Tag Archives: ETA

L’ultima Carta Dell’ETA: La Resa Condizionata

Per troppo tempo l’ETA ha perseguito una strategia politica fallimentare, o addirittura inconsistente: prova ne sia la sua crisi attuale. Il gruppo armato sembra voler giocare, come ultima carta, l’offerta di trattative per lo scioglimento. Che già si preannuncia una mossa perdente.

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[dropcap]L’[/dropcap]organizzazione armata separatista basca ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna) ha reso nota la disponibilità a trattare il proprio scioglimento, negoziando così la cessazione definitiva delle proprie attività. Al primo impatto, una mossa del genere potrebbe sembrare politicamente significativa. Tuttavia, una riflessione più approfondita rivela l’imbarazzante scarsità di alternative a disposizione dell’organizzazione terroristica e, a parte la potenziale minaccia di attacchi terroristici, tale scelta dimostra anche l’irrilevanza dell’ETA per il futuro costituzionale e politico dei Paesi Baschi e dell’intera nazione spagnola.

L’ETA, in ogni caso, non sta offrendo una resa incondizionata. Lo scioglimento rappresenterebbe piuttosto il culmine di una trattativa incentrata sul dialogo e sulle conseguenze del conflitto, concernenti le questioni dei prigionieri politici, dei rifugiati e della demilitarizzazione dei Paesi Baschi. Inoltre, l’ETA pretende che Francia e Spagna “riconoscano la propria responsabilità […] per la violenza ed i crimini di cui si sono macchiate duranti il conflitto”.

Si tratta di richieste pesanti: non solo difficili da attuare, ma politicamente inaccettabili per i governi di Madrid e Parigi. Per l’ETA, la disponibilità allo scioglimento sembra quasi una concessione, quasi si trattasse di una delle tante rivendicazioni finora espresse. Se questa interpretazione fosse corretta, sarebbe ancor più evidente l’anacronismo che caratterizza tale organizzazione.

Non è un mistero che l’ETA sia ormai parecchio indeboilita. È impressionante la regolarità con cui i suoi presunti leader operativi sono stati arrestati: in quattro anni, soprattutto in Francia, ne sono stati catturati circa dieci. L’ultimo – Izaskun Lesaka, fermato nel mese di ottobre – ha portato a ventiquattro, nel solo 2012, il numero totale degli arresti riconducibili all’organizzazione. Come se non bastasse, il  predecessore di Lesaka, Oroitz Gurruchaga Gogorza, è stato arrestato solamente a maggio, innescando così un cambio ai vertici talmente repentino e improvviso che ha inevitabilmente danneggiato la capacità operativa dell’ETA.

Per farla breve, nessun politico spagnolo o francese potrà mai essere disposto a trattare con un gruppo terroristico  agonizzante. Al contrario: secondo Jorge Fernández Díaz, Ministro dell’Interno spagnolo, la resa incondizionata sarebbe l’unica azione accettabile da parte dell’ETA.

I frequenti arresti tra i vertici dell’organizzazione terroristica sollevano un’altra questione, ispirata alla celebre massima di Mao Tse-tung, secondo la quale “il guerrigliero deve muoversi tra il popolo come un pesce nuota nel mare”. Con tutta probabilità, per evitare la cattura dei suoi uomini, l’ETA ha dovuto adottare rigide misure di sicurezza, che pure si sono rivelate infruttuose: una tale chiusura al mondo esterno fa dubitare che l’organizzazione sia capace di comprendere la situazione attuale di Spagna e Paesi Baschi. In effetti, l’ETA sembra aver perduto ogni contatto con la realtà, e le sue recenti affermazioni lo confermano.

Attualmente, i problemi maggiori per il governo di Madrid, presieduto dal Partito Popolare (PP), riguardano la crisi economica e la disoccupazione; per non parlare della questione della Catalogna, che rappresenta una seria minaccia alla Costituzione e all’integrità nazionale. Il partito di maggioranza, con le sue radici franchiste, non è un soggetto politico favorevole alla negoziazione diretta con l’ETA: già in tempi migliori, simili trattative sarebbero state improbabili, ma nell’attuale situazione di crisi si rivelerebbero pressoché impraticabili. Semmai, l’adozione della linea dura nei confronti dell’ETA potrebbe addirittura giovare al governo di Mariano Rajoy, procurandogli qualche sporadico consenso in una situazione tanto complessa.

