrificing long-term legitimacy for short-term gains for intelligence and imminent threat disruption. At this time the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was the main policing body and took the brunt of these criticisms, but the United Kingdom government and security services were not exempt for allowing these methods to continue.

The same techniques have reportedly been used on prisoners accused of being Islamist terrorists. There have been reports of mutilation, forced nakedness and other tortures such as the removal of fingernails. In contrast to the case of PIRA members mistreated in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and in Britain, those such as Salahuddin Amin, Rangzieb Ahmed and Rashid Rauf were captured or detained in Pakistan by the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) or the Intelligence Bureau (IB), two of Pakistan’s main security and intelligence agencies. They both confirmed, on several occasions, the presence of MI5 members. In some cases, the alleged MI5 members were aware that the detainees were being ‘processed in the traditional way’. Alam Ghafoor, detained in Dubai after the 7/7 London bombings, was so badly treated that, according to a consular official, he is likely to have signed confessions alluding to prior knowledge of the bomb plots. Another detainee, Zeeshan Siddiqui, was in such a terrible physical state that, upon being brought to court, the magistrate demanded that medical treatment be sought without delay.

Cicero once wrote ‘silent enim leges inter arma’ – ‘in times of war, the laws fall silent’ – and whilst most citizens would readily concede certain rights in a legitimate war, a ‘War on Terror’ does not fit the bill. Cofer Black, former head of counterterrorism at the CIA echoed Cicero in modern sporting vernacular, ‘after 9/11 the gloves came off’. However, more than stepping up the game, what the case of Islamist terror suspects highlights is a development from the Northern Ireland example in the ‘outsourcing’ of reprehensible methods and the virtual lack of an infrastructure for ethical international counterterrorism cooperation. This lacking was certainly an issue from the 1980s onwards when Prime Minister Thatcher attempted to work against the PIRA’s efforts to seek funding and arms from US-based support networks, European arms dealers as well as the PIRA’s troubling relationship with Libya’s Colonel Gadaffi. It would seem that, once again, history’s lesson has been ignored or misused in the creation of altogether more worrisome framework for liaison – strategic partnerships which allow tactical distancing from issues of accountability.

Since 9/11, what we have seen is a greater demand for openness in issues of national security and intelligence work. This need undoubtedly stems from the technological and fast-paced, information-sharing age we live in, but the ethical core of the issue remains the same. If embarrassing public inquiries are to be avoided, accountability and the long-term good of the United Kingdom’s citizens must be balanced with careful consideration. Many of these lessons could have been gleaned from the under-publicized and tardy Steven’s inquiry of 2003 into police and military collusion, which highlighted numerous failures in the military, intelligence and policing structures in Northern Ireland.

Whilst counterterrorism policy and scrutiny of police powers have come a long way since the 7/7 bombings, the virtual demonization of the UK’s Muslim citizens is only just beginning to be rectified. The main concerns are intrusive counterterrorism measures such as racial profiling and the monitoring of university students which prejudice Muslims as well as other ethno-religious communities in much the same way that ‘stop and search’ campaigns prejudicially target black people. It is easy to forget that Irish people were subject to the same invasive scrutiny in airports at the height of the Troubles. Essentially, the ethical problem between Northern Ireland and islamist terrorism has transferred from a national prejudice, to a racial and religious prejudice.

In addition, ethically dubious debates such as raising the maximum allowable period for detention without charge to 42 days has also, perhaps somewhat exaggeratedly, raised the concern of ‘special powers’ to hold suspects and gain large amounts of personal information. Reminiscent of internment without trial during the Northern Ireland Troubles, the social and political cost of such detention measures risk drastically outweighing the success of threat prevention which is seldom publicized.

The threat of terrorism does not constitute a trump card for governments to neglect or do away with civil liberties, but where do we draw the line between ethical practices and protecting the population?

Terrorism: Strategy Of The ‘Weak’?

Is terrorism a strategy of the ʻweakʼ?
{War Studies Department, King’s College London}

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[dropcap]F[/dropcap]rom the supposition in the question, we can assume terrorism is primarily a strategy, suggesting a long-term political agenda. The term ʻweakʼ is subjective and must be considered within a contextual framework such as political representation, operational dynamics and psychological factors in the group strategy. The first aim of this analysis is to take an instrumental approach and review the tactical advantages and limitations in terrorist methodology which can show how the strategy works primarily for disadvantaged actors.

As an extension of the instrumental approach, the second part of this analysis hinges upon psychological factors in the terrorist strategy.[1] In the context of a long-term political agenda, this piece will demonstrate how terrorism is used as a form of communication for social influence which differentiates it from other forms of political violence.[2] In discerning several variables involved in the process of transmission, this analysis will highlight the parameters within which those using terrorism as a strategy can feasibly be described as ʻweakʼ. An analysis of the terrorist strategy requires an adequate definition of the phenomenon which has proved problematic[3]. This study is based on the definition offered by Hoffman:

Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) [or targets]. It is meant to instill [and exploit] fear within, and thereby intimidate a wider “target audience” [through violence or the threat of violence].

