Tag Archives: India

brics

Di percezione e realtà: il multipolarismo dopo la Guerra Fredda

Accorpare Paesi diversissimi tra loro in semplicistici acronimi, quali “BRICs”, può talvolta distorcere la realtà: ad esempio, gli interessi di Russia e Brasile, grandi produttori di energia, dalla quale ottengono benefici in virtù degli alti prezzi applicati sulla relativa commercializzazione, non collimano con gli interessi dell’India che, invece, è tra i maggiori consumatori di quelle stesse fonti.

[dhr]

brics

[dhr]

[dropcap]I[/dropcap]n seguito al crollo del muro di Berlino nel 1989, e la conseguente dissoluzione dell’URSS, il momento post-Guerra Fredda diveniva a guida americana, unipolare ed egemonico, e un’intera categoria di Paesi faceva registrare un aumento costante della crescita economica. Tra questi, anche le economie dei Paesi emergenti, che avvaloravano così la teoria dei vantaggi dell’arretratezza delle condizioni di partenza (Gershenkron, 1962), prefigurando una futura convergenza con quelli economicamente più avanzati, anche in termini di influenza e potere politico.

In questa breve trattazione si cercherà di analizzare l’attuale scenario internazionale, verificando l’attendibilità di alcune delle principali previsioni di medio-lungo periodo sulla crescita economica e relative conseguenze. I BRICs, innanzitutto, rappresentano un valido esempio: la Cina è passata da una crescita a doppia cifra registrata nel 2010, ad un “misero” 7.8% del 2012. Il Brasile, nello stesso periodo di tempo, è passato da una crescita maggiore del 7.5% a poco meno del 2%, l’India dal 10.1% al 4.9% e la Russia dall’8% del 2007 al 3.7% del 2012.

Sebbene questi indebolimenti non possano essere assimilabili ad un arresto, risulta evidente come persino una crescita economica apparentemente inarrestabile implichi dei costi di sostenibilità nell’arco di un decennio. Come ha fatto notare l’economista dell’Università di Harvard, Dani Rodrik, il “percapita income gap” tra economie emergenti ed economie sviluppate è addirittura aumentato tra il 1950 e il 2000. Pertanto, nonostante il nuovo millennio sembrasse garantire una diminuzione di questo differenziale, nel 2011 si è ritornati al livello del 1950.

Tra l’altro, accorpare Paesi diversissimi tra loro in semplicistici acronimi, quali “BRICs”, può talvolta distorcere la realtà: ad esempio, gli interessi di Russia e Brasile, grandi produttori di energia, dalla quale ottengono benefici in virtù degli alti prezzi applicati sulla relativa commercializzazione, non collimano con gli interessi dell’India che, invece, è tra i maggiori consumatori di quelle stesse fonti. Come riportato dal World Economic Outlook del Fondo Monetario Internazionale, tutte le previsioni di crescita per il 2013 sono al ribasso quasi ovunque, specialmente in Europa e Cina.

Di conseguenza, si registra uno iato evidente tra quelle che sono, a tutti gli effetti, grandi potenze e tra coloro che aspirano ad essere tali. Infatti, a livello politico le sfide per i nuovi protagonisti della scena multipolare si preannunciano gravi e di difficile superamento.

Il colosso cinese dovrà essere chiamato ad affrontare sfide di natura strutturale. A Pechino il margine di manovra politica è condizionato dall’invecchiamento della popolazione, conseguente agli effetti della one-child policy in voga dal 1979, e da quello che, riprendendo Arthur Lewis, viene definito come il Lewis Turning Point. Secondo tale modello, utile a spiegare lo sviluppo industriale, viene ipotizzata una situazione di partenza simile a quella presente nei Paesi arretrati come la Cina di qualche decennio fa: la prevalenza di manodopera sottoccupata nel settore agricolo. L’economia, pertanto, è suddivisa in due settori: uno stazionario, cioè l’agricoltura, e uno moderno, l’industria. Lo sviluppo inizia con un aumento della domanda di prodotti industriali, che provoca un trasferimento di forza lavoro, in esubero nel settore agricolo, da quest’ultimo al settore industriale. Dato l’eccesso di lavoratori, i salari sono molto bassi e quindi le imprese hanno un notevole profitto, che viene poi reinvestito nelle aziende. Finché c’è un eccesso di manodopera nel settore agricolo, il processo di accumulazione degli investimenti e dei profitti procede nel settore industriale, ma quando si verifica il processo inverso, e l’eccesso di domanda di lavoro proveniente dal settore agricolo è stato già ampiamente riassorbito, una economia di tipo industriale subisce seri rallentamenti e gravi perdite di profitto. A tali problematiche se ne aggiungono due di natura politica: la prima, riguardante la supposta capacità del Politburo di Pechino di coniugare un’esigenza di legittimità domestica con il monopolio del potere da parte del partito, finora necessario per la pace sociale. La seconda di politica estera, tutta rivolta al mantenimento dell’influenza cinese nel Sud-Est asiatico.

Giungendo alle conclusioni, due problemi emergono da quanto finora scritto, l’uno di tipo metodologico e il secondo di tipo economico-politico. In primo luogo sarebbe necessario interrogarsi se il PIL, e le relative previsioni di crescita e decrescita, sia un valido indicatore per etichettare alcuni Paesi come “grandi potenze”, o anche solo per effettuare comparazioni attendibili senza il rischio di distorcere un’analisi seria e puntuale. A questo proposito, sembra più ragionevole paragonare Paesi che godano dello stesso reddito pro-capite. Questo, anche per evitare di cadere in visioni limitate che tendano a interpretare i Paesi emergenti come antropologicamente proni alla disuguaglianza, e i suoi cittadini non esigenti di importanti strutture sociali quali il welfare, la sanità e l’istruzione pubblica a livelli occidentali. Per quanto riguarda il secondo, sebbene il valore di previsioni politiche ed economiche possa risultare analiticamente accettabile, presenterà sempre alcuni rischi. In effetti, l’elemento cruciale risiede nel potere d’influenza che queste previsioni potrebbero avere nel presente, indirizzando o meno alcune politiche economiche nel medio e lungo periodo. La teoria, pertanto, deve rimanere uno strumento utile per capire la realtà e il suo progredire, ma di certo non il solo per comprendere tematiche e questioni politico-sociali.

[hr]

Photo Credit: MREBRASIL

Enrica Lexie

Enrica Lexie: il caso dei marittimi italiani imputati in India

L’articolo di questa settimana, a firma di Caterina Pikiz Gattinoni, ben enuclea l’ambizione e la proposta editoriale di questa testata, il cui fine principale è quello di incoraggiare uno studio puntuale e documentato delle relazioni internazionali. Di seguito, un parere prezioso e interessante sul controverso caso dei marittimi italiani imputati in India.

Buona e proficua lettura.

[dhr]

Enrica Lexie

[dhr]

 1. Ricostruzione in fatto della controversia; 2. Questioni giuridiche; 2.1 Giurisdizione; 2.2 Immunità; 3. Conclusioni.

1. Ricostruzione in fatto della controversia

Il 15 febbraio 2012, Massimiliano Latorre e Salvatore Girone, due fucilieri della marina italiana appartenenti al Battaglione San Marco (“Fucilieri” o “Marò”), imbarcati sulla petroliera Enrica Lexie, al fine della protezione della medesima contro eventuali attacchi di pirateria, sparavano contro un peschereccio composto da undici soggetti che avevano confuso per dei pirati, cagionando la morte di due di questi ultimi.

In seguito all’evento, la petroliera italiana riprendeva la propria rotta verso il golfo di Aden. Successivamente alle richieste della guardia costiera indiana, tuttavia, Enrica Lexie si ridirigeva al porto di Kochi. Il locus commissi delicti è rimasto a lungo controverso, oggi individuato intorno alle venti e alle trenta miglia dalla costa dello Stato del Kerala, India.

Mentre le autorità locali hanno ritenuto che l’incidente si sia in ogni caso consumato in zona soggetta alla giurisdizione del Kerala, la difesa italiana ha insistito nell’affermare che i soggetti coinvolti, al momento del fatto, non si trovavano nelle acque territoriali dello Stato sopra indicato e che, conseguentemente, le sue autorità non sarebbero potute intervenire nella vicenda.

Lo scorso 18 gennaio, a procedimento penale inoltrato, presso il Tribunale della capitale del Kerala, la Suprema Corte indiana (“Suprema Corte”) ha emesso un provvedimento che statuisce il difetto di giurisdizione dell’autorità giudiziaria dinanzi alla quale il procedimento fino allora si è svolto e che trasferisce la giurisdizione stessa a un Tribunale speciale in Nuova Delhi.

Come successivamente confermato dal Ministero degli Affari Esteri italiano, la Suprema Corte ha formalmente riconosciuto che l’accaduto si è verificato in acque non territoriali. Nonostante il provvedimento sottragga la giurisdizione alle autorità giudiziarie del Kerala, lo stesso non intende trasferirla ad istituzioni italiane, bensì a organi indiani competenti a giudicare controversie di natura federale. Inoltre, rimane controversa la questione relativa allo status giuridico dei due Fucilieri, definiti dalla Suprema Corte meri contractors e non, come ritenuto dalle autorità italiane, organi statali.

2. Questioni giuridiche

Le principali questioni da affrontare, a seguito della ricostruzione dei fatti, concernono (i) la giurisdizione e (ii) il regime di immunità previsto per gli organi statali stranieri.

Al fine di poter stabilire quale sia l’organo competente a giudicare sulla controversia in oggetto, nonché quale sia il regime giuridico applicabile alla condotta di un organo statale nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni e quando quest’ultimo possa definirsi tale, sarà necessario analizzare le norme relative: ai poteri dello Stato costiero nelle zone marittime adiacenti alla costa, ai poteri degli Stati in alto mare, ai derivanti criteri di riparto della giurisdizione e, inoltre, all’immunità organica o funzionale dell’individuo-organo. Brevi cenni saranno utili, infine, in riferimento alle disposizioni volte al contrasto del fenomeno della pirateria.

Per quanto attiene l’individuazione delle fonti, non potranno essere ignorati le consuetudini e i trattati internazionali, i pertinenti atti giuridici emanati da organi internazionali, gli eventuali accordi bilateri in materia, tra gli Stati italiano e indiano, nonché eventuali norme di diritto interno. Infine, alla luce delle norme e dei provvedimenti giurisdizionali considerati, potranno prospettarsi le soluzioni al caso.

2.1 . Giurisdizione

I principali strumenti giuridici per risolvere la questione pregiudiziale relativa alla giurisdizione sono contenuti nella Convenzione di Montego Bay del 10 dicembre 1982 (Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sul diritto del mare), ratificata sia dallo Stato italiano che da quello indiano, nel 1995 (“UNCLOS” o “Convenzione”).[1] La Convenzione rappresenta, infatti, la più importante opera di codificazione del diritto internazionale marittimo.[2]

Sono individuate un certo numero di zone marittime, all’interno delle quali vigono discipline diverse per quanto concerne la determinazione della giurisdizione.[3] A tal riguardo, appare fondamentale l’individuazione esatta del locus commissi delicti, nonché della natura dell’illecito.

Entro le 12 miglia marittime si estende il cd. mare territoriale, il quale è sottoposto alla piena sovranità dello Stato costiero, come il territorio di terraferma (art. 3 della Convenzione). A norma dell’art. 33 dell’UNCLOS, nella zona contigua al mare territoriale, tra le 12 e le 24 miglia marittime, lo Stato costiero può esercitare la propria sovranità al fine di prevenire la violazione delle proprie leggi e regolamenti in materia di polizia doganale, fiscale, sanitaria o di immigrazione, nonché di reprimere le violazioni ai medesimi leggi e regolamenti, qualora siano state commesse nel suo territorio o nel suo mare territoriale.[4] La zona economica esclusiva, permettente allo Stato costiero di sfruttare le risorse marine incluse nella stessa, non può estendersi al di là delle 200 miglia marittime.[5]

Gli articoli da 86 a 120 della Convenzione (parte VII), vogliono codificare le norme di diritto consuetudinario concernenti l’alto mare mare internazionale.[6] L’ambito di applicazione è specificato dall’art. 97 della Convenzione medesima:

Le disposizioni della presente parte si applicano a tutte le aree marine non incluse nella zona economica esclusiva, nel mare territoriale o nelle acque interne di uno Stato, o nelle acque arcipelagiche di uno Stato-arcipelago. Il presente articolo non limita in alcun modo le libertà di cui tutti gli Stati godono nella zona economica esclusiva, conformemente all’articolo 58.”