Allo stato attuale, la minaccia separatista più consistente non è di matrice basca, ma catalana; e poco importa che le elezioni del 25 novembre scorso abbiano in qualche modo indebolito la posizione di Convergència i Unió, il partito al governo della regione. Infatti, il presidente catalano, Artur Mas, medita un referendum per l’indipendenza nel 2014: ciò rappresenterebbe la più seria minaccia all’integrità territoriale della Spagna. Di conseguenza, è impensabile che il governo di Madrid sia intenzionato a dialogare con un’organizzazione terroristica,considerando che, per contrastare un movimento indipendentista democratico come quello catalano, ha già intenzione di appellarsi alla Corte Costituzionale.

In quanto alla regione basca, il maggiore partito democratico di matrice nazionalista è, da sempre, il Partito Nazionalista Basco (Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea – EAJ;  o Partido Nacionalista Vasco – PNV in spagnolo). L’EAJ/PNV ha amministrato la regione per trent’anni, intrattenendo complesse relazioni con i movimenti nazionalisti più radicali, ETA inclusa. L’attuale priorità del Partito Nazionalista Basco è di riottenere la maggioranza, sottrattagli nel 2009 da una coalizione tra socialisti e  moderati, lanciando a Madrid una sfida indipendentista simile a quella posta da Convergència i Unió in Catalogna. Pertanto, in un tal scenario, l’ETA non avrebbe alcuna possibilità di far valere le proprie rivendicazioni, tantomeno le sue avulse strategie politiche.

Seppur sia ancora presente e attiva, l’ETA gode di un peso politico marginale e di una capacità operativa insufficiente. Per troppo tempo l’organizzazione ha perseguito una strategia politica fallimentare, o addirittura inconsistente: prova ne sia la sua crisi attuale. Il gruppo armato sembra voler giocare, come ultima carta, l’offerta di trattative per lo scioglimento. Questo tentativo, come risulta ormai chiaro, si preannuncia perdente in partenza.

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Articolo tradotto da: Antonella Di Marzio

Articolo originale: ETA’s Last Throw Of The Dice?

Photo Credit: www_ukberri_net

ETA’s Last Throw Of The Dice?

ETA’s current predicament is a damning indictment of their political strategy – or lack thereof – over many years and at this moment in time their conditional offer of disbandment appears to be a desperate last throw of the dice, one which will undoubtedly fail.

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ETA

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The armed Basque separatist group, Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), issued a statement offering to disband and negotiate a definitive end to their operations. On the surface, this may appear to be a significant move on the part of a group widely classified as a terrorist organisation. In reality, it merely demonstrates to what extent ETA have run out of options and, aside from the security threat which they likely still pose, just how irrelevant they have become to the political and constitutional future of their Basque homeland and of Spain.

ETA’s offer to disband is not unconditional. It would be the culmination of a “dialogue agenda” focusing on the consequences of the conflict, namely prisoners, refugees and the demilitarisation of the Basque Country. Furthermore, ETA continues to insist that Spain and France “recognise the truth and responsibility… [for] the violence which they have used during the conflict and the crimes they have committed.”

Those are substantial demands: difficult in practice and impossible politically for both Madrid and Paris. ETA appear to believe that their offer to disband is a bargaining chip equal to their list of demands. If that is so, it clearly shows how detached they have become from the realities of today.

ETA are weak and everybody knows it. Their alleged operational leaders have been arrested, usually in France, with striking regularity – perhaps as many ten in four years. Most recently, Izaskun Lesaka was arrested in October, bringing the total number of suspects arrested in 2012 alone to twenty-four. The previous operational leader, Oroitz Gurruchaga Gogorza, was arrested in May and such a high turnover in leadership positions over a sustained period can only have lead to a serious degradation of ETA’s capacity.

