Falkland/Malvinas: Identity Crisis
{Department of War Studies, King’s College London}
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ʻNational unity is always effected by means of brutalityʼ, Ernest Renan(1)
[dropcap]T[/dropcap]he thirty year anniversary of the Falklands/Malvinas War was commemorated in both Britain and Argentina just weeks ago with much ceremony, speeches and media coverage. For the past five years, Argentina has reasserted its claim to the islands more vocally, takings its complaint of the ʻillegitimateʼ UK presence to the United Nations. Tensions have been rising, with Argentina drumming up allies and imposing embargoes on vessels flying the Falklands flag in Argentinean waters, going so far as to persuade Chile to restrict or ban flights to the islands, further isolating the residents and increasing the sense of ʻencirclementʼ.(2) British Prime Minister David Cameron, among others, retaliated in a show of political posturing, not only with British naval presence near the Islands, but also rather curiously by accusing Argentina of possessing a ʻcolonialist attitudeʼ.(3)
National identity played, and continues to play, a significant role in the perpetuation of the conflict. The aim of this analysis is to review current displays of nationalism and portrayals of national identity in Argentina and Britain with reference to the domestic and international circumstances at the time of the invasion in 1982 and thus to discern the key factors and justifications on both sides of the conflict. In order to do this, the author will conduct a theoretical analysis of the construction and securitization of national identity in both nation-states. The analysis will first analyze Michael Billigʼs ʻbanal nationalismʼ, often associated with this historic dispute, incorporating its foundations in Roland Barthesʼ semiological analysis of myth-symbols. The analysis will then look at an alternative approach through Benedict Andersonʼs ʻimagined communitiesʼ. During the analysis a number of examples will be discussed including language, symbols, speeches and events from the years preceding the war to the present day in order to view the way in which these displays of nationalism and representations of national identity are perpetuated and received.
Definitions
Before we define nationalism and national identity, it is useful to have an understanding of what exactly constitutes a nation. The ʻnationʼ can be viewed as a distinctive group of people dwelling in a specific territory, the members of which may or may not be ancestrally related.(4) A ʻquasi-mythical bondʼ is assumed between the group and the territory.(5) Alternatively, the nation can be viewed as a social construction, the character of which forms the basis for political strategies.(6) It has been argued that the nation is a contingency rather than a necessity.(7)
In the framework of this thesis, it is useful to view the nation-state, as represented by its central political institutions, in a dual capacity as legitimate if its internal members, as well as external counterparts, accept its sovereignty. This is particularly relevant considering the popular opinion that the Argentinean military dictatorship at the time of the 1982 invasion sought a ʻjust warʼ to seal its sovereignty.(8) The same applies when considering successive British governments attempts to maintain popularity and unity amidst shifting political spectrums and economic crises, and how the island dispute can effect this in the creation of a common enemy.
Nationalism is ʻprimarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruentʼ(9) Alternatively, nationalism is ʻan ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a human population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential ʻnationʼʼ.(10) Another perspective is that nationalism refers to the largest group of people with common descent, whereas ʻpatriotismʼ refers to civic and state affiliations.(11) These definitions show the difficulty in agreeing upon a universal formula for nationalism because a particular understanding of ʻnationʼ is presupposed.
Expressions of nationalism are one form of identity, as well as ethnicity, religion, language and of course gender. National identity involves a form of political community, which implies common institutions, rights and duties as well as the assumption of a common and finite social space within a fixed territory. National ʻidentityʼ implies that the members identify with, and feel they belong to, this fixed space.(12)
The Bold…
Constructivism argues that ʻinterests and identities are informed by norms which guide actors (states) along certain socially prescribed channels of ʻappropriateʼ ehaviour[sic]ʼ.(13) States, in their formation, look to apparently ʻlegitimateʼ behaviors and actions, which are not known a priori, but are based on the domestic and international circumstances in which they find themselves. Following this framework it is possible to analyze the depictions of Argentine and British national identities, and also how they can be categorized as ʻhotʼ or ʻbanalʼ, but exist ultimately in the aim of ʻimaginingʼ or creating national fervor around the Falkland/Malvinas dispute, or in reaction to the circumstances surrounding the dispute.