Pertanto, si deduce che la libertà dell’alto mare, enunciata nel seguente articolo 87 della Convenzione, non trovi applicazione nella zona economica esclusiva, nel mare territoriale, nelle acque interne di uno Stato né, infine, nelle acque arcipelagiche di uno Stato-arcipelago, ma soltanto negli “spazi marini sottratti al controllo, totale o parzialedi un singolo Stato”.[7]

Alla luce della ricostruzione in fatto della controversia, è bene considerare quanto segue. Premesso che il locus commissi delicti è stato individuato tra le 20 e le 33 miglia marine ca. dalle linee base dello Stato indiano, determinate conformemente all’art. 5 della Convenzione, considerato che l’India ha precedentemente individuato tra le 12 e le 24 miglia marittime la propria zona contigua e, fino alle 200 miglia, la sua zona economica esclusiva, pare ragionevole ritenere che, al fine di poter determinare in capo a quale soggetto di diritto spetti la giurisdizione, sarà opportuno escludere sia l’ipotesi in cui l’evento si sia consumato nel mare territoriale indiano che nelle acque dell’alto mare stricto sensu.[8]

Occorrerà, pertanto, analizzare il caso in cui le due navi, al momento del fatto, si trovassero nella zona contigua nonché, alternativamente, nella zona economica esclusiva allo Stato costiero, nella fattispecie concreta l’India.

La Convenzione stabilisce che nella zona contigua al proprio mare territoriale, lo Stato possa esercitare la propria sovranità al fine di prevenire la violazione delle proprie leggi e regolamenti in materia di polizia doganale, fiscale, sanitaria o di immigrazione e di reprimere le violazioni ai medesimi leggi e regolamenti, qualora siano state commesse nel suo territorio o nel suo mare territoriale; mentre, nella zona economica esclusiva, a norma dell’art. 56 della Convenzione medesima, lo Stato costiero “può esercitare il controllo esclusivo su tutte le risorse economiche della zona, sia biologiche che minerali, sia del suolo e del sottosuolo che delle acque sovrastanti”.[9]

Sebbene l’art. 97 dell’UNCLOS preveda che il regime dell’alto mare si applichi a tutte le zone marine non incluse nella zona economica esclusiva, nel mare territoriale, nelle acque interne di uno Stato e nelle acque arcipelagiche di uno Stato-arcipelago, essendo la sovranità dello Stato costiero limitata alla zona contigua e alla zona economica esclusiva (si parla, a tal proposito di limite funzionale), si propende a ritenere che, in riferimento a tali zone, per quanto concerne le materie non contemplate dalla Convenzione quali oggetto della sovranità dello Stato costiero, nel caso di specie quella penale, viga il regime dell’alto mare.

Accogliendo questo orientamento, rileverebbero gli articoli

(i) 92, I co., ai sensi del quale:

le navi battono la bandiera di un solo Stato e, salvo casi eccezionali specificamente previsti da trattati internazionali o dalla presente Convenzione, nell’alto mare sono sottoposte alla sua giurisdizione esclusiva (…)”;

e (ii) 97, I co.:

in caso di abbordo o di qualunque altro incidente di navigazione nell’alto mare, che implichi la responsabilità penale o disciplinare del comandante della nave ovvero di qualunque altro membro dell’equipaggio, non possono essere intraprese azioni penali o disciplinari contro tali persone, se non da parte delle autorità giurisdizionali o amministrative dello Stato di bandiera o dello Stato di cui tali persone hanno la cittadinanza (…)”.[10]

Secondo il combinato disposto degli articoli sopra richiamati, la giurisdizione sulle navi spetterebbe allo Stato di bandiera. Tuttavia, nell’art. 92 nulla viene specificato in riferimento ad atti che avvengono su una nave e si concludono su di un’altra nave, mentre l’art. 97 sembrerebbe potersi applicare ai soli casi di collisione e incidenti di navigazione. Nella fattispecie in esame, dunque, le norme considerate rileverebbero solo in parte.

A tal punto, giungerebbe in soccorso la giurisprudenza internazionale e, in particolare, l’affare Lotus, deciso dalla Corte Permanente di Giustizia Internazionale (“CPGI” o “PCIJ”) con sentenza del 7 settembre 1927.[11] Sebbene risalente a data anteriore alla Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite del 1982 e concernente un episodio di collisione avvenuto in alto mare, la sentenza richiamerebbe alcuni utili principi di diritto internazionale pubblico.

In tale occasione, infatti, la PCIJ affermò che:

the first and foremost restriction imposed by International law upon a State is that (…) it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory, except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from International custom or from a convention.

Inoltre, la sentenza chiarì che:

though it is true that in all systems of law the principle of the territorial character of criminal law is fundamental, it is equally true that all or nearly all these systems of law extend their action to offences committed the territory of the State which adopts them, and they do so in ways which vary from State to State. The territoriality of criminal law, therefore, is not an absolute principle of international law and by no means coincides with territorial sovereignty.

Sarebbe dunque possibile, a determinate condizioni, ritenere che non solo il principio di territorialità del diritto penale appartenga alle norme generalmente riconosciute nel diritto internazionale ma, altresì, alcune sue speciali eccezioni. Tra queste ultime, la PCIJ ritenne ragionevole includere il caso della fattispecie concreta, in quanto:

it is certain that the courts of many countries, even of countries which have given their criminal legislation a strictly territorial character, interpret criminal law in the sense that offences, the authors of which at the moment of commission are in the territory of another State, are nevertheless to be regarded as having been committed in the national territory, if one of the constituent element of the offence, and more especially its effects, have taken place there.”[12]

Il suddetto principio contemplerebbe la possibilità, quindi, di affermare la giurisdizione dello Stato dove l’evento si sia prodotto.

Alla luce del principio sancito nell’affare Lotus e della successiva Convenzione, per cui nelle acque internazionali l’esclusiva giurisdizione delle navi apparterrebbe al proprio Stato di bandiera, essendo le navi stesse soggette alla sovranità di quest’ultimo, parrebbe opportuno ritenere che, qualora una fattispecie criminosa si realizzi in acque internazionali e l’azione che la costituisce sia avvenuta su di una nave ma l’evento si sia poi prodotto su di un’altra, la giurisdizione potrebbe ragionevolmente appartenere allo Stato di bandiera dell’imbarcazione dove l’evento si sia verificato.[13]

Infatti, se da un lato la Convenzione nulla chiarisce in riferimento a ipotesi di reato che iniziano su una nave e si concludono su di un’altra nave, dall’altro lato il principio esaminato nell’affare Lotus potrebbe colmare tale silenzio normativo.

Diversamente, qualora si ritenesse che nelle zone contigue e nelle zone economiche esclusive non viga automaticamente il regime dell’alto mare per tutte quelle materie non espressamente indicate dalla Convenzione, non potrebbero essere considerati gli articoli 92 e 97 dell’UNCLOS, ma sarebbe necessario percorrere un alternativo ragionamento, al fine di poter validamente stabilire quale soggetto abbia giurisdizione nel caso di specie.

In particolare, qualora si volesse accogliere la tesi secondo cui, entro le 200 miglia dalle linee di base, non ci si trovi in acque internazionali, sarebbe in ogni caso necessario definire quale sovranità ammettere nelle zone contigue ed economiche esclusive, qualora esistenti come nel caso in oggetto. In base alle disposizioni contenute nell’UNCLOS, infatti, allo Stato costiero è concesso estendere la propria sovranità solo in riferimento a determinate materie mentre, oltre detti limiti, viene quod consequens riconosciuta agli altri Stati libertà analoga a quella prevista in alto mare.

Appare opportuno considerare tale interpretazione della Convenzione, in ragione del fatto che, sebbene l’evento del caso in oggetto si sia prodotto tra le acque contigue e la zona economica esclusiva alle coste dello Stato indiano, né le autorità locali né la Suprema Corte, fino ad oggi, hanno affermato che le imbarcazioni si trovassero in acque nelle quali si possa applicare il regime del mare internazionale. Peraltro, tale interpretazione sembrerebbe stata favorita dallo stesso legislatore indiano, come dimostrato dall’analisi di alcune specifiche disposizioni di diritto interno, emanate da quest’ultimo (amplianti la sovranità dello Stato nelle zone in questione), le quali sebbene riportino data anteriore alla Convenzione, risultano ancora valide.

In primo luogo, rileverebbe l’articolo 5 del The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976, Act No. 80 of 28 May 1976, il quale sancisce il potere del Governo centrale indiano di esercitare la propria sovranità e adottare le necessarie misure nella o in relazione alla zona contigua al mare territoriale dello Stato, non soltanto in riferimento alle materie annoverate dall’art. 33 dell’UNCLOS, bensì anche alla sicurezza dell’India. Inoltre, in seguito a notifica mediante la Gazzetta Ufficiale, il medesimo articolo prevede che il Governo centrale possa estendere alla zona contigua, con limiti e modifiche ritenuti opportuni, ogni atto normativo dello Stato indiano in qualsiasi materia sopra indicata. Gli effetti prodotti nella zona contigua dovranno corrispondere ai medesimi previsti nel territorio dello Stato.[14]

All’articolo 7, 7 co., vengono adottate disposizioni analoghe in riferimento alla zona economica esclusiva.[15]

Alla luce delle disposizioni contenute in The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976, Act No. 80 of 28 May 1976ut supra esaminate, il Governo indiano ha notificato, in data 27 agosto 1981, mediante gazzetta, l’estensione del codice penale e del codice di procedura penale dello Stato fino ai confini esterni della sua zona economica esclusiva (200 miglia dalle linee di base).

Nonostante l’atto normativo, stabilente l’estensione, non sia stato seguito da formale integrazione dei codici richiamati e lo stesso debba essere considerato tenendo altresì conto degli interventi normativi successivi (si ricordi, a proposito, che la Convenzione fu firmata dal Governo indiano nel 1982 ed entrò in vigore soltanto nel 1995),[16] ciò non comporterebbe un’automatica messa in discussione della sua validità, derivante dallo stesso dettato costituzionale indiano (art. 245).[17]

In proposito, appare opportuno ricordare l’articolo 59 della Convenzione, concernente la regola per la soluzione di conflitti nel caso in cui la Convenzione non attribuisca né diritti né giurisdizione all’interno della zona economica esclusiva:

“Nel caso in cui la presente Convenzione non attribuisca diritti o giurisdizione allo Stato costiero o ad altri Stati nell’ambito della zona economica esclusiva e sorga un conflitto tra gli interessi dello Stato costiero e quelli di un qualsiasi altro Stato o di più Stati, tale conflitto dovrà trovare soluzione sulla base dell’equità e in considerazione di tutte le pertinenti circostanze, tenendo conto dell’importanza che tali interessi rivestono per le parti in causa, sia per la comunità internazionale complessivamente considerata.”

Infine, appare importante, al fine di poter stabilire a quale soggetto spetti la giurisdizione sul caso Enrica Lexie, non trascurare il dettato dell’articolo 111 dell’UNCLOS, concernente il diritto di inseguimento. A prescindere dall’orientamento che si voglia prediligere, ossia del regime giuridico applicabile alla zona contigua e alla zona economica esclusiva, tenendo pur sempre conto delle norme di diritto indiano vigenti al momento in cui l’evento si è verificato, l’articolo in esame consente l’inseguimento di una nave straniera quando le competenti autorità dello Stato costiero abbiano fondati motivi di ritenere che essa abbia violato le leggi e i regolamenti dello Stato stesso.

Il diritto di inseguimento deve iniziare quando la nave straniera si trova nelle acque interne, nelle acque arcipelagiche, nel mare territoriale, nella zona contigua, nella zona economica esclusiva o nella piattaforma continentale dello Stato inseguitore. Se la nave straniera si trovava al di là del mare territoriale, ossia nella zona contigua, nella zona economica esclusiva o nella piattaforma continentale, l’inseguimento può essere intrapreso solo qualora siano stati violati i diritti a tutela dei quali le zone sono state istituite. Si noti, nondimeno, che lo stesso articolo prevede che una nave che abbia ricevuto l’ordine di fermarsi o sia stata sottoposta al fermo fuori dal mare territoriale, in circostanze che non giustificano l’esercizio del diritto di inseguimento, verrà indennizzata di ogni eventuale perdita o danno conseguente a tali misure.