In short, no politician in Madrid or Paris will ever accept any demand from a terrorist group widely regarded as being in its death throes. Indeed, the Spanish Minister of the Interior, Jorge Fernández Díaz, simply responded that the only statement he wished to hear from ETA was that they had “unconditionally disbanded.”

The frequent arrests of ETA leaders begs another question, based on Mao Zedong’s famous assertion that “a guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.” Since ETA operatives have presumably had to adopt stringent security measures to avoid capture (albeit unsuccessfully) then how can they understand the current political and social realities of the Basque Country and of Spain? The answer must be that they do not, a conclusion borne out by their recent statement.

The Partido Popular (PP) government in Madrid is wrestling with an economic crisis and mass unemployment, not to mention a serious threat to the constitution and territorial integrity of Spain emanating from Catalonia. Given the political – i.e. Francoist – origins of the PP, they would hardly have been inclined to negotiate directly with ETA at the best of times. In these very bad times, that is a political impossibility for Mariano Rajoy and his government. If anything, taking a hard line on ETA may even help them score some political brownie points to offset, however slightly, the major problems they face.

Currently the real separatist threat to Spain comes not from the Basque Country but from Catalonia, even if elections held there on Sunday somewhat weakened the position of the ruling Convergència i Unió (CiU) party. Nonetheless, Catalan President Artur Mas’ plan to hold a referendum in 2014 is the most serious threat to the territorial integrity of Spain for some time. In that context, it is incredible that ETA could think that the Spanish government would agree to talk to them – a ‘terrorist’ organisation – when Madrid has already made clear that it will appeal to the constitutional courts to counter a democratic independence movement in Catalonia.

As for democratic nationalism in the Basque Country, the largest party has always been Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea (Partido Nacionalista Vasco or EAJ-PNV), who held power in the autonomous region for thirty years until 2009 when they were ousted by a Socialist-led, pro-centrist coalition. Aside from the complex relationships EAJ-PNV have had in the past with more radical Basque nationalists, including ETA, their current priority must be to regain power and mount a challenge to Madrid similar to that of the Catalan CiU. In this context, and contrary to what they apparently believe, ETA have no place in the current political firmament of the Basque Country.

ETA are at best an extremely marginal player in political terms and evidently severely degraded in operational terms. Their current predicament is a damning indictment of their political strategy – or lack thereof – over many years and at this moment in time their conditional offer of disbandment appears to be a desperate last throw of the dice, one which will undoubtedly fail.

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Photo credit: www_ukberri_net

An Introduction To Terrorist Organisational Structures

An introduction to conventional hierarchy, cells, networks and leaderless resistance.

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[dropcap]I[/dropcap]t is generally considered that there are four forms of structure employed by terrorist groups: conventional hierarchy, cellular, network & leaderless resistance. The decision to employ one of these formats is grounded in the security/efficiency trade-off of each; conventional hierarchy providing the most efficient and least secure, leaderless resistance the opposite: highest security, least efficiency. It is worth stating in advance that certain terrorist groups prohibit us from placing them into just one category; the term ‘fuzzy boundaries’ is used to describe those organisations that transgress the stated demarcations. For example, Hezbollah utilize a conventional hierarchy in Lebanon whilst maintaining networks in the West. It is the purpose of this piece to briefly explain these structures and provide some examples of how they have been implemented by various groups (N.B. the security/efficiency numerals presented after each variant are purely indicative).

Conventional Hierarchy (Security: 1, Efficiency: 4)

Audrey Cronin has argued that all terrorist groups would, in an ideal world, utilize the conventional hierarchical structure, thus attempting to cross the border into full-blown insurgency. Such a structure equates to the mimicking of the hierarchy employed by modern-day military forces: the pyramid shape is populated at the bottom by footsoldiers (privates), managed by their officer (corporals) and so on until the top of the pyramid and the high command (generals).

