Tag Archives: Fatah

The Changing Dynamics of Palestinian Movements

Terrorists or not, it is clear that as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad make their rise the West will gradually lose its already-weak influence over decision-making processes in the Palestinian political landscape.


Palestine party politics protest[dhr]

Since the ’Arab Spring’ began in the December 2011, geo-political experts across the world have anticipated (and sometimes prophesised) the coming of changes to the Palestinian political landscape. However the popular uprisings that toppled governments in Egypt, Yemen as well as Libya and are trying to do so today in Syria, have eluded the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Yet it seems political commentators have self-caused the idea of the Arab Spring passing the Palestinian political environment to become axiomatic. By expecting to see such mass protests against the ruling regime in Occupied West Bank or Occupied Gaza Strip, what these commentators have missed is the more subtle and behind-the-scene change in Palestinian political dynamics – one that has been fuelled by the regional changes originating from the ‘Arab Spring’ events.
Palestinian political landscape is silently going through its own ‘Arab Spring’ moment with old gerontocratic leaders finding it difficult to assert the same power they have been wielding for such long time. At the same time new (Islamist) political forces are establishing themselves in politics, while other organisations are re-asserting themselves as new (and often more extreme) resistance forces.

Fall of Fatah

The ’old guard’ of Fatah led by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and technocrat Prime Minister Salam Fayyad seems to have its back against the wall. Firstly the economic situation of the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in the West Bank is on its last legs and according to the latest World Bank report will face a $ 400 million budget deficit that needs to be covered (as always) with the finances coming from international donors. The West Bank Palestinians are realizing that the current government cannot fill their expectations regarding improvement of quality of life or making progress in reaching peace with the Israelis that would lead to an independent Palestinian state. Of this bears witness the fact that numerous protests against both the rule of President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad took place in various West Bank towns throughout the last summer. Possibly the first nail in Fatah’s coffin is the latest poor showing at the West Bank local elections where the party won just two-fifths of the seats it contested for. What is more it lost its control over such key West Bank towns as Ramallah, Nablus and Jenin to former Fatah members who had seceded from the party.

It is of course too early to write off Fatah completely. Mahmoud Abbas has launched for the second time a Palestinian initiative in the United Nations and this time the Palestinian leader might succeed in what he is seeking. Abbas aims to change the legal status of the Palestinian entity to a non-member observer state at the United Nations and currently it looks that he is going to accomplish that as 150 to 170 countries supposedly will vote in favour. But this victory could turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory for Abbas. In reality not much will change for the Palestinian leadership – Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories will continue and can realistically be ended only through bi-lateral negotiations. And certainly nothing will change for the common Palestinian living in the West Bank or Gaza Stip. He or she will continue to face economic difficulty and Israeli occupation. Fatah leaders, by raising the hopes of Palestinian people and then returning from the General Assembly with nothing more than a legal piece of paper and no real benefits, might do disservice to themselves.

New political rise of Hamas

Misfortunes of Fatah have opened up opportunities for other Palestinian political actors. Hamas has been a central player in Palestinian politics, at least since the movement won Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006 and possibly even before that. The political changes of the Arab Spring have furthermore fuelled Hamas’s ever-accelerating accent – a political rise that is seriously threatens Fatah’s role as the premier Palestinian political actor.
Hamas like many other organisations found its position at the beginning of Arab Spring weaken as its relationships with its traditional backers Iran and Syria chilled. With the Syrian Alawite regime gradually cranking up violence against its Sunni subjects Hamas leaders distanced themselves from the al-Assad regime and eventually outright condoned the brutal crackdown. This subsequently entailed Hamas’s external bureau leaders leaving their traditional headquarters in Damascus as well as drying up of Iranian financial assistance and arms deliveries. But Hamas soon found new patrons – Turkey, Egypt and Qatar.

Somewhat surprisingly it has been the small but rich Gulf state that has proved to be the most supportive and possibly valuable ally to Hamas. Hamas leaders at first must have expected Egypt to become premier supporter of the Palestinian Resistance Movement. But the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi has been wary when dealing with Hamas and in numerous accounts has done less than Hamas leaders would expect from him vis-à-vis supporting the movement. Qatar seems to be more open regarding its support to Hamas, something that became clear just recently with Qatar pledging $400 million for different projects in the Gaza Strip that was followed by the Emir Hamad bin Khalifah Al Thani’s visit to the Palestinian enclave.