2.2. Immunità

Secondo una norma di diritto internazionale consuetudinario, posta a salvaguardia dell’organizzazione statale, “la condotta di qualsiasi organo di uno Stato deve considerarsi come un atto di tale Stato”.[18] A norma dell’articolo 4 del progetto di articoli sulla responsabilità dello Stato della Commissione del diritto internazionale (2001), inoltre, è da considerarsi atto di uno Stato l’atto di qualsiasi organo di tale Stato, eserciti esso “funzioni legislative, esecutive, giudiziarie o altre, qualsiasi posizione abbia nell’organizzazione dello Stato e quale che sia la sua natura come organo del governo centrale o di un’unità territoriale dello Stato”. Si tratterebbe, dunque, di tutti gli organi dello Stato abilitati a rappresentare lo Stato nelle relazioni internazionali o a manifestare la volontà dello stesso.[19]

Sebbene l’immunità funzionale sia espressione di una norma consuetudinaria generalmente riconosciuta dagli Stati (un’eccezione è prevista per i crimini internazionali), ci si chiede ancora in dottrina quale sia la sua natura giuridica. In particolare, si contempla la possibilità di ricondurla alla categoria (i) delle cause di esclusione della pena (ossia cause che hanno come effetto la non applicazione della sanzione penale, pure in presenza di un fatto di reato); (ii) delle cause di giustificazione (esercizio di un diritto, adempimento di un dovere); (iii) dell’incapacità penale o processuale; oppure (iv) di considerarla una forma di sottrazione alla potestà di coercizione penale.[20]

Dal punto di vista del diritto internazionale, il riconoscimento dell’immunità deriverebbe dalla necessità di mantenimento delle relazioni diplomatiche con Stati esteri, a garanzia di una pacifica convivenza tra i popoli e indurrebbe a ravvisare nella stessa un mero limite all’esercizio del potere giurisdizionale.[21] Ciò verrebbe confermato dalle disposizioni contenute nella Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sulle immunità giurisdizionali degli Stati e dei loro beni (New York, 2 dicembre 2004) che, sebbene non sia stata ancora ratificata dallo Stato indiano e l’Italia non ne sia parte firmataria, come statuito nel preambolo della stessa, codificherebbe alcuni principi del diritto internazionale consuetudinario generalmente riconosciuti.[22]

L’immunità funzionale, dunque, deriverebbe da fonte primaria internazionale e, una volta riconosciuta, dovrebbe essere applicata prescindendo dal locus commissi delicti.[23] Nella fattispecie concreta, non rileverebbe che l’evento si sia prodotto in zona economica esclusiva, in acque contigue o addirittura nel mare territoriale dello Stato, giacché i due Fucilieri agenti nelle proprie funzioni dovrebbero godere dell’immunità, accertabile d’ufficio dalle autorità indiane. Queste ultime, sebbene non mettano in dubbio l’istituto in se stesso, fino ad oggi, non hanno ritenuto poterlo accordare ai Marò.

Una volta chiarito l’istituto dell’immunità funzionale nel diritto internazionale, pertanto, resta da analizzare il caso concreto in riferimento ad esso e, quindi, compiere una valutazione circa la possibilità o meno di ritenere i Fucilieri della marina italiana effettivamente esercenti funzioni pubbliche al momento del fatto.

All’interno di una serie di misure volte al contrasto del fenomeno della pirateria, in ambito internazionale, l’Italia ha emanato il decreto-legge n. 107 del 12 luglio 2011 (successivamente convertito in legge n. 130 del 2 agosto 2011), al cui capo II “Missioni internazionali delle forze armate e di polizia”, articolo 5 “Ulteriori misure di contrasto alla pirateria”, prevede:

(1) Il Ministero della difesa, nell’ambito delle attività internazionali di contrasto alla pirateria al fine di garantire la libertà di navigazione del naviglio commerciale nazionale, può stipulare con l’armatoria privata italiana e con altri soggetti dotati di specifico potere di rappresentanza della citata categoria convenzioni per la protezione delle navi battenti bandiera italiana in transito negli spazi marittimi internazionali a rischio di pirateria individuati con decreto del Ministro della difesa, sentiti il Ministro degli affari esteri e il Ministro delle infrastrutture e dei trasporti, tenuto conto dei rapporti periodici dell’International Maritime Organization (IMO), mediante l’imbarco, a richiesta e con oneri a carico degli armatori, di Nuclei militari di protezione (NMP) della Marina, che può avvalersi anche di personale delle altre Forze armate, e del relativo armamento previsto per l’espletamento del servizio.

(2) Il personale militare componente i nuclei di cui al comma 1 opera in conformità alle direttive e alle regole di ingaggio emanate dal Ministero della difesa. (…)[24]

Conformemente a quanto previsto dal decreto-legge citato, per quanto concerne i teams militari, il Ministero della Difesa ha adottato un decreto il 1° settembre 2011 e l’associazione degli armatori (Confitarma) ha concluso un Protocollo con il medesimo Ministero l’11 ottobre 2011.

In base alla normativa di diritto interno ut sopra richiamata, derivante da esigenze di natura internazionale, lo Stato italiano è fermo nel ritenere che i Fucilieri, al verificarsi dell’evento, fossero in esercizio delle proprie funzioni in rappresentanza e manifestazione della volontà dello stesso.

Diversamente, lo Stato indiano sembrerebbe, fino ad oggi, identificare i due Fucilieri quali meri contractors, appartenenti a servizi di vigilanza privata.[25] Conseguentemente, Massimiliano Latorre e Salvatore Girone non potrebbero godere (e, di fatto, non hanno goduto) dell’istituto dell’immunità funzionale.

3. Conclusioni

Alla luce della ricostruzione in fatto della controversia e delle questioni giuridiche rilevanti analizzate, sembra ragionevole porre le seguenti conclusioni.

In riferimento alla questione relativa alla giurisdizione, nel caso in cui si accolga l’interpretazione della Convenzione per cui nelle acque contigue e nella zona economica esclusiva, eccezion fatta per le materie espressamente contemplate dalla stessa quali oggetto della sovranità dello Stato costiero, viga il regime delle acque internazionali, potrà prospettarsi un’ipotesi di giurisdizione concorrente, sia dello Stato italiano che dello Stato indiano.

Qualora, diversamente, si ammetta un’estensione dell’applicazione della materia penale dell’India alle zone in cui l’evento potrebbe essersi verificato, comprese tra il limite esterno del suo mare territoriale e le 200 miglia dalle linee di base, la giurisdizione potrà essere esercitata dallo Stato indiano.[26]

Riconoscendo, infine, l’immunità funzionale ai Fucilieri, quali organi dello Stato italiano nell’esercizio delle proprie funzioni al momento del fatto, la giurisdizione non potrebbe in nessun caso essere esercitata dall’India, a prescindere dal locus commissi delicti (fosse questo individuato nella zona economica esclusiva o nelle acque contigue alla costa). Accogliendo quest’ultima ipotesi, l’immunità funzionale dovrebbe essere rilevata d’ufficio dalle autorità indiane e la giurisdizione trasferita ai competenti organi giurisdizionali italiani.

[toggle title="Citazioni e note bibliografiche"]

[1] L’attuale disciplina concernente gli spazi marini è il risultato di vari tentativi di definizione da parte della comunità internazionale, di cui il primo risale al 1930, ad opera la Società delle Nazioni. Solo nel 1958, a Ginevra, furono adottati dalla maggioranza degli Stati quattro testi convenzionali che si prefiggevano il principale obiettivo di codificare le norme di diritto internazionale marittimo vigenti (“Convenzioni di Ginevra”). Si noti, a proposito, che le Convenzioni di Ginevra non sono state, ad oggi, abrogate. L’art. 311 della Convenzione del 1982 prevede, tuttavia, che questa prevalga, tra gli Stati parti, sulle Convenzioni di Ginevra del 1958.

[2] Si tenga presente che, come chiaramente esplicato in Treves T., diritto internazionale, Giuffrè, Milano, 2005, pp. 306-312, la convenzione di codificazione “dà forma scritta a regole consuetudinarie esistenti al momento della sua adozione”. La consuetudine, d’altra parte, rimane una delle principali fonti del diritto internazionale, origine di norme vincolanti per tutti i membri della comunità degli Stati.

[3] Nella Convenzione, sono individuati il mare territoriale, la zona contigua, la piattaforma continentale, la zona economica esclusiva e l’alto mare, all’interno dei quali si bilanciano la sovranità degli Stati costieri con i diritti generalmente riconosciuti alla comunità degli Stati.

[4] La zona contigua non comporterebbe una variazione del regime giuridico dell’alto mare, ma ne proporrebbe una sola limitazione funzionale. La zona, infatti, continuerebbe a costituire una porzione dell’alto mare, come disciplinato dalla parte VII della Convenzione. Inoltre, mentre il mare territoriale è pacificamente riconosciuto dal diritto internazionale e non necessita di particolari formalità per il suo riconoscimento da parte della comunità internazionale, si ritiene che la zona contigua, per poter esistere, debba essere formalmente dichiarata mediante legge nazionale dallo Stato costiero. Lo Stato indiano afferma la propria sovranità, seppur relativa, sulla zona contigua al proprio mare territoriale, mediante The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976, Act No. 80 of 28 May 1976. La legge richiamata fissa a 24 miglia marine il limite della zona contigua allo Stato medesimo.

[5] In riferimento alla zona economica esclusiva, l’art. 58, 3° co. della Convenzione, come tradotto in Luzzato R., Pocar F., codice di diritto internazionale pubblico, Giappichelli, Torino, 2010, recita: “Nell’esercizio dei propri diritti e nell’adempimento dei propri obblighi nella zona economica esclusiva in conformità con la presente Convenzione, gli Stati tengono nella dovuta considerazione i diritti e gli obblighi dello Stato costiero e rispettano le leggi e i regolamenti da questo emanati in conformità con le disposizione della presente Convenzione e le altre norme di diritto internazionale, a condizione che siano compatibili con la presente parte della Convenzione.” Inoltre, al seguente art. 59, è prevista la regola per la soluzione di conflitti nel caso in cui la Convenzione non attribuisca né diritti né giurisdizione all’interno della zona economica esclusiva: “Nel caso in cui la presente Convenzione non attribuisca diritti o giurisdizione allo Stato costiero o ad altri Stati nell’ambito della zona economica esclusiva e sorga un conflitto tra gli interessi dello Stato costiero e quelli di un qualsiasi altro Stato o di più Stati, tale conflitto dovrà trovare soluzione sulla base dell’equità e in considerazione di tutte le pertinenti circostanze, tenendo conto dell’importanza che tali interessi rivestono sia per le parti in causa, sia per la comunità internazionale complessivamente considerata.”

[6] L’alto mare è individuato mediante un criterio cd. residuale o negativo, in quanto derivante dall’esclusione dell’applicabilità delle norme relative alle zone economiche esclusive, alle zone contigue, ai mari territoriali, nonché alle acque interne o arcipelagiche (art. 86 UNCLOS). Con il termine Mare Internazionale, infatti, vogliono intendersi gli spazi marini sottratti al controllo, totale o parziale, di un determinato Stato (si veda, a proposito, l’art. 87 della Convenzione, di cuisupra, concernente la libertà dell’Alto Mare).

[7] Conforti B., diritto internazionale, editoriale scientifica, Napoli, 2006, p. 254.

[8] Lo Stato indiano ha definito gli spazi marini all’interno dei quali esercita, in tutto o in parte la propria sovranità, con The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976, Act No. 80 of 28 May 1976.

[9] Conforti B., diritto internazionale, cit.

[10] Ronzitti N., introduzione al diritto internazionale, Giappichelli, Torino, 2007, pp. 125-131.

[11] Pedrazzi M., corti internazionali, Enciclopedia delle Scienze Sociali, I Supplemento, Treccani, Roma, 2001: “La Corte Permanente di Giustizia Internazionale (CPGI), la cui istituzione era prevista nell’art. 14 del Patto della Società delle Nazioni (SdN) del 1919 e che nel sistema internazionale predisposto dal Patto veniva a trovare la sua collocazione ideale, quale complemento giudiziario della struttura politica da quello posta in essere, nacque per effetto di uno strumento separato, lo Statuto, approvato all’unanimità dall’Assemblea della Società il 13 dicembre 1920 e aperto alla firma quale trattato internazionale. Lo Statuto, che vide la partecipazione di un alto numero di Stati, con le importanti eccezioni degli Stati Uniti e dell’Unione Sovietica, entrò in vigore nel 1921; la Corte entrò in funzione l’anno seguente. Alla Corte Permanente di Giustizia Internazionale, avente sede all’Aja e composta, a seguito della revisione dello Statuto entrata in vigore nel 1936, di 15 giudici eletti per nove anni dall’Assemblea e dal Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni, era attribuita giurisdizione su qualunque controversia tra Stati le fosse sottoposta sulla base di un accordo. Essa poteva anche rendere pareri consultivi su ogni controversia o questione, su richiesta dell’Assemblea o del Consiglio della SdN.”

[12] In proposito, si vedano le rilevanti disposizioni della legge penale indiana (sections 1-5), la relativa giurisprudenza della Suprema Corte (Supreme Court of India, Mobarik Ali Ahmed v. State of Bombay on 6 September 1958 e, precedentemente, si veda anche Reg. v. Keyn, il cd. caso Franconia del 1876) nonché, infine, lo stesso codice penale italiano laddove, all’articolo 6, il legislatore ha stabilito che il reato si considera commesso nel territorio italiano quando l’azione od omissione che lo costituisce è ivi avvenuta, in tutto o in parte, ovvero si è verificato l’evento che è la conseguenza dell’azione od omissione.

[13] Più precisamente, la giurisdizione potrebbe essere esercitata sia nello stato dove la condotta criminosa si sia manifestata, in tutto o in parte, sia nello Stato dove l’evento si sia verificato, ovvero secondo un principio di nazionalità.