Employing such a structure provides an organisation with the greatest efficiency (this format aids the specialization of units in, for example, intelligence, recruitment, finance and support), ease of information transfer, and allows it to enforce a coherent long-term strategy. With regard to ideology-based organisations, it aids ideological unity among its members – an important issue given the need to maintain such unity within these groups. The weaknesses of this structure have been ably discussed by Beam (an American white nationalist), albeit with reference to the subversion of the American State. Beam argues that such a system is extremely dangerous when utilized against a state, especially in this era of electronic surveillance: should the state infiltrate or otherwise compromise the organisation at the higher echelons of command, the whole entity is compromised. Similarly, should the high command be killed or captured, there is a very real possibility of the group disintegrating. Thus, a more subversive organisational construct is of greater use for a terrorist group that seeks to remain in existence in the face of the “War on Terror”. The early Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) provide good examples of the use of this structure.

Cellular (Security: 2, Efficiency: 3)

The cell structure incorporates a network within a hierarchy. Each cell (generally comprising three to ten individuals) possesses one member (‘X’) – usually the leader – who maintains contact with the organisation’s high command. Often only one element of the command will have contact with X, and X will generally have no knowledge of other cells, or other members of the high command. Should X be compromised, the information that she is able to provide is distinctly limited: whilst her cell will likely be rendered inoperable, she is unable to provide details of other cells, nor is she able to provide details of the high command other than the commander that she has dealt with. Similarly, if a member of X’s cell is compromised, the only information they can provide is that of their cell and X.

Whilst the high command is removed from contact with their footsoldiers, this structure suffers from the same problem with that of the conventional hierarchy: should the high command be compromised the entire organisation could topple. Beam writes that “the efficient and effective operation of a cell system … [is] dependent upon central direction, which means impressive organization, funding from the top, and outside support”. The central command must maintain their hold on each individual cell in order to maintain strategic unity and thus remove the possibility that cells will act alone, thus potentially damaging the organisation as a whole (for example, say that a renegade AQ cell was responsible for 9/11. The United States would likely still have responded with an attack against the entire AQ infrastructure, even if the attack had not been initiated by the high command).

Network (Security: 3, Efficiency: 2)

An organisational network structure comprises numerous nodes/cells connected/interconnected in differing ways. Variations of such a network, each with different levels of security & efficiency, can include:

1) Chain
A linear trail: A – B – C – D – E. For a message to get from A to E it must pass through B, C & D.

2) Hub
One node acts as the hub for all other nodes: A is connected to B, C, D & E. B through to E have no connection with each other. Should B wish to send a message to E, it must go through A. This does not equate to A being the lead cell, simply the hub cell.

3) Star
The same as for the hub network, but each cell has contact with its two neighbouring cells in addition to A (the central node). So, aside from A, B would connect with E & C; C with B & D; D with C & E, and; E with D & B.

4) All-Channel
Each node is connected to every other: A is connected to B, C, D & E; B to A, C, D, E; C to A, B, D, E; etc.

Such structures result in the decentralisation of decision-making, permitting initiative from each cell and thus making it impossible to topple the organisation in one go. As Arquilla, Ronfeldt & Zanini explain, such an organisational structure can appear to be acephalous (headless) & polycephalous (multi-headed) at the same time. The points of the network with greater connectedness indicate their importance (so, for example, if a hub network was in position as per the example above, targeting A would provide for the greatest effect on operational capability).

Network structures, whilst benefiting from far greater security than conventional hierarchy/cell structures, suffer from low efficiency given the difficulties in getting a message out to all members of the network, with clear implications for organisational unity and strategic coherence. This, however, does not detract from the danger that such a structure poses.

Leaderless Resistance (Security: 4, Efficiency: 1)

The last structure that this piece will analyse is the most secure and the least efficient. An Environmental Liberation Front (ELF) recruitment video describes it perfectly: “Remember, the ELF and each cell within it are anonymous not only to one another but to the general public”. In the truest form of leaderless resistance there is no contact between cells and/or the central command. However, given the spread of the internet and the ease of international communication, such a finite requisite has been watered down (see Pantucci’s lone wolf classifications).