The crucial aspect of this definition for our purposes is:

Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack to effect political change.[4] ʻ[S]mall organizations resort to violence to compensate for what they lack in numbersʼ.[5] Some of the tactics that terrorists use in order to address this imbalance include assassination, targeted or indiscriminate bombing, kidnapping, hijacking and suicide terrorism.

Whilst terrorism is often ʻan unavoidable instrumentʼ when other routes of political coercion are depleted, terrorism can be an effective strategy for weak actors.[6] Terrorism extends the combat zone infinitely until populations hitherto unrelated to particular ideologies or groups, cannot escape their influence, conveying terrorists as more dangerous than a small, ʻweakʼ group. This is evident in the aftermath of 9/11 – the ʻWar on Terrorʼ. This pronouncement significantly impacted international security, creating a climate of fear and a constant ʻstate of warʼ. This target reaction, or overreaction, keeps terrorism, and al-Qaeda, at the forefront of public discourse.[7] Furthermore, the inability to win this ʻwarʼ creates a disconnect between a target regime and its population, either diminishing government support or increasing the ranks of terrorists. Concurrently, terrorists risk an ʻescalation trapʼ which alienates potential constituents through increased, indiscriminate violence.[8] Awareness and manipulation of this ʻrisky shiftʼ determines success. An example of this is the FLNʼs (Front de Libération Nationale) harrying of the French military, causing violent repression and highlighting the ʻbankruptcy of French ruleʼ.[9] Tactical provocation plays to the strengths of organizations ordinarily incapable of openly confronting the target.

Terrorism is economical for ʻweakʼ groups, requiring fewer participants, funds and resources. Despite the view of suicide terrorism as irrational, there is a “strategic logic”[10] in the perception that martyrdom is purposeful, and will confer status and remuneration to oneʼs family. Additionally, the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) hijacking of an El Al flight in 1968 as leverage for the release of Palestinian terrorists in Israel constituted an evolution in the terrorist strategy. This shows strategic adaptation and the manipulation of a conflict situation by comparatively ʻweakʼ actors.

Group structures reflect the compromise between efficiency and security which affect weak actors.[11] A top-down military structure can be operationally strong but rendered weak if ʻdecapitatedʼ.[12] Contrastingly, groupuscules within a network strengthen security but not efficiency. More recently, ʻacephalousʼ indoctrination and training is available on the internet, removing the need for contact but drastically increasing the chances of failure. Despite limitations, these factors highlight how the tactical and organizational advantages of terrorism can facilitate weak actors. This does not preclude that a strategy of pure terrorism can succeed. History has shown that installing a successor is more difficult than removing an enemy, requiring the mobilization of mass support and conventional participation. An example would be ETAʼs (Basque Homeland and Freedom) permanent cessation of armed activity in 2011 in favour of ʻdirect dialogueʼ.[13] As demonstrated, Crenshawʼs rationalist argument that terrorism constitutes an equalizer in an unequal struggle is accurate.[14]

Analyzing certain psychological factors can help explain perceived weaknesses of those that employ terrorism. Analytically viewed, terrorism is a form of communication designed to coerce change inflicting or threatening violence. This ʻpropaganda of the deedʼ constitutes an ʻindirect dialogueʼ. Although not mutually exclusive, terrorism differs from other forms of political violence because the ʻmessage functionʼ is the primary goal rather than territorial acquisition. Technological advances have assisted rapid information transmission to significantly larger audiences, rendering terrorism ʻrepugnantly voyeuristicʼ. [15] This can circumvent official channels to broadcast globally, allowing terrorists to set the conditions of the targetʼs response and blur the distinction between the (arbitrary) target of violence and the target of influence. This removes the targetʼs control of a situation and diminishes its capacity to protect its citizens.

However, ʻ[t]errorists and newspapermen share the naive assumption that those whose names make the headlines have powerʼ.[16] Audiences may be alerted to the terroristsʼ cause, but the subsequent stages in social influence campaigns present weaknesses. Terrorists cannot gain political transformation without attaining approval and retention of their message. Retention requires frequent and increasingly spectacular terrorists acts, stretching the capabilities of weak actors, and potentially causing feelings of rejection, anger and inurement, rather than fear and capitulation.[17]

Whilst the use of terrorism can provide short-term concessions and ʻinfamyʼ, it is not ideally suited to a long-term social influence campaign. Incumbent regimes have the power to publicly dismiss terrorists as ʻweakʼ and directionless, providing a counter-narrative to the terrorist rhetoric. In less liberal states, terrorist acts may receive no publicity whatsoever, halting them at the primary stage of exposure.

Whilst terrorism can occur as a response to perceived grievances and the loss – or fear of loss – of power, it can also occur in response to political concessions which Narodnaya Volya, for example, viewed as a sign of weakness. A more recent example is ETA whose group rationality, it can be argued, mutated to mere survival. Their ʻonly sense of significance [came] from being terrorists [and to cease violence] would be to lose their very reason for being.ʼ[18] This view indicates group psychological weakness through an absence of alternative identity and would concur with Postʼs supposition that terrorist violence constitutes the end itself, rather than a means to political change.