[14] The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976, Act No. 80 of 28 May 1976, articolo 5, par. 4: “The Central Government may exercise such powers and take such measures in or in relation to the contiguous zone as it may consider necessary with respect to: (a) The security of India, and (b) Immigration, sanitation, customs and other fiscal matters.” Segue al par. 5: “The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette: (a) Extend with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment, relating to any matter referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of subsection (4), for the time being in force in India or any part thereof, to the contiguous zone, and (b) Make such provisions as it may consider necessary in such notification for facilitating the enforcement of such enactment, and any enactment so extended shall have effect as if the contiguous zone is a part of the territory of India.”

[15]  “The Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette – (a) extend, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment for the time being in force in India or any part thereof to the exclusive economic zone or any part thereof; and (b) make such provisions as it may consider necessary for facilitating the enforcement of such enactment, and any enactment so extended shall have effect as if the exclusive economic zone or the part thereof to which it has been extended is a part of the territory of India.”

[16] Pare opportuno precisare che, secondo la stessa Costituzione indiana, lo Stato è tenuto al rispetto del diritto internazionale (art. 251), mentre l’Unione ha il diritto esclusivo di produrre atti normativi al fine dell’inserimento delle disposizioni di diritto internazionale (pattizio) nell’ordinamento statale (art. 253). In caso di conflitto tra disposizioni di diritto internazionale e disposizioni di diritto interno, si ritiene debbano prevalere le ultime (Supreme Court of India, Gramophone Company Of India Ltd v. BirendraBahadurPandey&Ors, on 21 February, 1984).

[17] Eboli V., The “Enrica Lexie case” and the limits of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of India, I quaderni europei, n. 39/2012, Centro di documentazione europea – Università di Catania.

[18] Parere consultivo 29 aprile 1999, in tema di Immunità dalla giurisdizione di un relatore speciale della Commissione dei diritti umani, C.I.J. Recueil, 1999, RDI, 1999, 783, par. 62. Si veda, inoltre, il progetto del 1996 della Commissione del diritto internazionale (art. 6).

[19] Treves T., diritto internazionale, Giuffrè, Milano, 2005.

[20] Fiandaca G., Musco E., diritto penale – parte generale, Zanichelli, Bologna, 2007.

[21] Romano M., commentario sistematico del codice penale, Giuffrè, Milano, 2004.

[22] Con riferimento all’immunità degli Stati, all’art. 5, si legge che: “Uno Stato gode di immunità, per quanto riguarda la sua persona e i suoi beni, dalla giurisdizione dei tribunali di uno Stato ferme restando le disposizioni della presente Convenzione”. Inoltre, per quanto concerne le modalità per dare effetto all’immunità dello Stato, all’art. 6, è stabilito che: “Uno Stato darà effetto all’immunità dello Stato in base all’articolo 5 astenendosi dall’esercitare la giurisdizione in un procedimento pendente davanti ai suoi tribunali contro un altro Stato e a questo fine assicurerà che i suoi tribunali accertino d’ufficio che l’immunità dell’altro Stato in base all’articolo 5 sia rispettata”.

[23] In riferimento all’immunità funzionale, è possibile trovare diversi casi nella prassi internazionale in cui sia venne accordata, sia rifiutata, a ufficiali delle forze armate. A titolo esemplificativo, si vedano l’affare McLeod (1841), l’affare Rainbow Warrior (1980), il caso Nicaragua v. Stati Uniti (1986), il caso Cermis (2000) e il recente affare Mavi Marmara (2010).

[24] Sottolineature di chi scrive.

[25] In proposito, si consideri la riserva apposta dallo Stato indiano all’UNCLOS, che prevede: “(…) The Government of the Republic of India understands that the  provisions of the Convention do not authorize other States to carry out in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf military exercises or manoeuvres, in particular those involving the use of weapons or explosives without the consent of the coastal State.” Si noti che, rispetto a tale riserva, l’Italia ha formulato formale obiezione: “(…) i diritti dello Stato costiero in tale zona non includono il diritto di ricevere notificazioni di esercitazioni o manovre militari o di autorizzarle”. Non risultano notificazioni italiane allo Stato indiano, per quanto concerne i Fucilieri sull’Enrica Lexie, né specifici accordi bilaterali in materia di pirateria tra i due Stati (in merito, l’Italia ha ritenuto sufficiente conformarsi alle disposizioni internazionali vigenti).

[26] A norma dell’art. 287 dell’UNCLOS: “Al momento della firma, della ratifica o dell’adesione alla presente Convenzione o in un qualsiasi altro momento successivo, uno Stato è libero di scegliere, mediante una dichiarazione scritta, uno o più dei seguenti mezzi per soluzione delle controversie relative all’interpretazione o all’applicazione della presente Convenzione: (a) il Tribunale internazionale per il diritto del mare costituito conformemente all’allegato VI; (b) la Corte Internazionale di Giustizia; (c) un tribunale arbitrale costituito conformemente all’allegato VII; un tribunale arbitrale speciale costituito conformemente all’allegato VIII, per una o più delle categorie ivi specificate.” In merito, nelle dichiarazioni formulate dall’Italia e confermate alla ratifica, si legge che: “Nel dare attuazione all’art. 287 della Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sul diritto del mare il Governo italiano ha l’onore di dichiarare che, per la soluzione delle controversie relative all’applicazione ed interpretazione della Convenzione (…), sceglie il Tribunale del mare e la Corte Internazionale di Giustizia, senza specificare che uno ha la precedenza sull’altra (…)”. Diversamente, lo Stato indiano, al momento della ratifica della Convenzione, ha dichiarato di riservarsi di esercitare in un momento successivo il diritto previsto dall’art. 287 di cui sopra, per cui ogni “Stato è libero di scegliere, mediante una dichiarazione scritta, uno o più dei seguenti mezzi per soluzione delle controversie relative all’interpretazione o all’applicazione della presente Convenzione”. Infine, si tenga presente che, in riferimento ai poteri esercitabili dalla Corte Internazionale di Giustizia, lo Stato indiano ha dichiarato di voler escludere la giurisdizione vincolante della medesima per i casi “concerning the interpretation or application of a multilateral treaty unless all the parties to the treaty are also parties to the case before the Court or Government of India specially agree to jurisdiction”.

[/toggle]

[hr]

Photo Credit: daw_news

PLA Missile Tracking Ship

China’s Growing Role In Counter-Piracy Operations

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has now maintained a counter-piracy presence in the Indian Ocean for four years. This begs the question: why is China becoming increasingly cooperative in counter-piracy operations?

[dhr]

PLA Missile Tracking Ship

[dhr]

[dropcap]T[/dropcap]he rise of China is one of the prominent issues that scholars of International Relations encounter today and will continue to do so in the future. The PLAN deployment is a fascinating component of the wider China debate as it represents the first time that Chinese vessels have conducted a ‘far-seas’ operation to protect Chinese interests since the fifteenth century. Even more remarkable is the fact that the typically isolationist and paranoid Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is now openly cooperating with a variety of traditional foes in the area of counter-piracy; states such as India, Japan and the US are now closely communicating and operating in conjunction with their PLAN counterparts in the Indian Ocean.

This raises a series of intriguing questions. From a Chinese perspective, what are the motivating factors behind this operation? Is it economic, political or geostrategic concerns that have driven the PLAN to cooperate in the Indian Ocean? Is this deployment merely benign in nature or does it imply an element of self-interest? Why is China cooperating over the issue of piracy when it refuses to align itself with international norms, for instance, human rights?

PLAN Deployment

This deployment did not arise out of a policy vacuum; when Jiang Zemin was replaced by Hu Jintao in 2002 he affirmed that the PLAN must develop towards ‘far-seas defence, enhancing the far-seas manoeuvring operations capabilities’. In the years since Hu’s statement, there has been a significant evolution in the PLAN capacity from a ‘near-seas active defence’ strategy (jinhai jiji fangyu) to ‘far-seas operations’ strategy (yuanhai zuozhan). Chinese defence expenditure has enlarged year after year in line with its burgeoning economy; official figures show that, prior to the PLAN counter-piracy operation began, defence expenditure rose to RMB417.876 billion (USD65.71 billion) in 2008, representing an increase of 17.5% upon the previous year. Thus, with an enlarged budget and a new ‘far-seas’ doctrine, the naval modernisation observed in the PLAN has certainly influenced the Chinese decision to join the international response in the Indian Ocean.

Traditionally, the East and South China Seas have been the significant regional chokepoints that had a strategic bearing on Chinese interests; however, as mentioned in the introduction, the Indian Ocean has now become a crucial expanse for China due to piracy, rising energy demand and trade interdependence. Hijackings, such as the Tianyu 8 and Zhenhua 4 incidents, are appropriate examples of how piracy is detrimental for Chinese trade.

Subsequently, the passing of UN Security Council resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838 provided the PLAN with the supranational authority it required and it joined the international counter-piracy effort on 26 December 2008, becoming fully operational on 6 January 2009. In searching for legitimacy to conduct this operation, it is expected that the presence of the EU, NATO and CTF-151 counter-piracy task forces had a positive influence upon China’s decision.

Chinese caution towards a potential deployment can be explained by the realpolitik that remains embedded in a post-Mao China and an enduring belief in the adages of Deng Xiaoping. A former PRC leader himself, Deng recommended that the Chinese leadership ‘bide time’, maintain a low profile and take advantage of international opportunities to gradually maximise its power and position in the world. China seemingly aspires to take advantage of the unique situation of Somali piracy rather than become an established torch-bearer of international peace and security. By participating in counter-piracy operations, China is afforded the opportunity to deploy into the far-seas without an immediately hostile reaction from the international community.

Counter-Piracy Cooperation

The PLAN signified upon the initiation of the deployment that its undertaking would primarily consist of the independent escort of Chinese and foreign vessels. Despite its underdeveloped operational capabilities in comparison with other naval forces, it is clear that China wishes to be both seen and consulted as an equal within the international counter-piracy effort. China is not comfortable with communicating openly with institutions such as the EU and NATO as they do not represent a single voice but a multitude of perspectives; Beijing much prefers to conduct dialogue on a bilateral basis.

In the wider operational dimension, China has repeatedly declined proposals to integrate with the collective maintenance of the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC). Again, China does not wish to integrate itself within a multinational command structure. Instead, China conducts its escort operations approximately ‘five nautical miles north and south of the IRTC’ rather than within the box system. Whilst the PLAN is still a ‘green-water’ navy and their model of participation is not unusual among the other independent actors, the refusal to participate in the IRTC indicates that China is not prepared to truly contribute to the ‘global good’ in a manner that is harmonious with the Western world, as much as its rhetoric suggests otherwise.

However, there are now signals that China’s actions in the Indian Ocean might begin to match their rhetoric; their counter-piracy strategy is outwardly evolving to incorporate a greater degree of coordination with the broader counter-piracy coalition. The first year of the PLAN was characterised by unilateralism, but the De Xin Hai hijacking on 19 October 2009 served to alter PLAN perceptions on counter-piracy cooperation when maritime cooperation could have prevented such an episode. It is widely agreed that only rigorous cooperation and coordination can help the international community to deal with the problem of piracy in an efficient way at sea.

Accordingly, the PLAN has taken progressive steps to enhance coordination with other navies in the Indian Ocean. Firstly, the key to successful and effective coordination is to communication and consequently, a web-based communication system entitled Mercury has been introduced amongst all naval forces apart from Iran. Secondly, China concluded an agreement in January 2012 with its traditional enemies, Japan and India, to strengthen coordination and adjust each other’s escort schedules to achieve maximum efficiency in the fight against piracy.

Lastly, and most importantly, are the coordination mechanisms of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) and the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) group. China was a founding member of the CGPCS as it is based around ‘voluntary cooperation’ in counter-piracy rather than under the command of another power or institution. SHADE is a scheme that assembles the wider counter-piracy community for regular meetings in Bahrain. China has now participated in the rotating chairmanship of the SHADE meetings and even expressed an interest in a co-chair position, usually held by the EU, CMF or NATO. However, this initial interest never materialised.

Nevertheless, it is patently clear that China is unwilling to enhance collaborative efforts with the wider counter-piracy community. Reasons for collaborative deficiency in Chinese foreign policy vary from a lack of operational experience to a lack of political will; it is true that much mistrust remains over ideological differences and issues such as human rights and Taiwan.

PLAN Motives

This defensive position is reflected in the PLAN’s counter-piracy deployment and their coordination with the international effort in several ways: firstly, the Indian Ocean represents a vital strategic arena in which China’s energy security is increasingly vulnerable. Secondly, China has evidently taken extra care not to arouse the ‘China threat’ theorem in its counter-piracy and wider foreign policies. Secondly, China is clearly endeavouring to protect Chinese national interests through the PLAN deployment and their naval modernisation. Thirdly, Chinese naval diplomacy in the Indian Ocean signifies a defensive policy, not one of aggression. Lastly, China is practicing ‘security through cooperation’ unilaterally with traditional foes.