Such a structure (or, more appropriately, a lack of) poses the greatest difficulties to counter-terrorist agencies given the minimal connection between the organisation (or the propagandist of the ideology), and the actor committing the terrorist act (the subscriber to the ideology). As with networks, this form of structure is incalculably aided by developments in information technology (the transformation of terrorism from ‘old’ to ‘new’, see Neumann).

Such a structure is highly secure; it is almost impossible to know which viewers of a website have been radicalised and whether they would ever come to commit an act. But the lack of control over such actors can be incredibly damaging. Should an act be committed by a member of an ideological network in the name of a specified group, resultantly negatively affecting said group’s public support, the group cannot disassociate itself from the act, regardless of its lack of participation in, or support for, the act. Further, given that the organisation propagating the ideology has no control over its ideological movement, such a movement may well disintegrate owing to a lack of developments: these sleeper cells may never wake from their slumber.

An example of leaderless resistance actor would be Roshonara Choudhry.

[toggle title=”Sources & Related Texts”]

Arquilla, J. & Ronfeldt, D. (2001), Networks and Netwars

Beam, L. (1983), Leaderless Resistance

Cronin, A. (2006), How al-Qaida Ends

Hoffman, B. (2006), Inside Terrorism

Neumann, P. (2009), Old and New Terrorism

Pantucci, R. (2011), A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists

Sageman, M. (2004), Understanding Terror Networks
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Negotiating With Terrorists

Under what conditions should governments negotiate with terrorists?
{Department of War Studies, King’s College London}

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‘You’ve got to be strong, not weak. The only way to deal with these people is to bring them to justice. You can’t talk to them. You can’t negotiate with them.’

George W. Bush[1]

[dropcap]G[/dropcap]eorge Bush articulated the above statement as part of a response to a press conference question concerning Al-Qaeda in 2003. He had clearly summed up his administration’s position on the subject in question – that negotiating with terrorists is a sign of weakness and should thus be avoided, even suggesting that merely talking to them was out of the question. His rhetoric remained consistent throughout his presidency regardless of the actor in question; if they could be successfully labelled ‘terrorist’ then dialogue was instantly deemed unacceptable and counter-productive. For instance, in 2008 he made an address to the Israeli Knesset mocking negotiations with ‘terrorists and radicals’ as half-baked attempts to ‘persuade them that they have been wrong all along.’[2] It is easy to be swept away by the conviction of these words, yet the administration’s actions did not always reflect Bush’s uncompromising language. In Iraq for example, the U.S. military was authorised to negotiate extensively with insurgents who were known to use terrorist tactics against coalition troops and civilians.[3] This essay will examine how and why the conditions arise for negotiations with terrorists and will conclude by suggesting best practices.

Peter Neumann has identified ‘a number conditions [which] must be met in order for talks to even have a chance of success’ – these can be simplified as three questions: who, when and how.[4] ‘Who’ refers to the nature of specific terrorist groups i.e. a government needs to assess ideology, propensity to violence and internal cohesion before committing to a course of action. The IRA made suitable negotiating partners for the British Government because their leaders realised that violence had limited utility and were capable of controlling the rank and file of the organisation. ‘When’ refers to the timing of negotiations in terms of strategic juncture, perhaps when the terrorists have recently suffered an tactical or operational setback, or are otherwise ‘questioning the utility of violence’[5]. ‘How’ refers to the actual format of the negotiations – ideally a ‘broad, multiparty process [which] exposes the terrorists to democratic practices.’[6] In Northern Ireland this was achieved through encouraging the participation of Sinn Féin in the democratic process.

Particularly contentious is Neumann’s assertion that ‘…a government should begin formal negotiations only after the terrorist group has declared a permanent cessation of violence’[7] which is directly contradicted by Jonathan Powell’s declaration that ‘it is always an error to set a precondition to a negotiation.’[8] There is a long, well documented history of deceitful or capricious behaviour by non-state ‘terrorist’ negotiators and the setting of preconditions is intended to provide assurances (mainly) to the government. However, the very act of securing these assurances, such as agreeing upon mechanisms for implementing and monitoring a ceasefire, can derail the whole process. The Government of Colombia has repeatedly experienced these frustrations with FARC.[9]