Terrorism is often viewed as a strategy of weak actors because its main purpose is to coerce political change through the psychological manipulation of fear. With rapid media available at any hour, terrorist acts can command the attention of billions. Terrorism comprises a strategic, military logic, designed for an operationally weaker side to engage a foe in combat without risking annihilation. In pure numbers, a terrorist group is without a doubt weaker as is always the case when sub- and non-state actors engage an enemy, but the methodology employed and the adaptability of organizational structures provide forms of tactical armour which help level the playing field and act as an ʻequalizerʼ.

Whilst these methods have often been successful in past (ethno-/nationalist) conflicts, it must be noted that this success depended on concessions. To reiterate, pure terrorism as a strategy does not often succeed because popular support cannot be achieved without the cessation of violence and the transition to conventional political participation. As is often the case when attempting to define typologies in terrorism studies, the strategy often depends on the specific context of a given conflict. However, we can conclude that terrorism constitutes a ʻstrong strategyʼ for ʻweak actorsʼ who wish to destabilize a more militarily capable target by removing its capacity to control a situation and fulfill its primary goal of protecting its citizens. Beyond this stage, the strategy of terrorism becomes a negative influence, often destroying the promise of political change.

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[1] This piece will avoid the study of individual psychology. Despite attempts at profiling, there are no infallible determinants – social, political, economic or otherwise – that explain why some turn to terrorism. See Bognar et al (eds.) (2007).
[2] Gerwehr & Hubbard in Bognar et al (eds.) (2007) p. 87
[3] Schmid (2004)
[4] Hoffman (2006), pp. 40-41
[5] Crenshaw in Reich (ed.) (1998), p. 11
[6] Heinzen in Laqueur (ed.) (1979) p. 55
[7] Neumann & Smith (2005) p. 591
[8] ibid., p. 588
[9] Hoffman (2006) p. 61
[10] Pape (2005)
[11] Neumann (2011)
[12] Cronin (2011) p. 31
[13] The Guardian (20 Oct 2011)
[14] Summarized by Post in Reich (ed.) (1998) p. 35
[15] Cronin (2011) p. 4
[16] Laqueur (1979) p. 252
[17] Gerwehr & Hubbard in Bognar et al (eds.) (2007) p. 88-91
[18] Post in Reich (ed.) (1998) p. 38

 

Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work”, International Security, 31(2) (2006), pp.42-78

Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism
Strategy”, International Security, 32(4) (2008), pp. 78-105

N.O. Berry, “Theories on the Efficacy of Terrorism” in Paul Wilkinson and A. Stewart (eds.),Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987)

Bruce Bongar, Lisa M. Brown, Larry E. Beutler, James N. Breckenridge and James
Zimbardo (eds.), Psychology of Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)

Michael Burleigh, Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism (London: Harper Press, 2008)

Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist behavior as a product of strategic choice” in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind(Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990, republished 1998)

Martha Crenshaw “The psychology of terrorism: An agenda for the 21st. century”, Political Psychology, 21(2) (2000), pp. 405-420

Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends : Understanding The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, (Princeton, NJ,: Princeton University Press, 2011)

Paul K. David and Kim Cragin (eds.), Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2009)

James DeNardo, Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985)

The Guardian, “Basque separatists announce end to violence” – video, (20 Oct 2011), full video at:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2011/oct/20/basque-separatists-endviolence Accessed: 1st Nov 2011

Lawrence Freedman, “Terrorism as a Strategy”, Government and Opposition, 42(3) (2007), pp. 314–339

Karl Heinzen, “Murder” in Walter Laqueur (ed.) The Terrorism Reader: A Historical
Anthology, (London: Wildwood House, 1979) pp. 53-64

Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006)

Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism”, International Security, 31(1) (2006)

Walter Laqueur, “Terrorism – A Balance Sheet”, in Walter Laqueur (ed.) The Terrorism Reader: A Historical Anthology (London: Wildwood House, 1979), pp. 251-267

Walter Laqueur, A History of Terrorism (New Brunswick, NJ: London 2001, originally
published: New York: Little, Brown, 1977)

Carlos Marighella, Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla (Montreal: Abraham Guillen Press, 2002). Full text: www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urbanguerrilla Accessed: 1st Nov 2011

Peter R. Neumann, Lecture titled “Terrorist Groups: Organization and Processes” in
Terrorism and Counterterrorism module, (London: Kingʼs College London, 2011)

Peter R. Neumann and M.L.R. Smith, ‟Strategic Terrorism: The Framework and Its
Fallacies”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 28(4) (2005), pp. 571-95

Peter R. Neumann and M.L.R. Smith, The Strategy of Terrorism: How It Works, and Why It Fails (London: Routledge, 2008)

Robert A. Pape, Dying To Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, (New York:
Random House, 2005)

Jerrold Post, “Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a product of psychological
forces” in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies,States of Mind (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990, republished 1998)

Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004)

Alex Schmid, ‟Terrorism – The Definitional Problem‟, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 36(2-3) (2004), pp. 375-419

Leonard Weinberg, “Turning to Terror: The conditions under which political parties turn to terrorist activities”, Comparative Politics, 23(4) (1991)
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