National identity can be employed to create or consolidate political legitimacy. ʻHotterʼ forms of nationalism such as the existence of causa Malvinas and vocal Argentinean expressions of ʻincompletenessʼ add fuel to the fire for groups of people not (yet) connected to the dispute. It must be acknowledged that criticisms of extreme Argentinean nationalism came predominantly from British governments, and that the present Argentinean government has attempted to depict ʻcoolerʼ territorial nationalism in its use of the UN as arbitrator.(14) Nevertheless, bold displays of nationalism, such as visits to strategically chosen locations such as la plaza de las Malvinas in Ushuaia by President Kirchner, as well as aggressive political posturing between Kirchner and Prime Minister David Cameron, are in direct contrast to the everyday, unnoticed reminders of national symbols which will be discussed later.
However, there are two dimensions to such bold displays of nationalism. As Matthew Benwell and Klaus Dodds point out, public expressions of national identity and attempts at solidarity such as Kirchnerʼs 2010 visit to Ushuaia – far south of Buenos Aires – have limited audiences, environmental conditions reduce the potential for large crowds of ʻflag waversʼ. Whilst ceremonies serve as ʻbanalʼ yearly reminders of the continuing relevance of the conflict, it has limited reach because it presupposes a ʻquasi-mythicalʼ bond between the average Argentine and the Malvinas. The study conducted by Benwell and Dodds shows the opposite relationship to be true. Young people interviewed, most born at the time of or after the conflict, did not see a ʻpurposeʼ to the islands and some questioned, ʻwhat nation?ʼ, depicting a major disconnect between Argentinean political rhetoric on national belonging and the younger voting generations.(15)
One of the hottest examples of nationalism for both nation-states arises in the discussion of UN Resolution 2065 on the Falklands/Malvinas ʻquestionʼ, based upon Resolution 1514. Resolution 1514 is informed by a conviction that ʻall peoples have an inalienable right to […] the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territoryʼ.(16) Argentina bases its accusation of ʻillegalʼ British presence upon this resolution, whilst its own claim is ostensibly territorial, refusing to acknowledge the rights or interests of the Islanders, whom they see as ethnically British settlers on a territory of Spanish inheritance. Resolution 2065 explicitly cites the interests of the Islanders.(17) These differences in legalistic stances reveal diverse perspectives on national identity. The British government has maintained that ʻit is the inalienable right of the Falkland Islanders to decide where sovereignty lies.ʼ(18) The previous British assertion was on the basis of long-term peaceful administration of the Islands since 1833. On the other hand, Argentina upholds territorial integrity over the rights of the population which is at odds with liberal democratic principles as well as Argentinaʼs past as a colonial territory and former military dictatorship – a past from which it is eager to distance itself. D. George Boyce highlights the inconsistency of a ʻcomparatively […] new nation […] comprised largely of immigrants […] seeking to make good its claim to the Falklands on anti-colonial groundsʼ.(19) Both nation-states appear to have a negative view of colonialism in line with UN Conventions, yet both accuse the other of maintaining just such an attitude.(20)
British national identity, in its overt manifestations, is somewhat more muted than that of Argentina. However, in the past decade or so, successive British governments have attempted to construct a greater sense of national belonging, more akin to American ʻflag wavingʼ, in the light of international terrorism, economic crises and widespread rioting in 2011. Understandably, British national identity is currently somewhat fragmented considering potential Scottish evolution, which has led to more regionalized nationalisms. There has been a significant debate on ʻEnglishnessʼ, rather than ʻBritishnessʼ – a conversation that occurs in peaks and troughs during times of duress, and which has a significant impact on Britonsʼ ability to identify with the culturally identical, yet geographically removed, Falklanders.(21) Similar to the disillusionment of young Argentines, Britons are less concerned with continued administration of, and sovereignty over, the Islands and are arguably more attuned to political pandering and diversionary tactics in the domestic space.(22)
Comparing British positions past and present, the circumstances do not appear to be drastically different. Whilst the United Kingdomʼs place on the international stage has increased in prominence, as has Argentinaʼs in light of a burgeoning Latin American economy, there is still a worldwide economic crisis and a significant national debt. Recent budget cuts have presented different angles on the debate, for example, in late 2010, retired naval commanders wrote to The Times to express their concern at defense cuts and the reining in of armed forces in the region, amidst fears that this was tantamount inviting Argentina to invade again. However, it was suggested that relations with Argentina had improved drastically, Argentine veterans ʻcome [to the Island] to bury the ghost. People here donʼt show any aggression to them.ʼ(23) This exemplifies the major disconnect between the reality of the situation between the islanders, those explicitly connected to the conflict and the general public, as well as those with outside interests such as politicians, pundits and military personnel; this highlights the mixed receptions to and justifications for ʻhotʼ nationalism.