Hamas, a Palestinian organisation that throughout its history has aspired to replace Fatah as the prominent Palestinian movement, will benefit Qatar’s recent generosity and Emir’s subsequent visit in numerous ways. Firstly the injection of cash will improve the living conditions of Gazans and will provide many unemployed people with much needed work. Of course even with this financial boost Gaza is still a long way from a comfortable and modern place to live, but that might not be the point. For Hamas and especially Gazan leaders they will be able to show that Hamas (irrespective of this being through foreign investment) is improving the living conditions of Palestinians in Gaza, while the Fatah led-government is pursuing populist goals at the time when the West Bank population is languishing in economic hardship. Hamas looks to win some political points with the West Bank Palestinians and could very well succeed through this strategy.

The visit of Qatari Emir is important also from an international perspective. It is widely publicised that Emir Al Thani was the first head of state to visit Gaza Strip since Hamas took power in June 2007. The real importance of the visit is however that it challenges the long-held monopoly by Fatah and the PLO as being accepted by the international community as the sole representative of Palestinian people. While Hamas officials have been on political visits to different Arab (and occasionally non-Arab states) the visit of the Emir, at least de facto if not de jure, confirms Hamas’s positions as the official ruler of the Gaza Strip and thus representative of (some) Palestinians. Moreover Qatar opened a diplomatic mission in Gaza while not doing so in the West Bank – a development that could reinforce the idea that the Gulf emirate sees Hamas as the new dominant Palestinian political force.

Hamas itself has for long sought to be accepted as a more credible political actor, but has struggled to relinquish its image of a resistance movement. The new Qatari recognition and financial injection into Gaza might very well help Hamas to move away from violence against Israel and commit more extensively to ruling the Gaza Strip. Firstly Qatari visit and the opening of the diplomatic mission might open the door for other (first Arab and later non-Arab) states to establish official contacts with the Hamas government inside Gaza Strip. Secondly when the Qatari-funded skyrises, hospitals and schools start to be built in the Palestinian enclave, Hamas has every incentive in limiting violence from the Gaza Strip that could incur destructive Israeli retaliation. There is no point in building a new hospital one week if it is destroyed the next. Hence Hamas’s internal security services will step up their actions to curb violent attacks by other Gazan-based militants groups against Israel. By providing Gazans with better life conditions Hamas can palliate itself from focusing less on the continuation of the armed resistance. It is unlikely however that armed resistance will stop altogether – nature abhors a vacuum. While Hamas is moving away from violence and becoming more involved in non-violent political and ruling process, another Islamist movement is posed to take its place as the quintessential Palestinian resistance movement.

The Resurgent Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) has long been living in the shadow of its rival Hamas. Although being one of the first movements participating in the First Intifada, the PIJ as an Islamist movement was forced to take the back seat after the creation of Hamas and has since then been seen as the supportive ‘little brother’ of the former. That is until recently.

The PIJ has become more critical of Hamas and has accused the later of selling out on the idea of resistance to Israeli occupation. True enough Hamas has scaled back its armed attacks against Israel following the 2007-2009 Gaza War that proved painstakingly destructive for Hamas and the Gazan population. Increasingly critical of Hamas, the PIJ has stated that it will continue the armed resistance against Israel even if Hamas decides to abandon such action. More importantly it seems that the PIJ actually possesses the necessary means to do so. Abu Ahmad, the spokesperson of the military wing of PIJ, said in an interview to Reuters in late 2011 that the organisation had at least 8000 fully equipped fighters under its command and that there was no shortage of new recruits wanting to join. Iranian connection to the PIJ was also mentioned during the interview and taking into account the fact that Hamas has fallen from the good graces of Iran it might be the PIJ that has come to replace Hamas as the main recipient of Iranian military assistance. In the light of this the alleged Israeli Air Force air strike against the Yarmouk arms factory in Sudanese capital Khartoum on 23 October might have destroyed 40 containers of weapons meant not for Hamas, but for its rival the PIJ.


Although the Palestinian civil society has not gone through a large-scale popular uprising as we have seen in other parts of the Middle East there is rock-solid evidence that Palestinian political dynamics are changing. And from a Westerners perspective the change (like many other political changes brought on by the Arab Spring) are worrying. Fatah, the long-time Western ‘go-to guy’ in Palestinian politics is fast losing its authority and might be on its way out as a political player. With the other two up-and-coming Palestinian political entities – Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad – the West largely lacks any meaningful connection, much to do with the fact that they are considered terrorists. Terrorists or not, it is clear that as these two groups make their rise the West will gradually lose its already weak influence over decision-making processes in the Palestinian political landscape. Instead it will be the various Arab and non-Arab states in the Middle East that will see their influence increase. Will these states exert their influence over these Palestinian entities to pursue peace or to pursue war? Only time will tell.


Photo Credit: No Lands Too Foreign

Hamas In The New Middle East

As the West attempts to navigate the new Middle East, it may find that the region’s new leaders hold a stronger line on the Israeli-Palestinian issue than their predecessors.