Neumann does not consider the conditions imposed by the nature of the state actor. It is important, for instance, to contemplate the effects of the counter-terrorism model adopted by the state in question.  In broad terms there are two ways for states to deal with the threat posed by those sub-state actors labelled ‘terrorists’. One might be forgiven for deducing from the above statement alone that George Bush advocates the criminal justice model, which was internationally prevalent until he dramatically declared ‘war on terror’ in an address to congress nine days after the 9/11 attacks. The war model sees terrorism as an act of war (as opposed to a criminal act), leverages military rather than law enforcement assets to provide a maximum force response and proactively searches for terrorists wherever they seek sanctuary (as opposed to the reactive, minimum force employed by the criminal justice model).

The problem with the war model is its high economic and human cost. Currently U.S. military deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan number 6,399[10], spending on the ‘9/11 wars’ is in excess of $1.3 trillion[11] and consequently the U.S. is growing weary of its open-ended commitment to ‘war on terror’. Hence, in direct contradiction of the above statement the U.S. sought after a negotiated settlement with terrorists in Iraq and similarly the search is now well underway for a negotiated settlement with the Taliban and Haqqani network.[12] This turn of events should not have been unexpected. Indeed ‘since the 1990s the majority of armed conflicts have been ended through dialogue, negotiation and compromise’[13]. The war model thus makes negotiations more likely, given the difficulty of developing a plausible theory of victory for Afghanistan or the war on terror more generally. Additionally, terrorists are arguably raised to the international plane (alongside nation-states) by the very act of declaring war on them. This puts the state at a relative disadvantage, hence the war model should only be used where a rapid military victory is realistic and sustainable, a notable recent example of which is the Sri Lankan campaign against the Tamil Tigers 2006-2009.

Bush’s rhetoric therefore seems increasingly nonsensical. However, there is one possible explanation: secret negotiations. Browne and Dickson have examined the secret negotiation policies of other world leaders who have made hard-nosed declarations which condemn terrorists and apparently forgo the possibility of negotiations. In 1993, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel reneged on an earlier assertion that his government would never negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). In 1999 José Aznar of Spain entered into peace talks with Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) despite his stated policy of no negotiation being ‘one of his party’s strongest weapons’.[14] Browne and Dickson go on to offer the plausible explanation that this behaviour is actually designed to reduce the state’s bargaining power, thus encouraging terrorists to come to the table. This is because engaging in secret negotiations while publicly decrying them increases the potential ‘audience cost’ for the state – i.e. ‘a leader who denounces a counterpart, but then negotiates with him anyway, and then fails to achieve an agreement may pay a particularly harsh price for appearing irresolute, incompetent, or both.’[15] Despite this risk, secret negotiations are preferable to public negotiations because they avoid conferring the same degree of legitimacy.

Avoiding the legitimisation of terrorism is a key aim of the criminal justice model. In contrast to the war model, terrorists are treated like regular criminals and denied any political recognition. However, this can also backfire, as was demonstrated by the hunger strikes of Bobby Sands and other IRA prisoners in 1981. The Government policy of avoiding public negotiations and offering only limited concessions behind the scenes (which were rejected) led to the death of ten prisoners and ultimately ‘growing polarisation between the two communities in Northern Ireland. In this context, the level of violence within the province climbed once more…’[16]

In summary, favourable conditions for negotiations exist when the government can easily activate existing, reliable channels of communication to negotiate secretly with a coherent and dominant terrorist leadership who have reached a strategic juncture in their campaign. Where possible, the government should use a criminal justice model over a war model, but should be open to the possibility of limited political concessions. Of course, these conditions are rare. However, they are more likely to manifest if dialogue is maintained. As Jonathan Powell puts it: ‘…we had to keep things moving forward like a bicycle…If we ever let the bicycle fall over, we would create a vacuum and that vacuum would be filled with violence.’[17] It therefore follows that to impose preconditions and risk stifling negotiations before they begin is bad practice: ‘It is best to leave the issue of weapons to the end of a peace process.’[18] At the time of writing, the government of Nigeria is struggling to open negotiations with the violent Islamic sect known as Boko Haram (BH). This has been a failure until now, but stands an increasing chance of success as the Nigerian government moves away from the war model towards the criminal justice model and attempts to open channels of communication without preconditions. However, the fractionalisation of BH and its lack of coherence, plus the absence of any apparent ‘strategic juncture’ do not bode well for the immediate future.