…The Banal…
Argentinean nationalism has been analyzed in relation to Michael Billigʼs concept of ʻbanal nationalismʼ. Benwell and Dodds argue that research into territorial nationalism should not ignore the wider spatial, temporal and everyday contexts, concluding that interest in the ʻMalvinasʼ issue varies in intensity depending not only on wider social, political and economic circumstances, but also on the geographic location under consideration and familial circumstances of the individual.(24) An important example is the national remembrance day of the war on April 2nd in both nation-states. For the average Argentine this provides a regular, annual reminder of the contemporary relevance of the dispute, bringing las Islas Malvinas to the fore of public consciousness. In Britain also the remembrance day brings weeks of media attention, causing parts of the public to fulminate against the issue.(25)
Benwell and Dodds highlight two issues with continuous ʻforgettingʼ in Argentina which constitute two sides of the same issue: in evoking the memory of the conflict as a representation of national identity and unity, the sense of ʻincompletenessʼ that the lack of sovereignty of the islands inflicts on Argentinean national identity is perpetuated. As discussed briefly above, this in turn is exacerbated by the disparity between the theatre of action and the individual – not only in the framework of the past conflict, but also in the present circumstances, in which the average citizen – Argentinean or British – cannot comprehend the reality of the islands in their geographically and/or culturally removed existence, but is nonetheless presented with an identity crisis.
The use of language, gendering in particular, is another aspect of banal nationalism in this case. Las Malvinas were referred to as ʻthe little lost sistersʼ, evoking a sense of feminine vulnerability.(26) Masculine terminology is ʻcolonizingʼ whilst feminine terminology is ʻcolonizedʼ.(27) In addition, the use of phrases and slogans such as ʻlas Malvinas son argentinosʼ (the Malvinas are Argentine) in rhetoric and propaganda perpetuates not only the use of a specific name – ʻMalvinasʼ rather than ʻFalklandsʼ – but also the possessive nature of the claim. Interestingly, such slogans refer to the islands only, and not the islanders themselves. However, Benwell and Dodds highlight that not all generations and regions identify with the narrative of ownership. Boyce states that the Islanders are seen as ʻBritish, kith and kin of the home nation, speaking in familiar accentsʼ.(28) It is implied that shared language and heredity unite people to a nation more forcefully than the Argentinean connection to the Malvinas soil.
Cultural symbolism adds to this picture under Barthesʼ thesis on the layering of meaning onto seemingly arbitrary objects. Argentina has created a furore by making concerted efforts to prevent civilian vessels flying the Falklands flag from entering their waters, also persuading vital British allies such as Chile to follow suit. This has been contested in the words of an Argentinean student as a ʻbig lie […] all they have to do is change the Falklands flag for a British flag and they can sail into portʼ.29 Whilst the islands are seen as a ʻsymbol of patriotismʼ, an Argentinean filmmaker, Tamara Florin, stated upon her visit to the islands that the people ʻeat fish and chips […], theyʼre Britishʼ. She states unequivocally that ʻthere is nothing Argentinean about the islandsʼ except perhaps the landscape and the active landmines left behind by Argentine forces during the conflict 30 years ago – a far from positive legacy to the islands.(30)
…And The Imagined.