[dropcap]A[/dropcap] year ago, you could be forgiven for thinking the only Arab dictators in trouble were pro-American. Enormous demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt had just led to the resignations of Ben Ali and Mubarak, but there were also serious disturbances in Yemen and Bahrain, major rallies in Jordan and Morocco and a Saudi man set himself on fire in imitation of Sidi Bouzid. America’s traditional foes, however, were relatively comfortable. Gaddafi could not have imagined that the clashes between a few hundred protestors and police in Benghazi spelled the beginning of his end. Assad too would have taken comfort from the failure of a planned ‘day of rage’ to produce more than a paltry showing.

Since then, of course, things have changed. In Libya, rebels supported by NATO airstrikes defeated Gaddafi’s forces and gave him a tyrant’s death. But it is events in Syria which may prove to be the most decisive for regional politics, at least in the short term. As the city of Homs braces itself for Assad’s onslaught, we can see some of the regional players shifting position.

The Arab League, reinvigorated after decades of irrelevance, has today announced the most serious sanctions on a member state since the expulsion of Egypt for the crime of making peace with Israel. Turkey has not only endorsed the Syrian rebellion, but hosts its ideologues, trains its fighters and even advises them in the field, if these reports are to be believed. This is a complete reversal of the formerly close ties between Turkey and Syria. Assad’s closest ally, Iran, has criticised foreign interference in Syria, but indicated its support for reforms. The Iranians may eventually swim with the tide. For now, though, the presence of Iranian forces in Syria suggests this will not happen soon.

Hamas finds itself in a more difficult position. Palestinian militancy has always been represented in the Middle East’s “resistance bloc” du jour. Until recently, this meant a Hamas HQ in Damascus and close political ties. However, as it becomes increasingly impolitic for the Sunni Islamist group to stand with Shi’ite heretics as they slaughter good Muslims, Hamas has been making moves to extricate itself from the toxic Assad brand.

Low-level Hamas figures have been leaving steadily, and now senior Hamas politburo members – including Khaled Meshaal – have left in protest. Syrian officials have even accused Hamas of supporting the opposition. Hamas is already feeling the consequences: Iran, its main sponsor, reportedly cut its funding in August.

Simultaneously, Meshaal has stirred the pot further by signing an agreement in Doha as part of reconciliation efforts with Fatah. This was apparently done without consultation with his rivals in Gaza, who denounced the “strategically unacceptable” move. Hamas PM Ismail Haniyeh has been in Tehran to mend ties with the Iranians, where he was pressed to continue resisting Israel and staying out of peace talks, but there is something of a split emerging between Hamas Gaza and Hamas Global (formerly of Damascus).

Whether or not this disagreement becomes more serious does not alter the main challenge facing Hamas: who will its allies be once the region settles? It will have to align itself with one of the emerging power blocs to thrive.

The new regime in Egypt is expected to be friendly and supportive, even if it won’t supply cash and arms as did Iran. The fraternal bond between the Egyptian and Palestinian branches of the Muslim Brotherhood won’t do any harm either. More promising still is Turkey, whose leadership has been increasingly vocal on the Palestinian issue and confrontational towards Israel. Turkey has also been a leading power in efforts to remove Arab dictators of all stripes. Reports that Turkey will fund Hamas are probably overblown, but are at least indicative of how close the relationship is.

As the West attempts to navigate the new Middle East, it may find that the region’s new leaders hold a stronger line on the Israeli-Palestinian issue than their predecessors. The revolutionary governments are unlikely to argue that violent protest was right in their own countries but wrong for Palestine – some level of support will be inevitable.

Quite what this support will look like is unclear, though Iranian-style sponsorship, with missiles shipments and training camps, seems doubtful. In the short term, we are more likely to see an effort to normalise Hamas politically. Offices in Cairo and Ankara would force Western powers to choose between sanctioning the two biggest powers in the region, or accepting that Hamas is not beyond the pale. A concerted effort to finally reconcile Hamas and Fatah, with some sort of coalition government, would entrench Hamas even further amongst legitimate actors.

This probably won’t be accompanied by a renunciation of violence or recognition of Israel. Hamas will be able to point to the region’s endorsement of their position, while revolutionary leaders struggling to put things back together won’t risk a public backlash by appearing to take Israel’s side. In terms of shifting opinions, then, the real change is with regional powers like Egypt and Turkey who are more sympathetic with Hamas than ever.

A case could be made that Hamas would move towards these powers even in the absence of the fighting in Syria, but it is clear that events there have brought things forward. Even if Syria and Iran stand to lose from the Arab Spring, Hamas clearly stands to gain.