 

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[1] George W. Bush quoted in Harmonie Toros: ‘We Don’t Negotiate with Terrorists!’: Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts, in Security Dialogue 39:407 (SAGE, 2008) p.407

[2] George W. Bush: Address to the Knesset, (15/05/08) available online: http://bit.ly/FR0QkY

[3] See Michael Rubin & Suzanne Gershowitz: Political Strategies to Counterterrorism, (12/07/06) available online: http://bit.ly/aLA8oG

[4] Peter Neumann: Negotiating with Terrorists, in Foreign Affairs 86:1 (CFR, 2007) p.128-138

[5] Ibid. p.132

[6] Ibid. p.135

[7] Ibid. p.133

[8] Jonathan Powell: Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland, (Random House, 2008) p.317

[9] Camilo González Posso: Negotiations with the FARC 1982-2002, in ACCORD: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, (Conciliation Resources in association with CINEP, 2004) p.46-51

[10] Coalition Casualty Count: http://icasualties.org/

[11] Amy Belasco: The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, (CRS, 2011) available online: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf

[12] Jill Dougherty: U.S. met with Haqqani terrorists this summer, (CNN, 21/10/11) available online: http://bit.ly/nyFrUa

[13] Isabelle Duyvesteyn & Bart Schuurman: The Paradoxes of Negotiating with Terrorist and Insurgent Organisations, in The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 39:4 (Routledge, 2011) p.677

[14] Giles Tremlett quoted in Julie Brown & Eric Dickson: “We Don’t Talk to Terrorists”: On the Rhetoric and Practice of Secret Negotiations, in Journal of Conflict Resolution 54:3 (SAGE, 2010) p.398

[15] Julie Brown & Eric Dickson: “We Don’t Talk to Terrorists”: On the Rhetoric and Practice of Secret Negotiations, in Journal of Conflict Resolution 54:3 (SAGE, 2010) p.381

[16] John Bew, Martin Frampton & Inigo Gurruchaga: Talking to Terrorists, (Hurst & Co. 2009) p.92-93

[17] Jonathan Powell: Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland, (Random House, 2008) p.5

[18] Ibid. p.317

 

Books:

John Bew, Martin Frampton & Inigo Gurruchaga: Talking to Terrorists, (Hurst & Co. 2009)

Jonathan Powell: Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland, (Random House, 2008)

 

Research Papers:

Peter Neumann: Negotiating with Terrorists, in Foreign Affairs 86:1 (CFR, 2007)

Harmonie Toros: ‘We Don’t Negotiate with Terrorists!’: Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts, in Security Dialogue 39:407 (SAGE, 2008)

Isabelle Duyvesteyn & Bart Schuurman: The Paradoxes of Negotiating with Terrorist and Insurgent Organisations, in The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 39:4 (Routledge, 2011)

Julie Brown & Eric Dickson: “We Don’t Talk to Terrorists”: On the Rhetoric and Practice of Secret Negotiations, in Journal of Conflict Resolution 54:3 (SAGE, 2010)

Camilo González Posso: Negotiations with the FARC 1982-2002, in ACCORD: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, (Conciliation Resources in association with CINEP, 2004)

 

Web Resources:

Amy Belasco: The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, (CRS, 2011) available online: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf

Jill Dougherty: U.S. met with Haqqani terrorists this summer, (CNN, 21/10/11) available online: http://bit.ly/nyFrUa

George W. Bush: Address to the Knesset, (15/05/08) available online: http://bit.ly/FR0QkY

Michael Rubin & Suzanne Gershowitz: Political Strategies to Counterterrorism, (12/07/06) available online: http://bit.ly/aLA8oG

Coalition Casualty Count: http://icasualties.org/
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