Benedict Andersonʼs ʻimagined communitiesʼ is relevant when considering the aforementioned disconnect between the reality of the Islands and the ʻeverymanʼ Argentinean or Briton. Whilst some aspects of ʻbanal nationalismʼ are more effective (and affective) than others, in truth most citizens of either nation-state will never visit the islands, thus a sense of connectedness has to be ʻimaginedʼ or ʻinventedʼ in order to maintain the relevance of the issue. Some examples to this end have already been given such as language, gendering, place names and ceremonies. However, thus far neither hot nor banal nationalism has fully explained the perpetuation of these symbols and their assumed ʻnaturalnessʼ – both overt and unconscious displays of national identity have varied absorption and reaction depending on spatial and temporal geographies.
Anderson argues that after the French Revolution the ʻnationʼ transformed into an ʻinventionʼ widely available for any prospective nation.(31) Indeed, Argentinaʼs transformation to a liberal democracy, and more importantly its past as a Spanish colony, could be said to involve much of this ʻinventednessʼ and the island dispute is ostensibly a significant factor in the full realization of a truly Argentinean national identity. Carlos Escudé argues that the remaining territorial nationalism in Spanish-speaking countries is a hindrance in regional and international cooperation and integration, citing the ʻindoctrination of public opinion through the educational systems and the mass mediaʼ.(32) He continues that ʻthe educational system appears to have been successful in the dissemination of the myth of Argentine territorial lossesʼ.(33) Boyce also states that ʻBritish children were not taught (as were Argentine children) that the islands were rightfully theirsʼ.(34)
Vicente Palermo argues that the island dispute is ʻdivisive and polarising [sic]ʼ; its place at the forefront of Argentine foreign policy affects its external relations and its ʻthinkingʼ. Thus, Argentina is reacting to the continuation of the dispute in its present democratic format with policy that affects the construction and reconstruction of national identity. ʻReconstructionʼ indicates that national identity is constantly morphing and shifting in line with domestic, regional and international landscapes. As Escudé states, in the national imagining, the historically derived perceptions of territorial losses created sensitivities which escalated ʻgrotesquely unimportant issues, preventing a much needed economic integration [and contributed] to push Argentina into a ludicrous, unwinnable and criminal war in 1982.ʼ(35)
In contrast, British national identity is constructed and ʻimaginedʼ by maintaining the rhetoric of self-determination for the Islanders, and is thus also ʻinventedʼ (in this case) in reaction to the dispute. It is considered a noble cause to defend the rights of a people faced with territorial expansionists whose cartographic policy continually draws and redraws their habitat in ever-encroaching boundaries.(36) At the same time, whilst it is appealing to perpetuate British national identity as a champion of democracy, it is constructed with the same pride, tantamount to pigheadedness, seen in the Argentine constitutional governmentʼs unwillingness to approach a negotiation that both would consider a capitulation.
Conclusion
In summary, Argentine national identity has undergone major shifts in the past 30 years through changing governments and economic situations. Whilst asserting its claim as a liberal democracy through the United Nations, Argentina continues to display quite ʻhotʼ forms of nationalism which have the potential to cascade to future generations who inherit the conflict. However, as shown, the potential for this to occur depends on geographies and individual affiliations – the assumed ʻnaturalnessʼ of banal references to the Malvinas in the Argentinean ʻimaginingʼ have varying levels of absorption across different demographics.
British national identity is similarly framed upon its history as a colonial Empire, seen in the light of global decolonization and the increasing role of the United Nations as an extremely negative legacy for which it must atone. Thus, national identity rebounds and reacts to the dispute, Britain assumes the role of defender of a weak island populace and its right to choose sovereignty, turning the conflict on its head and returning the colonialist accusation to its Argentinean opposition. The current domestic situation in both nationstates reflects their need to perpetuate the sovereignty dispute – President Kircher is being forced to implement the first budget cuts that a Peronist government has ever had to do, as well as maintaining the status quo stance on non-capitulation to territorial claims to avoid the self-perpetuating sense of national ʻincompletenessʼ whilst contending with the cultural disconnect between Islanders and Argentines. British national identity is imagined and reinforced in relation to its domestic economic and identity crises, but more importantly, this identity is created and reinforced through reminders of ethnic, cultural and linguistic similarities with the Falklanders in order to bridge the geographic distance that creates a disconnect between the Islanders and Britons on the mainland.