What is clear is that the Indian Ocean is a vital arena for China; every year some 100,000 cargo ships pass through the Indian Ocean, as well as 66% of the world’s oil shipments. The significance of this expanse becomes apparent upon learning that Chinese total energy consumption from 2005 to 2012 has risen 60% and is predicted to increase a further 72.9% between now and 2035. Accordingly, there is now a growing energy demand within China to sustain its economic growth and, as the majority of China’s oil imports derive from Africa (Angola, Sudan) and the Middle East (Saudi Arabia), it is obvious that the Indian Ocean is the critical route for its external energy requirements.

China has been determined to dispel the ‘China threat’ theory. Before the PLAN deployed in the Indian Ocean, they waited patiently to gauge the international reaction to the counter-piracy mission. They also ensured that the deployment had the authorisation of both the Somali government and the UN. In line with the maxims of Deng Xiaoping, China knows that any sign of aggressive behaviour would be criticised by the international community and potentially harm their development. Thus, China is essentially employing a neo-Bismarckian strategy, manoeuvring peacefully towards Great Power status without provoking the international community into a counter-balancing reaction.

This is embodied within China’s ‘peaceful rise’ policy. Chinese actions and rhetoric attest to this guiding principle in the CCP’s foreign policy; the counter-piracy operation in aid of the global commons allows China to justify their naval modernisation, along with the opportune location of the piracy problem. China speaks of a foreign policy that pursues ‘peace and promotes friendly cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’, in addition to Hu Jintao’s ‘harmonious world’ vision.

Moreover, Chinese counter-piracy policy is distinctly aimed towards the protection of Chinese national interests. There is an evident gap between China’s defensive interests and its actual capabilities; therefore, it is aiming to close this gap through the advancement of the PLAN’s operational capabilities, increased field experience and the acquisition of modern naval assets. For example, China has now acquired its first ever aircraft carrier, the ex-Soviet Varyag, and it is expected to become operational by the end of 2012.

By coordinating in the counter-piracy effort, China is able to learn how a ‘far-seas’ fleet is operated, offer PLAN personnel invaluable experience for future expeditions, and gain knowledge from other international naval forces. Thus, China has evolved its naval strategy to meet the demands of its expanding interests in the Indian Ocean and it can therefore be deduced that the PLAN deployment is an extension of this defensive strategy.

As a result of the PLAN’s new ‘far-seas’ mantra, the counter-piracy deployment has also increased Beijing’s diplomatic network across the Indian Ocean. After each task force rotation, the PLAN ‘sails along the East coast of Africa and visits Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa, Madagascar and the Seychelles’ to parade the Chinese flag and to foster goodwill within these countries. Further Chinese engagement with the Indian Ocean littoral states consists of port and refuelling developments at Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Chittagong in Bangladesh with the Seychelles also offering China an invitation to establish a military presence on the islands.

Yet, by cooperating to some extent with traditional regional adversaries, China hopes that it can begin to assuage their doubts about their growth as a power and hopefully continue along the path of development. On cooperation in counter-piracy and the wider Indian Ocean region it is imperative that China ‘go along to get along’ in protecting their national interests.

As Donald Rumsfeld proffered, it is ‘the mission that determines the coalition’ and the issue of piracy has clearly determined China’s participation and cooperation with the international community in the Indian Ocean. From a Chinese perspective, they have participated out of self-interest; on a wider scale, their participation has been facilitated by the ad-hoc regime that has emerged. For China to protect its national interests and continue on its path towards a ‘peaceful rise’ it now appreciates that ‘problems will be global – and solutions will be, too’; this is what truly accounts for Chinese cooperation in counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean.

[hr]

Photo Credit: Michael R Perry

acid attack victim

The Wanton Destruction Of Acid Attacks

Intimidation, revenge, control, spite, jealousy, senseless and unprovoked malice. These are just some of the irrational reasons behind one of the world’s most terrifying crimes – acid attacks.

[dhr]

acid attack victim

[dhr]

Acid attacks, also known as ‘vitriolage’, have grown in number since the 1980s and are increasingly used to target women – 80% of victims are female and almost 40% are under the age of 18 – particularly in countries widely considered to be the most dangerous in the world for the fairer sex. Sadly, the true number of times this horrific attack occurs likely eludes records because the nature of the crime means that victims are often from marginalised parts of society, too scared and too ashamed to speak out.

Nicholas Kristof suggests that acid attacks, rather than suicide bombings, are one of the most pertinent and frightening forms of violence to face Pakistani women in modern day society. Perfect strangers are increasingly joining the ranks of the perpetrators, who have tended to be husbands, spurned lovers and extended family members. What was once considered an endemic isolated to South East Asia and parts of Africa has increasingly become a pandemic affecting the global community.

Contrary to popular belief acid attacks are not restricted to any race, religion or geography. Although the majority of attacks occur in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, in recent years attacks have been reported in the United States, Great Britain and South America too with over 250 such occurrences in Colombia in the past three years. The increasingly diverse geography of this crime pierces holes in arguments made by Gadi Adelman in his article “Just a culture thing, or just Islamic?”. He is quick to pick out verses of the Quran which he interprets as advocating the superiority of men over women, and suggests it is this perspective that makes acid attacks so prevalent against women. He stops short of labeling vitriolage as an Islamic crime that predominantly affects countries where Islam is the prevalent religion, but his misplaced insinuations are clear.

The common link between Pakistan and Colombia for example extends further than just being beautiful countries, rich with history, culture and melodic languages. They also share a penchant for a machista societal structure. This inevitably leads to a situation where women are living in a state of perpetual fear and anxiety – not safe in their own homes or the streets of their hometowns and cities where do these vulnerable people turn?

In Pakistan’s Government Hospital, a free clinic, staffed by world-renowned plastic surgeons, exists to help women who have suffered from acid attacks. The clinic works alongside other nationwide clinics and support groups to provide aid and emotional support to these women where the government and their families may fail them. The significance of such support networks is apparent when we consider the context of some of these horrific attacks. One woman‘s husband burned her with acid, her sister-in-law doused her in gasoline and her mother-in-law lit and threw the match that engulfed her body in a fireball. This woman, for want of a secure life for her children, chose to continue living with and depending upon the very same people who came so close to ripping her life away from her. In a country where the legal system still has fundamental flaws to contend with, as well as the rampant problem of corruption, it is inevitable that this woman’s terrible story is not unique.

Although concentrated acids have a wide variety of legitimate uses, car batteries or household cleaning products for example, they can easily destroy lives in a fraction of a second. There is a real and growing need to categorise acid as a potential weapon given its increasingly malicious and life threatening usage. In most countries, as in Uganda, these calls have largely been ignored. Stringent guidelines and restrictions need to be introduced for people buying and selling highly concentrated acids in order to gain some kind of control against this abhorrent crime. Acid attacks continue to rise in India and Cambodia because of how readily available sulphuric and nitric acid are. Conversely, since the enactment of laws in Bangladesh increasing the punishment for acid throwing as well as restricting its availability came into force, the country has seen a 15-20% decrease in the number of annual attacks.

Food for thought: a small bottle of highly concentrated acid enough to disfigure and ruin a woman’s life forever costs less than a pack of 20 Marlboro Lights in India. All it takes is 16 Rupees (INR) – or $0.37 USD to inflict horrific life-long injuries. In Bangladesh, the cost is less than $0.15 USD for a small bottle of acid readily available from the roadside. More continued action must be taken to prevent more victims from suffering the fate of lost faces, lost identities and lost lives.

[hr]

The author recommends Saving Facean Academy Award winning documentary about Acid Violence in Pakistan.

Mumbai Dharavi Slum

Mumbai’s Largest Slum: More Than Meets The Eye

Dharavi gives lie to the traditional conception of Mumbai’s slums as places of squalor and poverty. This ‘city within a city’ is a model of economic efficiency and productivity, a place where most things appear to be broken but everything seems to be working rather nicely.

[dhr]

Mumbai Dharavi Slum[dhr]

[dropcap]O[/dropcap]n the surface, the Dharavi slum in the heart of India’s largest city, Mumbai, is an eyesore. Thousands upon thousands of corrugated iron roofs give the appearance of a place mired in poverty, a place in which every day is a struggle just to survive. In many ways, this appearance reflects the reality. Open drains leave a smell of human excrement in the air, and rats infest the streets. Dharavi’s residents often live ten people to a room the size of which a student in a British university would be unhappy with, and have access to clean water for only three or four hours a day, and this they have to share with their neighbours.

One third of the population of Dharavi have no access to clean drinking water at all. There is a serious sanitation problem in Dharavi, with poor drainage systems causing the spread of diseases and serious public health problems. This is only exacerbated by the annual monsoons, with the flooding leading to increased spreading of contagious diseases. In Dharavi there are 4000 cases of disease reported every day. Recent figures suggest that there is only one toilet for every 1440 people. It is clear that the Indian government, for various reasons, has failed to address the serious health problems that present themselves in Dharavi, and in this sense the slum stands as a prominent and ugly example of the huge social problems faced by an India in the process of rapid economic development and population growth. It is estimated that up to 300 families arrive every hour in Mumbai alone.

However there is more to Dharavi than poverty, squalor and disease. The slum is often described as a city within a city, and it is estimated that the annual turnover for the thriving businesses within Dharavi stands at somewhere in the region of $500-650 million. Well over three quarters of the residents living in Dharavi are employed, and the slum even has its own millionaires.  A recent Times of India report found one slum dweller, named Mohammad Mustaqueem, who started out sleeping in the streets of Dharavi as a 13 year old, to be in charge of 300 employees in 12 garment workshops with a turnover of $2.5 million per year.

Moreover, the economic and employment opportunities that Dharavi has to offer its residents appears to outweigh any concerns they may have about the health effects of living in such unhealthy conditions. One doctor working in Dharavi told the New York Times that “people who come to Dharavi or other slum areas- their priority is not health…their priority is earning”. Indeed many Indian’s, particularly from states such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, see moving to the slum as a great opportunity, enabling them to find work, gain skills, and escape rural Indian poverty. Whilst agricultural wages in India are measly, many households in Dharavi are earning up to 15,000 rupees per month, and the slum also provides cheap accommodation relative to other areas in Mumbai. Several industries thrive in Dharavi, including textiles, pottery and leather. To add to this, there is now a thriving recycling industry, which stops the city of Mumbai “choking to death on its own waste”, according to one Guardian journalist.

What’s more, the people of Dharavi seem quite satisfied with their lot. Crime in the area is low in comparison to other districts in Mumbai, an impressive fact given that the slum has somewhere in the region of one million residents. A scheme to revelop the slum, funded by private investors (who are attracted to the valuable land upon which Dharavi sits, with its proximity to the railway lines, and thus the rest of India, and its central location in Mumbai –it is close to the new Bandra Kurla financial district) is vehemently opposed by many of the slum dwellers themselves. Whilst they would be given a free and legal apartment on the same site, many feel that they would be unable to earn a living if they were moved from their street-side accommodation into high rise buildings.

It is not only economic considerations that lead people to oppose the redevelopment, but cultural considerations as well. Residents feel that redevelopment proposals will erode their traditional ways of life, disrupt communities with rich histories, and point out that the government is offering to re-house only those who can prove they have lived in Dharavi since before the year 2000. Thus, under the redevelopment proposals, the majority of Dharavi’s residents (many of whom have no paperwork to prove how long they have lived there) would have to leave, a scenario which would only lead to the creation of new slums. What angers the slum dwellers most about the proposals for redevelopment is how little they seem to have been involved in the process. Whilst they do not oppose redevelopment in its entirety, they feel that the motives behind the current proposals (which are led by the private sector) are predominantly, if not totally, commercial.

It is perhaps this reaction against the proposed redevelopment that most clearly makes evident the sense of community felt by the residents of Dharavi. Opposition to redevelopment plans which show scant regard for the preferences and desires of Dharavi’s inhabitants unite people across the religious divide, with both Hindus and Muslims (the two most represented religions in Dharavi) often taking to Dharavi’s streets to protest against the plans. Indeed, Dharavi’s residents seem determined to fight, quite literally if they have to, to preserve their way of life.

In an open letter to the private companies and government agencies involved in the redevelopment, Jockin Arputham from the National Slum Dwellers Association India stressed that the slum “provides income and livelihoods for hundreds of thousands of Mumbai citizens who would otherwise have no employment”, in addition to cheap accommodation. He goes on to claim that if the slum dwellers’ offer of partnership is ignored, and development plans continue without taking into account the views of slum dwellers themselves, then they will resort to the more traditional tactics of blocking the city’s main railway lines (which run in close proximity to the slums) and even the airport runways. Arputham makes clear that if only for economic reasons, those in charge of redevelopment plans would do well to accommodate the slum dwellers’ demands.

In truth then, Dharavi gives lie to the traditional conception of Mumbai’s slums as places of squalor and poverty, whose residents have little or no hope of a bright future. The slum is a model of economic efficiency and productivity, a city within a city, a place of opportunity for the hundreds of thousands of Indians who flock there every year in search of jobs, housing and education. Its residents have a very clear sense of their own identity; they have hopes and aspirations, and a genuine belief that these are achievable. This is not to take away from the serious public health issues which the government must do everything in its power to address, but it should make any potential developer stop and think about the virtues of a redevelopment plan which has the people of Dharavi at its heart.