In short, both national identities derive characteristics from their own histories as well as their interactions with each other in the the perpetuation of the conflict. Nationalist fervor in both nation-states varies in strength depending on domestic and international climates, but both perspectives on the islands are ʻimaginedʼ to create a sense of connectedness, and justification for claims to the Falklands/Malvinas.
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Endnotes
1 Renan (1990) p.11
2 Beckett (2012)
3 Ibid.
4 Ozkirimli (2005) p.18
5 Penrose in Jackson & Penrose (eds.) (1993) p.29
6 Mohan (1999) p.28
7 Gellner (2006) pp.6-7
8 Boyce (2005) p.3
9 Gellner (2006) p.6
10 Smith (2004) p.198
11 Walker Connor cited in Ibid. p.200
12 Smith (1991) p.9
13 Hobson (2003) p.146 emphasis added
14 Benwell & Dodds (2011) p.442
15 Ibid. p.445-446
16 UN (Dec 1960)
17 UN (Dec 1965)
18 House of Commons (2012)
19 Boyce (2005) p.11
20 Watt (2012)
21 Mohan (1999) p.29
22 Jenkins (2012)
23 Weaver (2010)
24 Benwell & Dodds (2012)
25 Watt (2012)
26 Escudé (1988) p.164
27 Hobson (2003) p.162
28 Boyce (2005) p.4
29 Goni (2012)
30 First citation Benwell & Dodds (2012) p.446, thereafter Goni (2012)
31 Anderson (1991) p.67
32 Escudé (1988) p.139
33 Ibid. p.157
34 Boyce (2005) p.6
35 Escudé (1988) p.152
36 Ibid. p.160
Bibliography
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London & New York: Verso [rev. ed.] 1991 [1983])
James Aulich (ed.), Framing the Falklands War: Nationhood, Culture and Identity (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1992)
Roland Barthes, Mythologies (Paris: Seuil,1957)
Matthew C. Benwell & Klaus Dodds, ʻArgentine territorial nationalism revisited: The Malvinas/Falklands dispute and geographies of everyday nationalismʼ, Political Geography, Vo. 30 (2011), pp. 441 – 449
Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London, California & New Delhi: Sage, 2002 [1995])
D. George Boyce, The Falklands War, (Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2005)
John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State [2nd ed.] (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 1993)
Peter Calvert, Border and Territorial Disputes of the World 4th edition (London: John Harper, 2004)
Peter Calvert, ʻSovereignty and the Falklands Crisisʼ, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs), Vol. 59, No. 3 (Summer 1983), pp. 405 – 413
Carlos Escudé, ʻArgentine territorial nationalismʼ, Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1988), pp. 139 – 165
Kevin Foster, Fighting Fictions: war, narrative and national identity (Cambridge: Pluto Press, 1999)
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism [2nd ed.] (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006 [1983])
Uki Goni, ʻʻThe Falklanders eat fish and chips. How can they belong to Argentina?ʼʼ, The Guardian, (January 28th 2012)
Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 [1983])
House of Commons, Daily Hansard Commons Debates: Falkland Islands, (January 31st 2012)
John Mohan, A United Kingdom? Economic, Social and Political Geographies, (London: Arnold, 1999)
Vicente Palermo, ʻFalklands/Malvinas: In Search of Common Groundʼ, Political Insight, (April 2012)
Ernest Renan, ‘What is a Nation?’ (translated by M. Thom), in Homi Bhabha (ed.), Nation and Narration, (London: Routledge, 1990 [1882]), pp. 8 – 22
Stephen A. Royle, ʻPostcolonial Culture on Dependent Islandsʼ, Space and Culture, Vol. 13, No. 2, (2010) pp. 203 – 215
Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, (London: Penguin, 1991)
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 1514 (XV) – ʻDeclaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoplesʼ, (December 14th 1960 – 15th Session)
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 2065 (XX) – ʻQuestion of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)ʼ, (December 16th 1965 – 20th Session)
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