It seems that in a place where most things appear to be broken, everything at present is working quite nicely.

Middle Eastern

Top 10 Middle Eastern Developments To Watch (Part 2)

The second part of a two-part piece providing the top 10 Middle Eastern developments to keep your eye on. In this section:  the Egyptian constitution, oil and gas in Cyprus and Israel, Indo-Pakistani relations, Afghanistan, and terrorism in the Yemen and the Sinai.

[dhr]

Middle Eastern[dhr]

[dropcap]T[/dropcap]his piece follows on from Top 10 Middle Eastern Developments To Watch (Part 1).

5. Egyptian constitution

This issue should be at the top of Israel’s security agenda. Two important things to watch out for: the timing of the new constitution’s inception and the division of powers between president, parliament and the military. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) might want to delay the passing of the constitution for as long as possible in order to buy some time and attempt to undermine Muslim Brotherhood’s legitimacy in Egyptian society’s eyes. Such efforts would ultimately prove to be fruitless, but they might just be enough to keep Egypt under control for long enough to wait for the Iranian crisis to fade away. The last thing the Egyptian military would want to deal with is a president letting Iranian warships through the Suez Canal bound for Tel Aviv to avenge bombarded nuclear facilities. Or, more likely, an Egyptian president happily letting through cargo ships loaded with guns destined for Hezbollah and Hamas. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafis, SCAF understands very well that Egypt cannot afford an open conflict with Israel.

The new constitution will stipulate the division of powers in Egypt – the presidential system is likely to be preserved. However some of the powers might be kept by SCAF, transforming the Egyptian system to resemble the Turkish model of division of power. Nevertheless, parliamentary control over state-owned enterprises has already had some repercussions for Egypt’s gas trade with Israel: Cairo has scrapped the deal according to which Israel would buy gas for prices below the market value and has stopped delivering gas. Israel points out, and rightly so, that the supply shutdown is in violation of the economic annex to the peace treaty of 1979.

Leaving Israel aside, the constitution of Egypt will permanently change the course of Levantine and North African politics. Egyptian society has always played the pioneering role in the Arab World, and once again it will be leading the way. The legal framework of the constitution might determine the future success or failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in mending the country’s crippling economy and society, troubled with deep sectarian divides. This success or failure will also determine whether Islamism is just another stop, after Arab nationalism, on the Arab journey to seek its identity’s final destination.

4. Oil and gas bonanza in Israel, Jordan and Cyprus

Cyprus and Israel are soon to become new gas Eldorado. The discovery of natural gas in the Israeli and Cypriot exclusive economic zone (EEZ) waters, some 50km west of Haifa, as well as the discovery of world’s second biggest reserve in of oil shale in Israel and Jordan can bring a huge cash flow to these countries and permanently change the geopolitics of the Levant. Cyprus and Israel are already working on unitization of gas extraction in Aphrodite deposit, which lies on the border between the Israeli and Cypriot EEZ. Extraction at Israel’s Tamar and Leviathan gas deposits are planned to be fully operational by 2020. Israelis intend to use the FLNG technology – a floating extraction plant – or simply put a ship, which extracts, liquefies and pumps gas onto tank ships, which then sail off to ports.

Russia and South East Asian countries are already interested in buying, but the EU might also be keen to get the goods, since now, more than ever, it seeks to diversify from its main energy source (yes, I mean Russia). Cyprus also plans to build a pipeline, starting at Aphrodite deposit, going to the Cypriot coast, then to Crete and finishing in Greece. Nicosia hopes the revenue will stabilize its economy and free it from all future economic shakedowns in Greece, to which it is currently dangerously tied.

There is, as always, a dark side to these new discoveries. History teaches us that there is a well-documented proportionate correlation between rivers of cash and rivers of blood. It would be far-fetched to claim the new gas and oil deposits will precipitate a major war, but conflicts, so far only diplomatic, have already started. Lebanon unilaterally announced that Israel’s water border should be moved 22m (!) south. Moving the border south gets Lebanon roughly 500 square kilometers extra sea territory for their exclusive exploration, and the sole rights to profits from any resources, live or fossilized. Cypriot activities are already causing irritation in Ankara, which claims that by signing EEZ agreements, Cyprus opens Pandora’s box with regard to its northern neighbours’ claims. Turkey sees no good in Cyprus bathing in gas dollars and might step up its diplomacy to limit Greek Cypriot profits.

Shale oil is a different story. Luckily enough, most of Israel’s shale oil reserves lay in Israel proper, not in the West Bank, hence no need to launch another campaign to “explain” her actions in the Palestinian territories. Israel and Jordan are in an early stage of negotiations (read: declarations were made and everybody went home) with Jordan regarding potential cooperation in oil extraction in order to increase profits. Israel is blessed in that matter, as natural gas is necessary to vaporize oil trapped in shale stones and having both resources, it makes the future Israeli industry self-sustainable and insulated from global market’s price fluctuations.

Altogether, Israel’s combined oil and gas resources are worth a striking $717 billion, and Cypriot Aphrodite $129 billion. This fortune will undoubtedly have an impact on the Middle East for at least the rest of this century.

3. Indo-Pakistani rapprochement

Pakistan and India will have friendly and warm relations – and it’s not just a fantasy of a college student reading too many IR books on international dialogue. This April Manmohan Singh and Asif Ali Zardari met in New Delhi. Although the meeting lasted only 30 minutes, cautiously and proportionately to the current state of bilateral relations, it fairs well for the future of the two countries. Both governments have already considered opening more border crossings to encourage trade exchange (currently limited to one land border crossing in Wagah – a crossing which rather serves tourists coming to watch the odd daily show of nationalism and popular rivalry, then cargo trucks). Banks are also supposed to have exchange offices in order to facilitate investments and, most importantly, peace negotiations have finally resumed first time since their suspension following the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

One may wonder why have India and Pakistan decided right this moment to amend relations. For India, the main motivations is the potential threat from China. As Beijing becomes a global superpower, New Delhi wants to divert its efforts from the half a century old conflict with its western neighbour to counter growing Chinese influence. A similar story can be drawn from Pakistan’s rationale, but for Islamabad the threat comes from the Spin Ghar mountains and the Taliban hiding in their caves. Pakistan has virtually no authority in the Federally Administered Tribal Territories (FATT) and obviously wishes to change it. Terrorism in the FATT is raging, causing strife with the US and undermining the Pakistani government’s prestige in international arena. However, a two front conflict is beyond anyone’s capability (Germany tried it twice: it didn’t work out) and rapprochement with India seems like a natural move if Pakistan genuinely wants to step up its counterterrorism campaign.

2. Post-war Afghanistan

NATO leaves Afghanistan in 2014. It’s a fact: the decision has been made and there is no coming back. It is going to leave an Afghan government controlling Kabul’s government district and maybe few streets nearby whilst the Taliban are more powerful than ever since the invasion in 2001. This topic does not require much deliberation – post-war Afghanistan will turn into the same kind of extremist state as it did after Soviet troops left in 1989. The country has, in essence, a failed economy, lacking in infrastructure and possessing a society that has hardly developed since the initial American action.

1.  Yemen and the Sinai Peninsula – new havens of terrorism

Yemen has suffered from domestic turmoil for quite some time. It wasn’t only the anti-government protests, which erupted after the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, but even earlier there were reports of tribal conflicts over water supplies.

Yemen is virtually on the verge of becoming a failed state. Just a couple of days ago, terrorists detonated a bomb at the Policy Academy in Saana. President Saleh might be gone, but Yemen has to face much bigger challenges than Libya, Tunisia or Egypt. The State’s authority over its territories is limited to major cities, leaving terrorists, financed by Iran, thriving in the North and the South of the country. Hadi’s new government has virtually no resources to increase its presence in rebellious provinces or to undertake reforms, which would revive the non-existent economy. And since Yemen has minute natural resources, none of the Western states is keen on entering a substantial and comprehensive development aid project. Since half of Yemen’s population already lives for less then $2 a day, the country can already be seen as a giant harvesting ground for terrorist organizations. Yemen might draw attention of the West, when it will be already infested with Al-Qaeda and Iran-backed terrorist cells. It is an extremely volatile situation right now which can go from bad to extremely dangerous within a few years if the US is not willing to step up its counter-terrorism activities in Yemen.

A threat on a different but still very serious level comes from the Sinai Peninsula. The Egyptian territory east of the Suez Canal has virtually become an outlawed territory after Mubarak’s downfall, falling into the hands of gangs of Bedouin smugglers. It is already estimated that the smuggling industry in Sinai is worth around $0,5 bln. Everything can be contraband – from food and weapons to sex slaves and drugs. Indeed, the Sinai has become one of the major human trafficking spots, where Bedouins kidnap Sudanese refugees desperate to reach Israel, and sell them to Europe and elsewhere. These gangs operate technicals – the Somali-“Black Hawk Down” type – as well as anti-tank missiles, machine guns, RPGs and many more. A development severely worsening the situation is the progressing radicalization of traditionally religion-neutral Bedouins. The culprit for this is Hamas in the nearby Gaza Strip, who trade with Bedouins and recruits operatives to mount attacks on Israel from Egyptian territory. Since Mubarak left the government, there were around 200 incidents of terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians in Eilat or the Negev desert, as well as sabotage attacks on pipelines, which supply gas to Israel. The gas flow has already been suspended a couple of times leaving Israel with gas shortages over the year. This picture indicates that the Sinai might become, alongside Yemen, another haven for Al-Qaeda and Hamas terrorists. The result might be a regional disaster – any major attack on Israel from Egyptian territory will shred the peace treaty into tatters.

pakistan

Pakistan & The Bipolar World Order

As we drift ever closer to a bipolar world order, why not let economic stagnation become the mutual enemy that all nations share?

[dhr]

[dhr]

[dropcap]F[/dropcap]ukuyama’s ‘The End of History’ essay may not have correctly predicted everything it was supposed to, but one realisation certainly holds true to this day: realist manoeuvrings and proxy inter-state wars have always been an inevitable feature of a bipolar world. With the fall of the USSR, and the US’s securing of uncontested, top dog status, inter-state warfare has fallen to its lowest level since World War II, making this the most peaceful period of modern history. The explanation being that in a world with two competing super powers, fragile alliances are held together by mutual enemies.

Although not yet a bipolar world by most people’s evaluations, the rising influence of China will undoubtedly lead to nations asking serious questions of themselves and who they choose to associate with. This week, while the US ambassador to Pakistan stepped down for what Washington insisted was for personal reasons alone, the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan met with President Zardari to discuss matters of mutual cooperation and bilateral trade.

In recent years, Ambassador Munter may well have held the least coveted role in international relations. Following the arrest of a CIA contractor in Lahore and the US led mission to capture and kill Osama Bin Laden, Munter has had to deal with the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers in November 2011 when the US strayed across the border from Afghanistan. His resignation may appear, after all this, to be the icing on a rather stale and crumbling diplomatic cake.

A Difficult Friendship

The most worrying aspect of these recent events is the fact that they do not come as much of a surprise to anyone. The US and Pakistan have quite a history of sharing mutual enemies and their relationship has, therefore, always been one of convenience and insincerity. Whether it was Nixon and Kissinger using Pakistan’s friendship with China to make Sino-US inroads, or Pakistani support of anti Soviet groups in Afghanistan, the US has always been able to find some beneficial reason to keep Pakistan within arm’s length.

The most recent chapter of this tale has certainly been the trickiest yet. Shortly after 9/11, President Musharraf ended his alliance with the Afghan Taliban while officially entering the Bush Administration’s War on Terror. Since 2001, Pakistan has handed over 5000 members of Al Qaeda to American authorities and received nearly $10 Billion in aid for its troubles. Despite this closeness, Pakistan has constantly been accused of ‘looking both ways’ when it comes to terrorism. Pakistan’s Inter-Services-Intelligence Agency (ISI) has been accused of training and sponsoring groups that the Americans claim to be fighting across the border in Afghanistan. Indeed, it was Pakistan’s Intelligence Agency that was instrumental in bringing the Taliban to power in Afghanistan in the mid 90’s with a view to setting up a favourable regime in a neighbouring country. With the US planning to withdraw a substantial number of troops from Afghanistan in 2014, all bets are off as to what condition Pakistani – US relations will be in if the Taliban were ever to re emerge in Afghan political life.

China may be far from another USSR in terms of economic ambition and political philosophy, but one very unfortunate consequence of their rise to power may be a return to the days of short lived alliances based on mutual enemies. Courting Pakistan may prove to be a way for China to counter US influence in the sub continent, particularly given the improving relationship between the US and Pakistan’s long term rival India.

The New Mr. Popular

On April 19thIndia launched its new Agni 5 Missile in the Bay of Bengal. Possessing missiles with the ability to reach key Chinese cities, and a new missile defence shield installed this week, President Singh has praised the ‘credibility of his country’s security and preparedness’. In contrast to the standard reaction of the Western powers to missile testing, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton showed almost no concern, instead citing India’s ‘solid non-proliferation record’. Similarly, the Chinese have not openly condemned India’s actions and have insisted that the two nations remain ‘partners’. The most binding of India’s bargaining tools currently is the state of its economy. India and China have increasingly managed to let economic integration and trade overcome border disputes in the South China Sea, starting a process that must be continued if the subcontinent has any chance of seeing long lasting peace.

This ought to come as a warning to Pakistan. Trade will continue to be more effective at maintaining relationships than simply possessing the same enemies. Economic growth and an expanding middle class are Pakistan’s best chance of securing credible status. A lack of commitment from its democratically elected politicians to end the influence of the army and the ISI will only seek to damage its chances of gaining its fair share of economic prosperity in the sub continent.

As for the US and China, learning the lessons from the days of the Cold War should hopefully remind them that the likelihood of a rise in inter-state warfare in the Indian subcontinent, or indeed anywhere, is only likely to increase if tensions between themselves become too strained. As we drift ever closer to a bipolar world order, why not let economic stagnation become the mutual enemy that all nations share?

iran flag

The Effects Of A Nuclear Iran

With reference to Israel’s nuclear strategy, would a nuclear-armed Iran spur proliferation among Arab states, strengthen Hamas and Hezbollah and disrupt oil shipping?
{Department of War Studies, King’s College London}

[dhr]

[dhr]

[dropcap]H[/dropcap]aving deposed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from its throne, the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme currently occupies the prized position as the mainstay of Middle Eastern debate. Intransigence and fiery rhetoric has gained Iran few friends, numerous enemies, and left the international community playing a guessing game as to how the conflict will evolve. There are few moments of clarity within this subject area. One, however, is the indubitable fact that the regime is pursuing the development of a weaponized nuclear capability. The IAEA revealed in May of last year that Tehran has been working on the construction of a nuclear detonator, a project that has absolutely no civilian purpose; its only use is in the detonation of a nuclear warhead.1

Thus this paper will initially question why Iran wishes to develop a nuclear weapon (NW), proceeding to analyse Israeli nuclear strategy and pre-emptively assaulting the question by declaring its non-viability: I argue that Iran categorically will not acquire a NW in the foreseeable future. As such, all latter arguments come with the caveat that they are inherently speculative and capricious. I argue that should Iran ‘go nuclear’ proliferation in the region is preventable, that a nuclear-armed Iran would be unlikely to assail oil shipping and I provide various differing situations, policy-recommendations and predictions regarding a nuclear Iran’s relationships with regional non-state actors.

Iranian Nuclear Desire: Why?

This section will analyse Iranian nuclear desire through the prism of Sagan’s three theories of nuclear proliferation: security considerations, domestic considerations and international norms. Resultantly corroborating the view that “nuclear proliferation cannot be explained by a single causal model”.2

Security Considerations

Iranian desire for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) was born following the Iran-Iraq War, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani explaining: “it was made very clear during the war that [WMDs] are decisive… . We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of [these] weapons”.3 Fear of Iraq metamorphosed into a fear of the United States following its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the declarations of intent for regime-change in Iran by the Bush administration augmenting “long-standing concerns about American intentions”.4

The view that “there is no way to deter the United States other than by having nuclear weapons” has been corroborated by the case of North Korea.5 The East Asian country has tested its NWs on more that one occasion and continues to provoke the powers that be;6 Iraq on the other hand did not have a nuclear ability and suffered the consequences. The lesson to be learned is apparent: the acquisition of nuclear weapons prevents American military intervention.7 Thus, given the plethora of American military forces in the region, when viewing Iran’s situation through a security prism desire for NWs is understandable.

Domestic Considerations

Irrespective of whether a NW serves the security of the state, such a programme is “likely to serve the parochial bureaucratic or political interests of at least some individual actors within the state”.8 Sagan outlines three groups that could stand to benefit from proliferation: (i) the nuclear energy establishment; (ii) the military (or an element within it), and; (iii) politicians presiding over a populace desiring nuclear capability.9

The evolution of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) into a “socio-military-political-economic force” with influence stretching far and wide within the Islamic Republic has, according to some analysts, afforded the entity greater control over Tehran than the Supreme Leader.10 With clout in the nuclear establishment, influence in the military and significant control over the political system (former Guard commanders hold positions in the Supreme National Council, the Expediency Council, and of course the current President),11 its desire for nuclear capability is undoubtedly a driving force within Iran. Additionally, polls suggest that 7 out of every 10 Iranians (both pro- and anti-government) support the nuclear programme, thus providing political incentives for politicians.12 Consequently domestic theory provides further answers to comprehending Iranian nuclear ambition.

International Norms

The last of Sagan’s theories argues that proliferation may not be determined by “leaders’ cold calculations about the national security interests [nor] their parochial bureaucratic interests, but rather by deeper norms and shared beliefs about what actions are legitimate and appropriate in international relations”.13 Examples given are the establishment of Air Malawi, Royal Nepal Airlines and Air Myanmar. None were founded to develop transport infrastructure within their respective countries, more because national leaders “believed that a national airline is something that modern states have to have to be modern states”.14

Iran is a proud country that often proffers its vision of itself as a regional power with aspirations to become a world leader. Due to the fact that the first five nuclear states hold positions of great power in international diplomacy (permanent seats in the United Nations Security Council), is it any wonder that a country with a vision such as Iran’s seeks to develop attributes that would allow it to achieve a status on par with its desires?

The Begin Doctrine

Menachem Begin’s famous words have long been adopted as the underlying doctrine behind Israeli policy towards neighbouring countries’ WMD manufacturing: “on no account shall we permit an enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against the people of Israel”. The dictum has been altered by later Israeli statesmen, including Ariel Sharon: “Israel cannot afford the introduction of the nuclear weapon… . We shall therefore have to prevent such a threat at its inception”.15 Such iteration has given birth to common sentiment that Israel will assault any proximate nation that seeks to develop a NW, building on the Begin Doctrine which referred more generally to any form of WMD. A cursory glance at Middle Eastern nuclear proliferation attempts and Israeli reactions demonstrates that Israel has not always held true to such an axiom.

Shlomo Brom provides various instances showing the lack of Israeli action pursuant to the more general Begin Doctrine: Egyptian chemical and biological weapons development in the late 1950s; Syrian chemical weapons programmes after the Yom Kippur War, and; construction of an Iraqi chemical plant in the early 1980s.16 Brom proceeds to remind the reader that Baghdad restarted its nuclear program after the bombing of the Osirak reactor in 1982 inducing no further military action from Jerusalem. Similarly, after Operation Desert Storm and the revelation that Iraq was again attempting proliferation, Israel opted to coerce European countries into preventing the supply of materials necessary for such a program to reach realisation rather that performing additional strikes.17 The decision to utilize solely diplomatic overtures was most likely due to the difficulties involved in striking the post-Osirak Iraqi programmes. Saddam Hussein learned the lesson, one that Iran has clearly taken note of, that the dispersal of critical sites is imperative.18 By spreading his nuclear program thinly across Iraq, Hussein distinctly limited Israel’s ability to undertake pre-emptive aerial strikes against such facilities. The effortless destruction of Syria’s sole nuclear reactor at al-Kibar is a secondary case in point as to the importance of such a strategy.

This, however, does not lead to the extrapolation that Israel will not attempt to incapacitate Iran’s nuclear programme through military means should current diplomatic efforts fail. It is beneficial to allow diplomacy to see as much sunlight as possible before being shelved (owing to the difficulties in assailing Iran), but this route is only viable for Israel until Iran nears breakout capability. Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), in which he evoked memories of the holocaust as reasoning to destroy Iranian nuclear ambition, is one of many examples of Israeli dictum stating the intention to prevent an Iranian bomb whatever the cost.19 President Obama’s speech at the event similarly reiterated that his policy is to “prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon” and that he would “not hesitate to use force… to defend the United States and its interests”;20 the last three successive American presidents have vocalised similar ultimatums.21

We will not see an Iranian NW unless we see radical regime change (excuse the pun) in Tehran and the emergence of a government that is able to rebuild relations with Jerusalem. Even with such an implausible scenario manifesting, it remains highly unlikely that a Western-friendly Tehran would be permitted to construct this most dangerous of weapons. Thus, to all extents and purposes, the remainder of this paper deals with purely speculative analysis on issues that are unlikely to ever come to fruition. As Fiore notes, “given the security culture in the country, no Israeli decision-maker can risk allowing a bitter ideological enemy to acquire enemy weapons”.22 There will be no nuclear-armed Iran in the near future.

A Nuclear Iran and Proliferation

It has been argued that the Israeli fear of a nuclear Iran is more due to the resultant threat of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East than an Iranian NW per se.23 The revolutions that have swept across the region over the year or so will conceivably lead to greater control of Arab foreign policy by the Arab street, thus animosity towards Israel will appear in future decision-making. Israeli apprehension is born out of the theory that an Iranian NW will, by way of the security concept mentioned previously, lead to proliferation in the region. Combine greater regional acrimony toward the Jewish state with an Arab nuclear capability and Israeli fears are comprehensible.

As Kenneth Waltz has argued, history demonstrates that the cascade concept (a state will rapidly construct NWs to counter strategic imbalance created by a hostile neighbour’s nuclear arming) is flawed. His argument is further consolidated by virtue of the fact that the fear of rapid nuclear proliferation has been vociferously audible in Western media almost every year since the 1960s, yet the world possesses only nine nuclear powers.24 Leaving this convincing argument to one side, would a nuclear Iran provoke proliferation in the Middle East?

Sagan’s aforementioned three theories assume that a state has the ability and the opportunity to develop a weapon.25 By inserting such a caveat we can eliminate numerous states from this predictive analysis of proliferation in the region. Whilst existing nuclear powers (China and Pakistan for example) may be willing to suffer international condemnation for the provision of nuclear technology to a strong regional player (perhaps Saudi Arabia) in return for the “strategic prize of security ties”, they are highly unlikely to do so for minor actors (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait etc.) – irrespective of the ability of such states to pay over-the-odds for the technology.26 It is highly unlikely that such states would be able to proceed with a NW program as a result of this. Furthermore, it is doubtful that these smaller states would risk alienating their American or Saudi security backers by developing a NW given that such powers “are the cornerstones for ensuring their autonomies from the larger states of Iraq and Iran”.27 Such stumbling blocks would likely lead to these states further cultivating their security relationships with the United States.28

Saudi Arabia, whilst currently lacking the technical infrastructure to develop a weapon,29 is the most likely to respond to an Iranian weapon with one of its own. Saudi fears of future American intervention and mistrust of Israel combined with the threat of an increasingly Iranian dominated Gulf region would likely result in the logic that a NW would offset such perils.30 The former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal iterated last December that “it is our duty towards our nation and people to consider all possible options, including possession of [nuclear] weapons”, a statement that goes some way to substantiating this argument.31 The ability and opportunity clauses are satisfied owing to Saudi financial reserves and the long-standing defence ties between the Kingdom and nuclear-armed Pakistan.32 But such an eventuality is containable through the prevention of Pakistani assistance, American guarantees of non-intervention in the Arab country, provision of conventional arms to mitigate increased Iranian influence and a guarantee of American nuclear deterrence against Tehran.33

Turkey is one of a handful of countries that have recently communicated their intention to commence a nuclear program, a progression that has been interpreted by some analysts as a “hedge against a nuclear-armed Iran”, presumably their first steps towards developing a weapon.34 Such an interpretation can be refuted not only due to Ankara’s warming relations with Tehran and disaffection with American and European sanctions against the Islamic Republic, but furthermore owing to Turkey’s long history of participation in non-proliferation efforts.35 The Anatolian country joined NATO within a few years of its creation and has hosted nuclear weapons under America’s umbrella for some time. Thus it seems improbable that Turkey would feel the need to proliferate following the advent of an Iranian weapon.

Predicting eventual political make-up and direction of both Egypt and Syria falls outside the scope of this paper, though such analysis is paramount to anticipating the potential for proliferation. It is widely assumed that Assad will eventually succumb to the opposition movement in Syria, though envisioning how the rebels will behave vis a vis Assad’s allies in Tehran or the United States is problematic (with evident repercussions as to their potential pursuit of NWs).36 What is clear, however, is that Israel would not permit a Syrian weapon. As the strike on al-Kibar in 2007 demonstrated, Israeli Air Force (IAF) action against Syria is not constrained by the impracticalities of an attack on Iran. Syrian anti-aircraft weaponry and its air force are military relics of eras gone by, and, unlike Iran, the distances involved in an aerial strike are easily surmountable. Furthermore, Syrian infrastructure relating to a nuclear program is negligible and “bar significant infusions of external assistance”, unlikely to be realised.37 It is doubtful that a future Syrian government’s cost-benefit analysis would negate to take account of such points.

With similar caveats for Egyptian predictions, whilst the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) retain influence within the Republic proliferation is unlikely. The United States could deduct the “estimated budget of any suspect research and development program” from American military and economic aid to Egypt.38 Such a development would reduce the SCAFs power given their use of the $1.3 billion p/a aid to shore up support for their political presence.39 Owing to current political dilemmas it is improbable that such an occurrence would be welcomed.

In summation, whilst nuclear proliferation in the region following Iranian nuclear attainment poses a real threat in the case of Saudi Arabia, the remaining major regional players are unlikely to initiate a NWs programme. Noticeably absent from this analysis is Iraq, owing to this author’s belief that given the current pro-Iranian government and continued American influence proliferation seems unlikely – though it is recognised that this may change in the future. An American nuclear umbrella, the provision of conventional arms and a strictly enforced prohibition on the transfer of nuclear technology would diminish prospects of proliferation dramatically throughout the region.

Non-State Actors

The effects of an Iranian bomb on non-state actors can be dichotomised as follows: (1a) Iran provides a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon; (1b) an Iranian weapon is stolen by a militant group; (2a) an Iranian bomb would provoke unsanctioned aggression from Hamas and Hezbollah (the proxies as belligerents), and; (2b) Iran would sanction aggression by these proxies (Iran as the belligerent).

Nuclear Provision & Theft

At the recent AIPAC conference, President Obama aired the fear “that an Iranian nuclear weapon could fall into the hands of a terrorist organization”.40 This could occur in two situations: either Iran provides a nuclear weapon to a militant group or such a group steals an Iranian weapon. The former is highly unlikely.41 Since 1979 Iran has, for the most part, employed a coherent, rational foreign policy;42 the provision of nuclear weapons to proxies that it does not possess full control over is not an action undertaken by any rational pragmatist. Iran would be held responsible for any resultant detonation and thus would be subject to the full retaliation of the United States and its allies.43

The latter, given that Tehran may not implement sufficient safeguards to prevent unintended detonation or theft,44 is of greater concern. However, in the eventuality of an Iranian weapon, would this not provide a suitable opportunity to reintegrate Iran into the international fold? If the West were to provide assistance in securitising the Iranian nuclear program, economic benefits aside, the construction of links between the pariah state and the West would be wholesome for all involved.

Hamas & Hezbollah

Fiore argues that Hamas and Hezbollah “might take the nuclear umbrella for granted and be more inclined to escalate minor conflicts with or without encouragement from Tehran”,45 an argument that is supported elsewhere.46 There have been conflicting messages originating from the Palestinian group regarding their response to a pre-emptive strike on Iran, but how would the two groups act should Iran cross the nuclear threshold?47

In the event that aggression was not sanctioned by Tehran, aggressive posturing by Hamas and Hezbollah would likely facilitate a destructive Israeli response. We can draw a parallel with the intifadas: Arab pacifism in the First Intifada limited the potency of the IDF; violence in the Second permitted the IDF to utilize its distinct military superiority. Iran would likely be reluctant to intervene in such a scenario as to do so would result in all-out war with Israel.48 That leads us to question whether Iran would galvanize the two organizations into action, a consideration that would ultimately prove or disprove Waltz’s theory that nuclear states act responsibly. It is unclear whether Iran would undertake such action, however it should be noted that if Assad were to fall the current supply-line would cease to exist,49 therefore the most feasible solution to supplying Hamas and Hezbollah would be through Iranian use of the Suez Canal (the precedent of which has been recently set).50 Whether Israel would allow such a transfer to take place is arguable, though the Jewish state has acted in the past (the Karine A affair) to stop similar actions in international waters.51 The Iranian backlash to Israeli action on this front is equally unpredictable.

To conclude this section, it is not only dubious to assert that Iran would provide a non-state actor with a nuclear weapon, but coequally to suggest that Iran would support Hamas or Hezbollah in the event of their non-sanctioned aggression against Israel. What is unclear is how Iran would weigh up the costs and benefits of stimulating proxy action against Israel. The threat of an Iranian weapon being stolen by another entity is preventable should the West seek to ingratiate itself with the Iranian regime.

The Oil Weapon

The Supreme Leader has emphasized Tehran’s willingness to “seriously jeopardize” energy supplies should the US attack or punish Iran, an assertion that has been repeated by various elements of the Iranian establishment.52 Such rhetoric is seized upon by neoconservatives to demonstrate the dangers that Iran poses and the need for conclusive military action to prevent Iran building a bomb and thus becoming ‘immune’ to retribution in the case of Iranian actions against shipping. But such logic is flawed as Iranian use of the oil weapon would be reactionary to intervention of some description.

The United States and the European Union have recently punished Iran through increased sanctions, an action that has not catalysed an Iranian response. Should Iran ‘go nuclear’ and thus achieve military immunity (if the N. Korea-Iraq paradigm of American non-intervention in nuclear-armed states holds true), America would not attack Iran and thus there would be no provocation to induce an Iranian reaction. The risk of Iran acting against the Strait of Hormuz emanates from a pre-emptive military strike that Tehran considers to be severely threatening and that fails to destroy Iranian military assets.53 Once Iran has crossed the nuclear threshold, America would not act against Tehran and therefore the reasoning behind an assault on oil shipping lacks foundation.

In Summation

Initially considering the reasons why Iran would desire a nuclear weapon, this paper proceeded to assert the improbability of Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon through an analysis of Israeli nuclear strategy and the Jewish state’s irrevocable attitude towards preventing any regional power challenging its military superiority. In the implausible circumstance that such an eventuality manifests, this paper has argued that of all the proximate states likely to view an Iranian weapon as a security threat, Saudi Arabia, with its financial reserves and strong links to Sunni Pakistan, is the most likely to attempt proliferation. This paper has posited that such a development is containable through the provision of a well-received and believed-in American nuclear umbrella, conventional arm sales to limit Iranian influence and stringent controls on the spread of existing nuclear technology. Syrian, Egyptian and Iraqi nuclear development is unlikely for a host of reasons, though inevitably such predictions rest on the ontogenesis of these states following recent upheavals.

Latterly, if the Iraq-N. Korea paradigm holds true, Tehran would have no reason to impact on oil shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, not least out of consideration for the detrimental effects on the Iranian economy. This paper further asserted the absurdity of the suggestion that the Islamic Republic would provide its proxies with a nuclear weapon. Whether a nuclear weapon would morph Iran into a regional aggressor, or whether its possession of such a bomb would provide the foundations for integration with the West has been left unanswered. Israeli nuclear capability allowed the Jewish state some semblance of security in a region of hostile Arab states. A Persian nuclear capability would serve the same purpose.

 [toggle title="Citations & Bibliography"]

1 Fiore (2011), p. 2
2 Bahgat (2006), p. 124
3 Bowen & Kidd (2004), p. 264
4 Ibid.
5 Sagan & Waltz (2007), p. 137
6 ‘North Korea conducts nuclear test’, BBC, 25 May 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8066615.stm
7 Bahgat (2006), p. 126
8 Sagan (1996), p. 63
9 Ibid., p. 64-65
10 ‘Iran’s Revolutionary Guards’, Council on Foreign Relations, 12 October 2011, http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-revolutionary-guards/p14324
11 Ibid.
12 ‘Iran, Lebanon, Israelis and Palestinians: New IPI Opinion Polls’, International Peace Institute, 8 December 2010, http://www.ipacademy.org/index.php/events/details/256-Iran,%20Lebanon,%20Israelis%20and%20Palestinians-%20New%20IPI%20Opinion%20Polls.html
13 Sagan (1996), p. 73
14 Ibid., p. 74
15 Brom (2005), p. 137
16 Ibid., p. 136
17 Brom (2005), p. 136
18 Ibid., p. 142
19 ‘Netanyahu invokes horrors of Holocaust, declares Israel’s right to “defend itself, by itself”’, Reuters, 6 March 2012
20 ‘Transcript of Obama’s AIPAC speech’, Politico, 4 March 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/73588.html
21 Edelman et al. (2011), p. 76
22 Fiore (2011), p. 9
23 ‘An Iranian Nuke Is No Threat – An Arab Nuke Is’, theriskyshift, 22 February 2012 http://www.theriskyshift.com/2012/02/iranian-nuke-is-no-threat-arab-nuke-is.html
24 Gavin (2009), p. 17
25 Jo & Gartzke (2007), p. 169
26 Russell (2005), p. 34
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 44
29 Bowen & Kidd (2005), p. 53
30 Russell (2005), pp. 31-32
31 ‘Saudi may join nuclear arms race: ex-spy chief’, AFP, 5 December 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hHglcDORk9Wk5WtM79nbDw8GC9yQ
32 Bowen & Kidd (2005), p. 53
33 Bowen & Kidd (2004), p. 273
34 Edelman et al. (2011), p. 69
35 Ulgen (2011), p. 138
36 ‘Obama: Syria’s Assad “will fall”, but no air strikes’, Reuters, 6 March 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/06/us-syria-idUSTRE8220CI20120306
37 Bowen & Kidd (2005), p. 71
38 Sagan (1996), p. 72
39 Russell (2005), p. 42
40 ‘Transcript of Obama’s AIPAC speech’, Politico, 4 March 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/73588.html
41 Fiore (2011), p. 4
42 See Rasmussen (2009)
43 See Gavin (2009) p. 16
44 Edelman et al. (2011), p. 72
45 Fiore (2011), p. 4
46 Edelman et al. (2011), p. 68
47 ‘Hamas sends conflicting message over support for Iran’, Trumpet, 8 March 2012, http://www.thetrumpet.com/9196.13.0.0/middle-east/iran/hamas-sends-conflicting-message-over-support-for-iran
48 Bahgat (2006), p. 129
49 Support for Assad from Hezbollah and Iran will likely mean that should the rebels defeat the Syrian leader future relations with the two entities would be poor.
50 ‘Iran warships sail via Suez Canal amid Israeli concern’, BBC, 22 February 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12533803
51 ‘Seizing of the Palestinian weapons ship Karine A’, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 January 2002, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/1/Seizing%20of%20the%20Palestinian%20weapons%20ship%20Karine%20A-
52 Talmadge (2008), p. 88
53 Ibid., pp. 87-88

Abrahamian, E. (2005), ‘Neocons and Their Nemeses in Iran’, Boundary 2, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 95-115

Babaei, A.R. (2008), ‘Israel’s Concerns and Iran’s Nuclear Programme’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 6, pp. 21-25

Bahgat, G. (2006), ‘Nuclear Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran’, International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 124-136

Bowen, W.Q. & Kidd, J. (2004), ‘The Iranian Nuclear Challenge’, International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2, pp. 257-276

Bowen, W.Q. & Kidd, J. (2005), ‘The Nuclear Capabilities and Ambitions of Iran’s Neighbours’, in Sokolski H. & Clawson, P., Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute), pp. 51-88

Braun, C. & Chyba, C.F. (2004), ‘Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 5-49

Brom, S. (2005), ‘Is the Begin Doctrine Still a Viable Option for Israel?’, in Sokolski H. & Clawson, P., Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute), pp. 133-158

Edelman, E.S., Krepinevich, A.F. & Montgomery, E.B. (2011), ‘The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 1, pp. 66-81

Fiore, M. (2011), ‘Israel and Iran’s Nuclear Weapon Programme: Roll Back or Containment’, IAI Working Papers, Vol. 11, No. 18, pp. 1-16

Gavin, F.J. (2009), ‘Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 7-37

Jain, A. (2011), Nuclear Weapons and Iran’s Global Ambitions (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy)

James, C.C. (2000), ‘Nuclear Arsenal Games: Coping with Proliferation in a World of Changing Rivalries’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 723-746

Jo, D. & Gartzke, E. (2007), ‘Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 167-194

Nye, J.S. (1992), ‘New Approaches to Nuclear Proliferation Policy’, Science, Vol. 256, No. 5061, pp. 1293-1297

Rasmussen, K.B. (2009), The Foreign Policy of Iran: Ideology and pragmatism in the Islamic Republic (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies)

Russell, R.L. (2005), ‘Arab Security Responses to a Nuclear-Ready Iran’, in Sokolski H. & Clawson, P., Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute), pp. 23-50

Sagan, S. (1996), ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb’, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 54-86

Sagan, S. & Waltz, K. (2007), ‘A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability Or Courting Disaster’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 2, pp. 135-150

Singh, S. & Way, C.R. (2004), ‘The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 6, pp. 859-885

Shaikh, F. (2002), ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-Proliferation Regime’, International Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 29-48

Talmadge, C. (2008), ‘Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz’, International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 82-117

Ulgen, S. (2011), ‘The Security Dimension of Turkey’s Nuclear Program: Nuclear Diplomacy and Non Proliferation Policies’, in Ulgen, S. (ed), The Turkish Model for Transition to Nuclear Power (Istanbul: Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies), pp. 142-181

[/toggle]